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Abstract 
This thesis is about the ways in which mad people are excluded from the 
decisions reached about their lives. It uses Niklas Luhmann's theory of social 
systems to explain and describe why this exclusion arises. 
Luhmann defined social systems as structured around specific social 
codes, and comprised of the communications relating to that code. This thesis 
asks how the phenomenon of madness can be understood within this 
framework and argues that mad utterances are statements or acts which 
cannot be parsed according to any existing system of social or interpersonal 
meaning. The psy-disciplines transform these uncertain acts into stable 
meaning by defining them within a functionalist or pathological framework. 
These meanings are fragile because the operations of the psyche are socially 
invisible and so mad utterances have to be defined in relation to existing social 
systems of meaning. Mad utterances therefore generate uncertainty, which 
leads systems such as law and the economy to over-react to madness and 
discredit to a disproportionate degree what mad people have to say. 
The discreditation of mad people is problematic because it limits their 
personal autonomy. The ways in which systems exclude mad people, even 
when their stated objective is to promote their inclusion, is illustrated by the 
research literature on involvement in healthcare decision-making. The law 
plays a particular role in sustaining discreditable assumptions about mad 
people, and this is evidenced by a close examination of the research literature 
and case law relating to the Mental Health Review Tribunal in England and 
Wales. 
Luhmann's systems theory is not normative, so no clear normative 
agenda for change can be adduced from this description alone. Instead, this 
account offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand some 
of the shortcomings of mental health law, which is of particular relevance now 
that the involvement of mad people in decision-making them has been firmly 
placed on the legal and political agendas. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This is a thesis about the exclusion of mad people from the decisions made 
about their lives. It explores why the mad person remains "the outsider par 
excellence" (Foucault 2006a p. 183) despite the best efforts of committed 
activists, practitioners and researchers to change this status. 
My interest in this conundrum arose when I was working as a lay 
mental health advocate. Many of my clients described feeling that they were 
not listened to at meetings where their health and welfare were discussed. 
They felt they were not seen as experts on their own lives. Even those people 
who felt the practitioners they encountered were `good listeners' were anxious 
because they felt these relationships were fragile. If they were not able to 
rapidly reach agreement on an issue, it would be their view which was 
overridden, not that of the practitioner. Many of them saw their advocate as 
someone who could help amplify what they themselves were saying, and yet all 
of them were people who were physically and mentally capable of speaking up 
on their own behalf. Sometimes the substance of what they said might be 
challenging, but it was rare for me to encounter a client who said things which 
were wholly unreasonable. 
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At the same time, I saw that many of the practitioners I met were 
deeply committed and compassionate. Despite scarce resources and heavy 
workloads I saw many instances of social workers, psychiatric nurses, 
psychiatrists and others going out of their way to treat their clients with 
respect and to make time to listen to them. Finally, I noted that our advocacy 
service was massively ineffective. Despite obtaining high quality legal advice 
and representation none of my clients ever won any dispute. We lost Mental 
Health Review Tribunals, Housing and Council Tax Benefit Appeals, Welfare 
Benefits Tribunals, Housing Appeals, Employment Tribunals and Family 
Court hearings. 
Taken together, these facts suggested to me that there was a need for 
an underlying structural explanation which could account for both the anxiety 
my clients felt about being discredited, and the high degree of discreditation 
they suffered in practice. I recognised that attitudes alone did not provide an 
explanation because the attitudes of many of the decision-makers involved 
were impeccable. Instead, I wondered if the imperatives of social systems such 
as the law and the economy might account for this phenomenon. 
So this thesis employs Niklas Luhmann's highly distinctive theoretical 
account of the interactions of social systems to explain the discreditation of 
madness and to describe some of the implications of this discreditation. It 
argues that madness takes the form of utterances that cannot readily be 
comprehended by others and because these problems of comprehension are so 
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threatening to social systems of meaning, the things mad people say which are 
not mad are disproportionately discredited. Disciplines such as psychiatry, 
psychology and psychiatric nursing attempt to engage meaningfully and 
therapeutically with madness. Problems with discreditation arise when the 
specific knowledge of these disciplines is translated into legal, political and 
economic distinctions. 
1.1.2 Thesis outline 
Law and policy on mental health service provision emphasise the importance 
of promoting the involvement of the service user in decision-making. At the 
same time, empirical evidence demonstrates that people with mental health 
needs typically retain the capacity to make decisions about their lives and 
survey data into the attitudes of healthcare professionals suggest that most of 
them also support the involvement of service users in decision-making. 
Nevertheless service users report high-levels of exclusion from decision-making, 
and the legal system has been an imperfect ally in promoting the rights of 
people with mental health needs to have a greater say in their own lives. This 
thesis attempts to explain this problematic disjuncture between policy and 
evidence. 
I start by exploring how the social phenomenon of madness looks 
different when viewed from the perspective of social systems theory. So this 
Introduction will outline how social systems theory describes society as 
3 
comprised of a variety of functionally differentiated subsystems of meaning, 
including the legal, economic and political systems. Chapter Two examines 
how madness can be understood as consisting of utterances or acts which lack 
a specific meaning referent and therefore cannot be made sense of either within 
the operations of social systems, or more locally within the operations of 
interaction systems such as the family. Chapter Three describes the operations 
of the psy-disciplines as unified around a distinction between madness and 
sanity and asks what functions this system of knowledge of madness is able to 
perform for society. Chapter Four then looks beyond madness and the psy- 
system to the operations of other systems such as the law and economy and 
asks why these systems may be motivated to exclude mad utterances from 
their operations to the greatest degree possible. I argue that the function 
which the distinction disdain/esteem performs within interaction systems such 
as local communities is mirrored in the function which the distinction 
discreditation/accreditation performs for social systems. Social systems 
discredit and accredit utterances in order to maintain their boundaries, and to 
ensure that they can continue to apply their own internal code effectively. 
One of the criticisms which has been levelled at systems theory is 
that far from being a sociological description of modern societies, it is in fact 
"not sociological enough" (Cotterrell 2003 p. 250). This is certainly a fair 
criticism of Luhmann's own work, which tends to describe social trends in 
general rather than specific terms and relies primarily on secondary literature 
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as a source for claims about social change. It is also true, to a more limited 
extent, of much of the literature which has attempted to employ systems 
theory within socio-legal research. There are some exceptions, Paterson's work 
on the regulation of the offshore oil and gas industries is based upon extensive 
empirical study (Paterson 2000) and King and Piper's work on the law 
relating to welfare of children draws systematically and exhaustively on the 
large empirical literature on the work of child welfare services and the family 
courts (King and Piper 1995). This thesis explores how the impact of the 
meaninglessness of madness can be used to explain the shortcomings of policy 
and legal interventions intended to afford mad people a greater say in the 
decisions which affect their lives. Chapter Five looks at the research literature 
on mental health service user involvement in decision making and argues that 
the difficulties of promoting involvement can be understood as resulting from 
the ease with which social systems discredit mad people. The problem of 
discreditation is compounded by the difficulties of constructing a positive 
social identity around madness and the weakness of social knowledge of 
madness. Chapter Six then looks at how the legal system responds to what 
mad people have to say about their care. Using the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal as a case study, it argues that the legal system systematically 
privileges psy-system accounts of the individual over the individual's self- 
understanding, not as a result of bigotry but simply because of anxiety about 
the uncertainty madness generates around social meaning. 
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In conclusion, Chapter Seven summarises some of the strengths and 
some of the limitations of the systems theoretical approach and argues that 
the theory provides a provocative lens through which to view developments in 
mental health law and policy. 
1.2 What [some] mad people have to say... ' 
Systems theory does not provide a grounded or bottom-up account of 
individual experiences. It has been criticised for offering an excessively 
complex top-down description of society which supplants people's own self- 
understanding of their situation (Flood 2005). This is a significant criticism 
and one which will be engaged with in this chapter (pp. 46-51). But the 
observations I made above about the degree of exclusion and discreditation 
mad people experience are consistent with the personal accounts they provide 
of their treatment by mental health services. Research has demonstrated that 
A note on term: as the next two chapters will make clear it is a central contention of this 
thesis that the category of `mad' is socially constructed and therefore always contingent. Terms 
for madness which imply a pathological categorisation such as mental illness have been avoided 
throughout this thesis. Instead I have used the terms `mad people' and `mad person' to denote 
people who are perceived to be distinguishable on the basis of their madness. When talking 
specifically about the delivery of mental health care I have used the term `service user' to refer 
to the subset of mad people who use mental health services. 
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mad people's views on services are typically heterogeneous (Lammers and 
Happell 2003) and that as a result attempting to adequately summarise the 
likely views of service users based on a few personal accounts is essentially 
futile. The accounts quoted here are not intended to provide an aggregate 
picture of mad people's views. Instead, they demonstrate that both individual 
experiences and understanding of madness are diverse, with mad people 
expressing views which range from the radical to the conservative, the critical 
to the accepting and the political to the spiritual: 
"They treated me as though I was ill, so I became more passive. Part 
of being a patient is to expect a cure... it is not surprising that people 
take on this state of mind, expecting the next drug to be a cure, that 
doctors know best. It takes away one's initiative and the search for 
other, human action-based solutions. " (Lindow 1995) 
"I thought I'd cracked the system. I laugh now, painfully. The system 
well and truly cracked me. The freedom I had found for six short weeks 
was now over. Everything I had felt, loved, over that time, I was told 
was 'all a delusion'. Time to conform. " (Shaughnessy 2000) 
"I hated the regimentation, the requirement that I take drugs that 
slowed my body and my mind 
... 
Aly only aim during my two month stay 
in hospital was to get out... At the same time I was consumed with the 
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clear conviction that there was something fundamentally wrong here. 
Who were these people who had taken such control of our lives? Why 
were they the experts on what we should do, how we should live? Why 
was the ugliness, and even the brutality, of what was happening to us 
overlooked and ignored? " (Chamberlin 1998, original emphasis) 
Vivien Lindow, Peter Shaughnessy and Judi Chamberlin describe how the 
mere fact of being an inpatient took away their right to claim knowledge of 
themselves or how best they should be treated. However, the substituted 
rationality of the medical system did not offer a desirable alternative; the 
diagnoses and treatment they received replaced action, initiative, love, 
spontaneity and vigour with control, conformity, regimentation, ugliness and 
brutality. However, medical labels are not always rejected, and some people 
find them reassuring. Esther Freud writes about her anxieties on seeing a 
therapist after an unexplained crisis: 
"`But what happened on the bus... ' I tried to explain the drowning. 
`A normal panic attack, ' he assured me and I almost laughed, normal, 
normal... 
`So you don't think I'm beyond hope? ' And he smiled with me and said 
I was going to be alright. " (Freud 1996) 
Some mad people both accept the medical account of madness and 
argue that normalising the experience of mental distress and treating mad 
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people as if they had a physical illness would reduce the disempowerment and 
stigma they experience. 
"To clear up stigma we have to recognise that madness is just another 
illness, one that should inspire compassion and not ridicule. We have 
to show that it is 90% curable. And it could happen to anyone. It 
makes a marvellous plot for plays and films, but it is not different to 
sciatica and lumbago. " (Jameson 2004) 
"With my rheumatologist and my lung doctor... I am a full partner in 
my own treatment and recovery. I am consulted, listened to, and given 
the information I need to make informed choices. " (Chamberlin 1998) 
As an alternative to medical accounts of mental distress some service user 
advocates have argued for a social model to be employed instead. Rather than 
seeing such symptoms as innate problems they argue that mental distress is 
made problematic by the attitudes of the wider community and that it is the 
community which needs to change not the individual if the suffering and social 
exclusion associated with mental distress is to be eliminated (Sayce 2000 
pp. 133-139). Sometimes it is not the illness a person has but their use of 
mental health services which takes away their social standing. 
"I have a neighbour who used to run inside when she saw me and now 
ignores me. She will have seen dramatic incidents such as me being 
taken to hospital by the police when I was very ill. " (Antoniou 2004) 
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Even professionals who might be expected to know better make assumptions 
about the likely status of people with mental health needs: 
"When I first decided to become active in the consumer movement, to 
speak out and stand up, to be counted, I was very apprehensive and 
unsure. My first experience of public speaking, following becoming ill, 
was at a conference attended by psychiatrists, psychologists and 
lawyers... The organisers of the conference included me in the program 
as Dr Helen Connor, Psychiatrist. When I attempted to correct this 
the conference organiser said `But of course you are a psychiatrist, 
look at the quality of your paper; well you must be a clinical 
psychologist then, a consumer wouldn't have written that paper'. That 
hurt me deeply. " (Connor 1999) 
Finally, some service users actively seek out alternative and individual 
explanations of their distress, which they feel valorise aspects of their 
experiences which are excluded from medical and sociological accounts of 
illness. Rosalind Caplin, for example, describes how she valued the approach 
taken by a homeopath she consulted: 
"My label was not considered in the remedy 
- 
which was given on the 
basis of my overall personal makeup, my emotional, physical and 
energy states at the time. I was treated as an individual 
-a response 
10 
far removed from the psychiatric one, which still considered me to be 
abnormal. " (Caplin 2000) 
Other social factors which service users have identified as formative in their 
experiences of mental distress include racism and gender bias from within the 
community and within the `system'. Veronica Dewan, for example, writes 
about how her suicide attempts as an adolescent were in part triggered by the 
identity crisis she felt as the child of an Indian father and Irish mother 
growing up in an Irish family (who had adopted her) in England. This feeling 
of lacking an identity and its impact upon her were compounded by the 
insensitivity of her local hospital when she arrived there asking for help: 
"Back at APiE reception they ask you lots of questions... `Ethnic 
background? ' Why? I have to tell someone 
-I don't know how to 
explain. Well, I was born here. He keeps staring at me. `I'm British. ' 
He taps his pen on the desk. ` Where are your parents from? ' he insists. 
Which parents, which ones? English and Irish, Irish and Indian. 
Where are your parents from originally? ' `I'm mixed Irish and 
Indian. ' `Indian 
- 
that's what I thought', he snaps and ticks the box for 
Asians. But I'm 
- 
it's just that 
- 
oh what's the point? " (Dewan 2000) 
Despite the significance of these self-understandings, many mad people 
recount how they do not feel that the system empowers them to introduce 
their own perspectives on their care into decision-making processes: 
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"At the end of the section my consultant... said to me `Your girlfriend 
visits too much, it's bad for you. ' I had to bite my tongue 
- 
I'm still on 
a section. He said to me, When you are in hospital you complain a 
lot. ' 
'Yeah, that's right, ' I said. 
`Complaining is a symptom of your illness. Next time you come in, 
we'll ignore them. '" (Shaughnessy 2000) 
Shaughnessy's description of how his attempts to influence the care lie 
received in hospital were in turn pathologised and thus defused are 
acknowledged in research into user involvement (Barnes 1995, Rose 2001, 
Hodge 2005) but rarely expressed so clearly. In addition he raises the issue of 
how his legal status further disempowers him; being on a section means that 
he is not in a position to disagree with this analysis. Christine McIntosh also 
argues that rights to information are a prerequisite for patients wishing to 
challenges decisions reached upon their behalf: 
"... after much soul searching, I consulted a lawyer and was shocked to 
discover that nowhere in law does it state that a patient has a 
categorical right to be informed of their diagnosis... I have little recourse 
against the very people who were supposed to look after my mental 
welfare. I would happily trade the empty Patient's Charter for a few 
basic civil rights. " (McIntosh 2000) 
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Rachel Perkins makes the further point that she needed information in order 
to make treatment choices not only as an empowerment strategy but because 
without it she couldn't be an active participant in her treatment or reduce the 
risks associated with ECT: 
"... this was brought home to me when the consultant psychiatrist with 
whom I work asked me questions like What equipment did they use? ', 
`How many volts? ', `What anaesthetic? ', What seizure length? '. My 
rather pathetic answer 
- 
`I don't know' was greeted with the response: 
Why ever not? I bet you know the name of the medication you're 
taking'... I have worked in mental health for many years and I did not 
know these things. It transpires that they are important questions 
especially for women. " (Perkins 2000) 
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1.3 The voice of the service user in law and policy 
1.3.1 Service user involvement policy in England and 
Wales2 
One reason why these accounts of feeling excluded from decision-making 
should be surprising is that involving people in the decisions made about their 
healthcare and treatment is a central objective of current healthcare policy in 
England and 'Vales. Guidance on the delivery of care to people with mental 
health needs describes patient involvement as playing a primary role in 
ensuring better treatment outcomes (Department of Health (DH) 1999a, DH 
2008a). However, the meanings attached to the term `involvement' in research 
findings on the effectiveness of involvement as a strategy are diverse and 
confusing. Both professionals and service users have been actively involved in 
researching service user involvement, sometimes to determine the significance 
2 Another note on terms: the terms `user participation' and `user involvement' are used largely 
interchangeably in the research literature in this area. Whilst some authors would imply that 
the two terms connote very different things (Arnstein 1969, Chamberlin 1988) the distinction 
between the two terms is not observed consistently. The term favoured in English and Welsh 
policy-making is user involvement, and so for ease of reference that will be the term employed 
here. 
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of involvement for professional practice (Anthony and Crawford 2000, 
Summers 2003), sometimes to highlight the lack of `real' involvement for some 
service users (Peck et al. 2002, Langan and Lindow 2004, Hodge 2005a) and 
sometimes to develop a better understanding of related topics, such as the 
origins of social movements (Crossley 1999) or the impact of consumer models 
on health service provision (Barnes and Prior 1995). As a result it is not easy 
to summarise what is known about service user involvement since knowledge 
in this area is locally situated and contingent. However, the very fact that 
involvement is seen as a distinct phenomenon and worthy of study is 
interesting. People who use mental health services are inextricably involved in 
their delivery: services could not be offered if there were not individuals there 
to receive them. The phenomenon being described must be something beyond 
the unremarkable degree of involvement implicit in simply receiving care and 
treatment. This new `involvement' must presumably be intended to change the 
existing possibilities for communication within mental health settings, since 
otherwise no new policy making would be required. 
The bulk of references to service user involvement as a principle are 
contained within national non-statutory regulations and policy documents. 
There are also references to involvement as a practice in some guidance 
documents published by international bodies including the World Health 
Organisation and the Council of Europe. However, summarising the law on 
service user involvement in personal care planning is simple. The law requires 
15 
the consent of patients for decisions relating to medical care and treatment 
but does not expand on the requirement for consent to specify any particular 
form of involvement in the decision reached. Mental health legislation in 
England and Vales has historically been preoccupied with delivering 
procedural justice to those subject to compulsory powers, and has avoided 
addressing the more thorny issues of what mental health professionals might 
be expected to do to ensure that service users feel meaningfully involved in 
decisions about care. Since the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) is primarily 
concerned with determining when the involuntary detention and treatment of 
individuals in hospital may be lawful it is perhaps not surprising that it 
originally omitted any reference to involving the service user in decision 
making. Its operating assumption is that ordinarily service users will be able to 
decide when they want care and treatment and that in those circumstances 
they should be treated as identical in terms of rights to those using somatic 
Health services. 
Tile expert committee convened to review the Mental Health Act 
agreed with the view that the role of compulsory powers under statute should 
be essentially residual, with the ordinary assumption being that treatment 
decisions will be made outside of the law and on the basis of consent (DH 
1999b). They recommended that the right to participation in assessment, care 
planning and treatment should be one of a number of general principles given 
an elevated status in any new legislation, but they make clear that they do not 
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intend these principles to be interpreted as enforceable rights for service users. 
The Government White Paper on `Reform of the Mental Health Act 1983' 
(DH and Home Office 1999) did not accept the need for these general 
principles, although it did assert that it was government policy to promote 
involvement of service users and carers though other policy initiatives 
(presumably the National Service Framework for Mental Health (DII 1999a) 
and the revised guidance on the CPA (DH 1999c)). The final outcome of these 
lengthy debates over mental health legislation for England and `Vales has been 
the introduction of a short act to amend existing legislation. The new Mental 
Health Act 2007 does not contain a statement of principles, but S. 8(2)a of the 
Mental Health Act 2007 requires that the Secretary of State include a 
statement of fundamental principles within the Mental Health Act Code of 
Practice and s. 8 (2)b states that: 
"In preparing the statement of principles the Secretary of State shall, 
in particular, ensure that each of the following matters is addressed- 
(a) respect for patients' past and present wishes and feelings, 
[and] 
(d) involvement of patients in planning, developing and delivering care 
and treatment appropriate to them, " 
The latest version of the Code of Practice accordingly includes involvement 
under the banner of the `participation principle' (DH 2008b para. 1.5). 
However, the significance of references to involvement in this and other soft- 
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law sources has not yet been given any attention by the courts. This is 
perhaps not surprising given the legal status of the Code of Practice. In a 
recent decision on the legal status of the Code of Practice a majority of the 
House of Lords held that the Code could not be departed from unless there 
were cogent reasons for doing so (R (Munjaz) v. Ashworth Hospital Authority 
[2005J). But in the case in question (which concerned the application of a 
seclusion policy within one hospital which was wildly at odds with that 
prescribed nationally in the Code of Practice), the fact that medical opinion at 
that hospital favoured not applying the Code justified the hospital's decision 
to apply a different policy. In other words, the Code must be adhered to unless 
the patient's doctor favours not applying the Code. The weak status of such 
regulatory documents means that a service user who wished to contest her 
exclusion from decision-making might well be advised that she did not have a 
case. It might also be the case that given the conceptual uncertainty attached 
to the term involvement, any right to it as such would not make a radical 
difference to service users. 
Elsewhere, legislation has been used to ensure that health service 
providers have a duty to promote community participation in decisions 
relating to service planning and delivery (i. e. beyond merely personal care 
planning). However, the history of legal reforms in this area has been 
chequered. S. 11 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001 provides that 
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`It is the duty of every body to which this section applies to make 
arrangements with a view to securing, as respects health services for 
which it is responsible, that persons to whom these services are being 
or may be provided are, directly or through representatives, involved 
and consulted on: 
(a) the planning of the provision of these services 
(b) the development and consideration of proposals for changes in 
the way those services are provided, and 
(c) decisions to be made by that body affecting the operation of 
those services. " 
The following year, s. 20 of the NHS Reform and Healthcare Professionals Act 
2002 required the Secretary of State for Health to establish a Commission for 
Public and Patient Involvement in Health (CPPIH) (this section was further 
amended by s. 32 by the Health and Social Care Commission Healthcare and 
Standards Act 2003). The CPPIII was intended to coordinate the creation of 
patient and public forums in NIlS Trusts around the country and to evaluate 
their performance. But in June 2004, after a review of spending on `Anus 
Length Bodies' across government it was decided to amend primary 
legislation, abolish the CPPIH and create a new Patient and Public 
Involvement Resource Centre which would be privately run but managed by 
the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement. A new non-statutory 
'NHS Centre for Involvement' which operates independently but under the 
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auspices of the NHS was founded to replace the CPPIH in 2007. The CPPIH 
had been instrumental in ensuring that every health trust in England and 
Vales had a Patients Forum (PPI). However, these forums have in turn been 
dissolved and replaced with Local Involvement Networks (LINks) under Part 
14 of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. The 
continual upheavals in government policy on the promotion of patient 
involvement has meant that although this strategy was first outlined in the 
NHS Plan (DH 2000), it is still too early to comment upon what effects it is 
having on service delivery on the ground. 
LINks cover the same geographical areas as local authorities but must 
be hosted by an organisation independent of both the local authority and the 
NIlS. They are intended to work on both health and social care delivery, 
unlike the old Patients Forums. Many of them have connections to non- 
statutory public consultation forums, such as those set up expressly by or for 
service users. However, the degree of active involvement in service planning 
they undertake is likely to be dependant both on local membership and the 
relationship they have with health service providers. Although research into 
these forums has not yet been conducted, the potential vulnerability to service 
provider control of existing consultation bodies has been demonstrated in a 
number of research studies (Pilgrim and Waldron 1998, Peck et al. 2002, 
Diamond et al. 2003, Rutter et al. 2004, Hodge 2005a). 
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The provisions of the Health and Social Care Act 2001 provide an 
example of what seems to be a slightly paradoxical state of affairs. The 
complexities of securing effective involvement at the service planning level 
would seem to be far greater than those involved in promoting involvement as 
a matter of policy (not just practice) at the personal level, and yet in national 
policy terms it is the latter not the former which has been neglected. Some of 
the historical and political reasons for this will be discussed in greater detail 
later on. It is notable that in the most recent NHS Plan, commitments are 
made to increasing the role service users play in making treatment choices and 
increasing the say service users have in planning services at all levels of 
delivery (DH 2000). However, a specific reference to involving people with 
mental health needs is only made once: the Plan comments that service user 
involvement forums should draw on the experience of specialist advocacy 
organisations in working with people with mental health needs. It is not 
suggested that specialist external advice should be sought before working with 
any other category of service users. The Department of Health also 
commissioned 12 research studies to look at the practice of increasing public 
involvement in health service planning. Not one of these studies looked at 
involvement in the context of mental health services and the subsequent 
report contains no references to mental health service provision (DH 2004). 
This would tend to support the view that policy makers have sometimes failed 
to exclude mental health service users from the new consumer led agenda in 
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the health service rather than chosen to include them. Mental health service 
users have not even been an afterthought, which is why no attention appears 
to have been paid to the question of how such choices could be exercised 
within a context of potential compulsory treatment, growing public anxiety 
about violence and the increasing use of extra legal coercion within specialist 
mental health services to ensure treatment compliance. 
References to involvement in personal care planning and in service 
planning are also sparse when one looks specifically at mental health policy 
documents. However, Standard 4 of the National Service Framework for 
Mental Health, which relates to care planning and delivery, states that: 
"When service users are involved in agreeing and reviewing the [care] 
plan, the quality of care improves, and their satisfaction with services 
increases. " (DH 1999a) 
And the latest guidance given by the Department of Health on care planning 
in mental health also states that: 
"... service users and their carers are partners in the planning, 
development and delivery of their care [and] need to be fully involved in 
the process from the start... Service users will only be engaged if the 
care planning process is meaningful to them, and their input is 
genuinely recognised, so that their choices are respected. " (DH 2008aß, )
It seems fairly clear then, that involvement is something that the Department 
of Health thinks mental health professionals and service providers should 
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aspire to. However, as Chapter Five will outline, realising these aspirations has 
proven difficult in practice, and this may be linked to the fact that whilst 
involvement is widely endorsed, the reasons for involving service users are 
rarely explained. 
1.3.2 Involvement in international law and policy 
Involvement is also mentioned in a variety of documents addressing the rights 
of mad people that have been produced by international bodies including the 
United Nations, European Union and the World Health Organisation. Since 
the European Convention on Human Rights forms a justiciable part of English 
law, it is the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
that might be expected to have the greatest impact upon the rights of mad 
people. However, the ECIIR case law on the rights of mental health service 
users has been, if anything, even more preoccupied with procedural justice 
than the national law. Commentators have noted that in many of the key 
cases relating to the rights of people with mental health needs including 
Winterwerp v Netherlands 119791 and Herczegfalvy v. Austria 1993], the 
European Court has skirted round many substantive issues whilst reinforcing 
the view that procedural measures alone can ensure convention compliance 
(Fennell 2005, Richardson 2005, Bartlett et al. 2007 p. 18). Although the 
jurisprudence does not deal directly with the issue of involvement, the issue of 
this focus on procedural justice is important because it demonstrates why a 
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right to involvement, even if it existed, might lack any teeth. Bartlett and 
Sandland (2007) suggest that the rulings in R (Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor and 
MIIA SOAD [2002] and R (Wooder) v. Feggetter and MHAC 20021 may 
reflect a shift in the approach taken by judges in the English courts to cases in 
which the application is a mental health service user. Both cases, however, 
involved issues of traditional procedural justice, and they only suggest that the 
courts may take a marginally more creative approach to determining issues of 
administrative law in light of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). It has not 
been suggested anywhere that that HRA requires that the views of the service 
user be given greater weight. 
Fennell (2005) takes a gloomier view. He suggests that the `new human 
rights agenda' has been used to emphasise the role of government in 
promoting the Art 2. right to life and therefore having a duty to protect the 
public from harm at the hands of mad people and this has been at the expense 
of service user's rights not to be arbitrarily detained or treated. In this respect, 
the PIRA may have even set back the agenda to promote rights for service 
users to participation and autonomy. Richardson (2005) suggests a number of 
directions which the courts could take in extending the reach of convention 
rights beyond process, although she concludes that in most respects the 
approach of the English courts to date has been disappointingly narrow. 
The Council of Europe has however, made a recommendation on the 
`Protection of the Human Rights and Dignity of Persons with Mental 
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Disorder' (CoE 2004) which includes as a general principle the requirement 
that where possible individuals should be consulted on their treatment plan 
(Art. 12.1). These guidelines are not intended to have binding effects on 
member states and the UK is, in any event, not a signatory to the 
Recommendation. Current English mental health law does not comply with a 
number of the principles in the Recommendation, including the requirement 
that a capacity based test be used to determine whether or not treatment 
without consent is lawful (Art. 12.2) and the requirement that decisions on 
compulsory admission to hospital be made by a court or other competent body 
(Art 20.2). Despite the fact that the Recommendation pays much greater 
attention to substantive issues around the practices of mental health 
professionals than the case law of the ECIIR it nevertheless continues to pay 
considerable attention to issues of process which perhaps reflect the largely 
legal and judicial capacities of this organisation. 
It is clear that the primary objectives of an organisation affect the way 
in which they conceptualise involvement. The European Union, for example, 
wants to establish an EU-wide strategy to improve mental health. They 
perceive the economic impact of mental illness in particular as a growing 
problem for member states. Their green paper on `Improving the Mental 
Health of the Population' (European Commission 2005) strongly advocates 
public involvement in redesigning mental health services and reforming policy 
in order to increase the efficiency of such services. The World Health 
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Organisation in its 2001 World Health Report focussed on mental health and 
made 10 recommendations to countries around the world on how to improve 
mental health in their populations (WHO 2001 pg. 110-2). Recommendation 5 
was that policy makers should `Involve communities, families and consumers'. 
The report argues that this should improve services and ensure that they are 
better suited to the needs of the community. This echoes the statement on 
involvement made in the National Service Framework for Mental Health 
(1999a) but no supporting evidence for this claim is cited. 
The United Nations in their "Principles for the Protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness" (High Commission for Human Rights 1991) state that 
"The treatment and care of every patient shall be based on an individually 
prescribed plan, discussed with the patient, " (Principle 9.2) and that patients 
shall be "involved as far as practicable in the development of the treatment 
plan. " (Principle 11.9). These principles cannot be enforced by individuals, 
and, unlike other similar documents, there is no body charged with monitoring 
their implementation. Their use as a tool for advocates and individual service 
users is therefore limited (Rosenthal and Rubenstein 1993). Gendreau (1997) 
points out that the Principles, rather than reinforcing the rights of people with 
mental health needs to non-discrimination, instead delineate when such 
discrimination is acceptable; in the process they make such discrimination 
easier for states to justify. In an analysis which bears some similarity to that 
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of Fennell cited above she asks: "Is this the unavoidable effect of the explicit 
recognition of psychiatric patients' rights at the international level? ". 
A new and hopefully less overtly discriminatory approach is adopted 
under the UN Convention on the Rights of Disabled People. The Convention 
includes mental disorder within its definition of disability for the first time, 
and places a number of obligations on state parties to work towards securing 
positive social inclusion for disabled people. Significantly, it places considerable 
emphasis upon participation, and creates specific rights to participation in 
political and public life (Art. 29) and participation in cultural life (Art. 30). It 
is also the case that during the drafting of the convention considerable 
attention was paid to the views of disabled people. The Ad Hoc Committee 
appointed to draft the convention took an unprecedentedly open approach to 
promoting the involvement of civil society in its work, and placed considerable 
emphasis on the need to hear evidence from disabled people (including people 
with mental illnesses) (Light 2005). The Convention was only ratified in 
March 2007, and the United Kingdom is only a signatory to the Convention 
itself and not to the Optional Protocol which allows for individual complaints, 
so it is too early yet to assess what impact, if any, this much more robustly 
worded document will have on the right to participation enjoyed by mad 
people in England and Wales. 
It is worth noting that the WHO and EU recommendations conflate 
the roles of service users, their carers and the wider community into public 
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involvement even though their agendas may often conflict. Barnes and Bowl 
(2001 pp. 42-3) discuss the prevalence of this conceptual confusion, and suggest 
one reason for it is that, historically, carer led campaigning groups often 
presented their agendas as being identical to those of the people they care for 
in order to increase their political leverage. Similarly, the rhetoric of some 
groups campaigning on public safety issues such as the Zito Trust and SANE 
might lead people to believe that their primary concern is the promotion of 
rights for mad people. This confusion is not helpful for mad people who are 
trying to argue that they have a distinct contribution to debates about the 
services they and others receive. As a result the extent to which the 
recommendations of the WHO and EU really indicate a commitment to 
meaningful involvement for mad people is debatable. 
The extent to which individuals with mental health needs are excluded 
from the decisions made about their lives is both unsurprising and surprising. 
It is unsurprising because mad people are often assumed to be incapable of 
exercising decision making powers in their own best interests. Indeed the 
earliest legal interventions designed to protect the interests of people with 
presumed mental health needs were occasioned in part by the need to protect 
them from making poor decisions about the allocation of their property 
(Bartlett and Sandland 2007 p. 17). But empirical research conducted into the 
operation of care planning processes tends to assume that people are ordinarily 
excluded from the settings within which decisions about care are reached and 
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therefore can have little control over their outcomes (Pilgrim and Waldron 
1998, Anthony and Crawford 2000, Peck et al. 2002). It is abnormal insofar as 
mental health law typically begins with a presumption that individuals enjoy 
physical and mental autonomy, and are not merely capable but are also the 
best people to make decisions about their lives. And for many people with 
mental health needs, who have never been subject to legal compulsion of any 
sort and who have little contact with specialist mental health services, such a 
model makes sense. From this perspective, it is the legal assumption that 
people with mental health needs should not have their liberty infringed 
unnecessarily which appears innovative. 
The law, however, is an imperfect ally because the available evidence 
on involvement suggests that it is as yet imperfectly defined (see Chapter Five 
pp. 183-92) and cannot readily be reduced to the narrow set of procedural and 
substantive distinctions which the legal system is typically capable of 
observing. For example, it is notable that whilst the emergence of evidence 
based psychiatry has led to increasingly nuanced accounts of mental disorder 
(the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association (DSM IV-TR) contains considerably more diagnostic possibilities 
than those available to nineteenth century physicians), legal constructions of 
the individual with mental health needs continue to revolve around a handful 
of key attributes such as capacity and dangerousness, which are held to 
contain as much information as it is necessary for law to grasp about an 
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individual before pronouncing upon the legality of an intervention. Most of all 
the need for legal decisions to be binding over time and across cases with 
similar facts does not reflect the contingent nature of mental disorder itself. 
The contingency of mental disorders can be observed from the fact that their 
symptoms, and consequently diagnoses and treatment plans, are dynamic 
rather than static, and can change within timescales far shorter than those 
within which the law operates. But the contingency may also arise from other 
elements of the social context. Peay (2005) provides an example of this when 
describing a study of how doctors and social workers reach decisions on 
whether or not to compulsorily admit patients. They presented a group of 40 
psychiatrists with a scenario concerning a man whose mental health appeared 
to be deteriorating and found that 30 of the 40 would choose to compulsorily 
admit him. When they presented the same scenario to a group of 20 forensic 
psychiatrists they found that none of them would choose to compulsorily 
admit since they viewed the patient as a comparatively `soft case'. So decisions 
about the application of the law made by non-legal actors may be affected by 
(amongst other things) the specific expertise and experience of the person in 
question. 
1.4 Defining systems theory 
One theory of why the law deals with contingency in the way that it does is 
advanced by Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann was a German sociologist working in 
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the latter half of the twentieth century who set himself the ambitious task of 
outlining a complete theory of society which could explain the emergence and 
maintenance of social order in the face of continued disruption and disorder 
(Luhmann 1997a p. 11). He was strongly influenced by the emergence of 
systems theory as a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding interaction. 
Systems theories are diverse but they all aim to provide an account of the 
interactions of components of a system. These components could be the parts 
of an aircraft, sections of code operating within a computer program, the DNA 
of living organisms or the members of a family. Systems theoretical approaches 
are further unified by a desire to explain the dynamics that operate within a 
system, rather than simply describe the attributes of these components in an 
atomistic fashion. Von Bertalanffy, in a wide ranging discussion of systems 
theory, makes the claim that "Social science is the science of social systems" 
and that the claim of sociology to scientific distinction is founded upon its 
focus on interactions which can best be understood at the level of the system 
(von Bertalanffy 1969 pp. 194-7). 
Luhmann was particularly impressed by the systems theory of Talcott 
Parsons (Parsons 1991/1951), with whom lie worked for a year whilst 
conducting his doctoral thesis. But he swiftly moved on from Parson's action 
based theory of society to advance an alternate model based on the 
observation that communications rather than actions provide the fundamental 
building blocks of systems of social meaning. Communications rather than 
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actions are the indissoluble basic elements of society, they provide the means 
by which information is coded and transmitted so as to produce social order 
(Luhmann 1995/1984 pp. 38-9. Whilst Luhmann accepts that there exists an 
ontologically real world comprised of organisms and objects, meaning exists 
only at the level of the social and can be transmitted and understood only 
through communication. Communications are comprised of three components: 
utterance 
-+ selection -+ understanding. Thus communication must always 
involve at least two psychic systems, 'psychic systems' being the term 
Luhmann employs to describe individual systems of consciousness. 
Communication has no ontological reality for Luhmann. It cannot be reduced 
to physical acts because it is the unique preserve of the social. He asserts that 
even though we can retrospectively break social systems down into their 
constitutive actions, we cannot form social systems out of an accumulation of 
acts 
- 
for that one needs communication (ibid. pp. 137-41). Communication for 
Luhmann is therefore mysterious, because it is so very improbable that it 
should ever happen at all. Meaning can arise only at the level of the social 
system and utterances can contain no inherent meaning. Luhmann terms 
individual systems of consciousness (or human minds) `psychic systems'. 
Psychic systems and systems of communications are structurally 
complementary, although the relationship is asymmetrical since psychic 
systems can exist without communication but communication systems cannot 
exist without psychic systems (Luhmann 2002a). Luhmann further 
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distinguishes between the emergence of small locally defined interaction 
systems such as families and local communities and functionally differentiated 
subsystems of meaning such as systems of legal meaning, economic meaning or 
scientific meaning. The emergence of the latter is, for Luhmann, a hallmark of 
modernity. 
We can identify the social system to which a communication belongs 
by reference to the binary code it addresses. All those communications which 
address the code legal/illegal comprise the legal system and can be 
distinguished from the code of the economic system (efficiency/inefficiency), 
business (profit/loss), politics (power/not power, which in democratic societies 
is often marked as the distinction between government/opposition), religion 
(immanence/transcendence) and so on (Hornung 2006). Closure arises from 
the systems attempts to functionally differentiate itself from other systems. In 
this respect each communication about the legal code, helps to define the law's 
boundaries to those of other systems in the process closings its operations to 
them. However it is the self-referentiality of systems which leads to their 
ultimate closure from other systems. Law defines laws `truth' solely by 
reference to its own operations, its previous decisions and the statutes it 
chooses to interpret and apply in a particular way. In this way, just as other 
theories of law have attempted, systems theory provides an account of law's 
separation from morality (Luhmann 1993). 
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Luhmann sees functional differentiation as a product of social 
evolution. Prior to the Enlightenment, codes were not differentiated. Society 
was instead stratified, with religiously justified moral communication 
providing the schema within which communications relating to law, politics 
and the economy were understood. Functional differentiation is an emergent 
quality, which Luhmann describes as happening in Europe as a product of the 
Enlightenment during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. However, 
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Luhmann is at pains to point out that this evolutionary model is not goal- 
oriented (Luhmann 1995/1984 pp. 397-8). Evolution only describes the 
mechanism, in this case the selection of operations, by which social systems 
have attained the characteristics we can now observe them to have. He argues 
that the view that law operates as an external regulatory lever upon society is 
flawed. Instead, law is just one part of the web of social systems that 
collectively create the framework we call society (Luhmann 1989a). As a 
result, law has no privileged insight into the operations of other systems, its 
insight is always constrained by its need to reconceptualise the operations of 
other systems in order to see them from within its own frame. 
Lulimann defines this closure as a product of social `autopoiesis' a 
concept he developed from research in the field of biology where the term had 
been coined to define the key characteristics of living systems (Maturana and 
Varela 1980). Autopoietic systems are those which are capable of maintaining 
themselves internally and of reproducing themselves, provided they can take 
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some resources such as sunlight from the natural environment. Autopoiesis is 
thus characteristic of living systems, but not of systems arising in the physical 
environment, such as waterways, nor of engineered systems, such as machines 
or computer programs. The creative impulse Luhmann derived from the work 
of Maturana and Varela (who have also applied the term to social systems, see 
Maturana and Varela 1992) was to identify that social systems of meaning 
share these attributes of living systems: they are capable of maintaining their 
own boundaries, employ self reference in their reproduction and nonetheless 
remain operationally open to their environment in a manner analogous to the 
relationship between living organisms and their environment. 
But it has been argued that law appears to connect with other systems 
far more than autopoiesis allows, indeed, it is forced to, since it does not 
function purely to prescribe the conditions of its own continuing operations 
but to prescribe the correct, i. e. legal, operations of other systems (Teubner 
1989). Luhmann argues that law never has direct effects on the operations of 
other systems (Luhmann 1992a). Instead, events take place within the 
environment of the legal system, which come to have meanings applied to 
them within more than one system, so a woman who develops the belief that 
she must kill her own child, may be reconstructed within the psy-system as 
suffering post-puerperal psychosis, within the legal system as having a mental 
disorder which is sufficiently serious as to warrant a compulsory admission to 
hospital, within the child welfare system as an instance of child endangerment 
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which warrants intervention and so on. All of these constructions will unleash 
a chain of operations within each system, and will also act as irritants for the 
operations of other systems. 
This example gives some idea of how powerful social systems theory 
could be in helping us understand how communications about mad people are 
made, or fail to be made. Rather than locating the incoherence of the mental 
health `system' (which is really not a system at all, but a conglomeration of 
communications made within a wide range of different closed discourses) in 
shortcomings of individual actors, or in the lack of a shared language, 
Luhmann's systems theory suggests that we should anticipate communication 
failures. 
1.4.1 Radical consequences 
Luhmann himself (1995/1984 p. lii) suggested that his writings about systems 
theory resembled a labyrinth, such that pinpointing precisely what Luhmann 
means is not always possible. He has bequeathed a body of texts which are not 
always internally consistent (nor should we expect the products of a forty year 
career to be so) and not, perhaps ironically, self referential. Luhmann rarely 
distinguishes between his earlier or later work, or steps back from the central 
thesis he is expounding to explain how his ideas fit together. As a result, any 
account of his account of autopoietic systems will necessarily be partial and 
oriented towards the theoretical concerns of its author. This may help to 
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explain why the reception of his ideas within the English-speaking world has 
been inconsistent, and has resulted in considerable dissent over how his work 
should be interpreted (see the dispute between Mingers 2002 and King and 
Thornhill 2003 for example). 
Within socio-legal theory, the idea of law as a social system comprised 
of communications has also been explored by Gunther Teubner. However, 
Luhmann's ambition of providing a complete account of modernity led him to 
employ an incredibly far-reaching approach to theory building. Teubner's body 
of writing does not approach it in terms of depth or breadth. Consequently, in 
considering how law interacts with other social systems, Luhmann's theories 
provide the more obvious starting point. Both Luhmann (1992b) and Teubner 
(1993 pp. 27-30) agreed that much of their work was complementary, and it 
has been argued that with the exception of some key differences, including 
differences in their views on closure and evolution (that is whether autopoietic 
closure results from evolutive or evolutionary forces), it is possible to employ 
the extensive work of Luhmann in making supporting claims for the work of 
Teubner (Paterson 1996). 
Teubner's work has tended to focus on the interactions of law and the 
economy, and in particular upon the phenomenon of regulatory failure 
(Teubner 1998). Regulatory failure arises when the implementation of a 
regulatory regime in another social system results in unintended and adverse 
consequences for the regulating system (or law). It occurs because other 
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systems will always seek to minimise the difference between what their own 
binary code demands and the legal code. The economic system will be 
concerned with maximising the efficiency of implementing regulations, 
communications within political system will be concerned with adopting 
regulatory interventions in such a way as to maximise the chances of achieving 
or maintaining the power to govern. In mental health law, we could see the 
widespread use of extra-legal coercion in preference to legal coercion as a 
consequence of regulatory failure. Extra-legal coercion involves the use of 
threats or moral suasion to ensure that a patient complies with treatment in 
the community (Monahan et al. 2005) or agrees with admission to hospital 
(Poulsen 2002). Patients who agree to the demands placed upon them are 
treated as acting voluntarily and decisions made about their care and 
treatment are not subject to the same degree of scrutiny as decisions to 
compulsorily admit or treat a patient would be. Nor do such patients have a 
right to appeal to a tribunal or court to demand an end to the compulsion. 
However, from the difference minimising perspective of the psy-system such 
voluntary-involuntary compliance is to be preferred to legal coercion, because 
the latter requires that paperwork be completed, hearings attended and legal 
oversight of diagnostic and treatment decisions be permitted. 
As an explanation for regulatory failure systems theory offers a number 
of benefits over competing explanations located in social theory. Firstly, as 
noted above, it removes the idea of the incompetent or corrupt subject from 
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the explanation. Secondly, it makes us realise the radical limitations placed on 
the law, since it can only observe, and never directly affect the operations of 
other systems. Thirdly, for Teubner at least it suggests a way forward through 
the use of reflexive law (Teubner 1983, Teubner 1993 pp. 82-99). Reflexive law 
creates the possibility of other systems developing their own internal 
regulatory structures which can define norms for the system which are agreed 
within the system. Teubner envisages that those who act within a system may 
be in the strongest position to define the norms they uphold in such a way as 
to minimise the difference between their own operations and those required 
under the regulatory code. Luhmann (1992b) however, points out that this 
may simply create an additional problematic for the law, and still result in 
perturbations within the operations of the system being regulated. Since, the 
creation of a reflexive structure implies the possibility of the operations of the 
other system becoming a legal event, law will continue to need to make 
observations about the operations of other reflexively regulated systems. 
There are not many instances of legal scholars applying systems theory 
to mental health law, although certain characteristics of mental health law 
would seem to make it a particularly attractive candidate for an autopoietic 
makeover. In England and Wales the bulk of decision making about the 
application of mental health law is conducted by non-legal actors. The 
majority of decisions about whether to compulsorily admit or detain someone 
in hospital rely on these actors conducting three simultaneous appraisals of the 
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person's situation, one of whether her state of health warrants admission, one 
of whether her needs could otherwise be met in the community and one of 
whether it would be lawful given these circumstances to decide to admit. 
Moreover, the process of decision making is intended to be carried out jointly 
by two doctors and an approved social worker. The opportunities here for 
communication failures seem legion. Indeed, it would seem that the only 
reason why the vast majority of patients subject to compulsory powers are not 
in hospital unlawfully is that the law is not that fussy about substance 
provided that its procedures are followed correctly. 
Keywood (2003), in an article about the law's construction of the 
anorexic body as it applies to decisions about force-feeding, argues that law 
has enslaved psychiatric concepts and robbed them of their inherent 
indeterminacy, in the process artificially simplifying the concepts involved. 
The law only recognises a narrow band of clinical knowledge, which she 
suggests overstates the view that there is consensus on forced feeding as a 
practice. If the same analysis is applied to compulsory admissions it might 
suggest that by requiring a decision about admission or detention to follow a 
prescribed format, the law is effectively fettering the medical system, which 
might otherwise reach conclusions on the basis of a wider array of evidence, 
justify them using wholly different language, and consider a wider range of 
options than the narrow binary between admit/not admit. 
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Peay (2005) also offers a brief analysis of how mental health law looks 
when seen autopoietically. She draws on the findings of an empirical study 
into decision making in the mental health service and considers what this tells 
us about the nature of communications made by non-legal actors about the 
law. Amongst other findings, this study demonstrated that in pairings of 
doctors and approved social workers (ASWs), the legal role of the professionals 
involved appeared to influence which member of a discussion's views would 
dominate the decision reached (Peay 2003). So ASWs were far more influential 
in discussions concerning compulsory admissions, i. e. when their approval of 
the decision is essential, than they were in discussions about discharge, when it 
is the doctor's statutory responsibility to reach the final decision. She suggests 
that `creative misunderstandings' about the term `best interests' may offer a 
way forward, since this was a term which although not especially relevant to 
statute, was nonetheless employed in descriptions of their deliberations by 
many of the professionals involved in her study. And whilst the law, medicine 
and social welfare may apply different meanings to `best interests', they can 
nonetheless paper over the cracks of their disagreements with an appearance of 
unity. 
Both these analyses are interesting in their application, but whilst 
Keywood is certainly concerned about the meanings applied by law and 
psychiatry to anorexic bodies, neither analysis affords a space to service users 
themselves. The law as it relates to the use of compulsion affords no space to 
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the account the service user gives of herself. Instead, the mad person's 
appearances before the law must always be mediated through another 
discourse. 
To take a recent case as an example, in R (B) v. Ashworth Hospital 
Authority (2005), B challenged the decision of the hospital authorities to move 
him, without his consent, into a specialist unit which treated patients with 
personality disorders. B had been admitted to hospital with a diagnosis of a 
mental illness and had later been given a further diagnosis of personality 
disorder. The classification of his mental status under s. 37 (the section of the 
MHA 1983 under which B had been admitted) had not been changed and B's 
lawyers argued that as a result s. 63 which allows for the administration of 
compulsory treatment in hospital could not be applied. 
Baroness Hale gave the leading judgement in which she argued that 
given the uncertainties attendant upon psychiatric diagnoses, hospitals had to 
be granted the power to exercise a degree of flexibility when it came to making 
decisions about referrals. Interestingly however, she also observes that the 
treatment being offered to B could not, in any event, be unlawful since it did 
not require any physical interference with his person, he was simply 
experiencing a different behaviour management regime. This is true, but it 
also raises the question of why B took the case? B may have taken the case 
because he felt strongly that the incoherent application of the statutory rules 
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relating to classification and compulsory treatment needed clearing up, but 
this seems unlikely. 
In the earlier judgement of the Court of Appeal some of B's reasons for 
complaining are outlined more fully (R (B) v. Ashworth Hospital Authority 
[2003] para. 13). Amongst other things he was unhappy that higher levels of 
surveillance were employed in the specialist unit, that he would be required to 
attend workshops during the day, and that he would see his RMO less 
frequently. He was also concerned that the stricter regime on the ward would 
prevent him from demonstrating that he was able to control his own behaviour 
effectively and thus secure his discharge. Given that in the special hospital 
environment B's liberty was already severely constrained, the impact of these 
new restrictions might be felt especially acutely. However, they are also 
concerns which are in themselves legally invisible. B does not state that he 
objects to the physical environment of the ward, nor in this statement does he 
state that he disagrees with the diagnosis of personality disorder (although he 
had argued this point at an earlier tribunal). It is, however, only the argument 
that his reclassification is unlawful that the law can recognise, irrelevant to B 
though this may be. Both Gledhill (2005) and Bartlett (2006) make the point 
' This is based on a statement made by B's solicitor and may therefore also represent a selective 
account of B's own version of events. 
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that the safeguards which exist to protect patients from battery or negligence 
do not meet the mischief, which is that the decision in this case extends the 
reach of compulsion to any manifestation of a person's mental illness, without 
affording the patient any power to dispute the appropriateness of such 
treatment. However, for legal safeguards to truly make a difference to B, both 
the medical and legal system would need to be able to recognise that being 
denied access to television, or to one's room during the day, constitutes a valid 
complaint. 
The history of mental health law is often written as a history of a 
pendulum swinging between law and medicine for control of the process of 
making decisions about the lives of people with mental health needs (Glover- 
Thomas 2002 is a good example of this). With such an account in hand it is 
possible to point to the cruelties meted out by the medical profession when 
their work is subject to inadequate legal scrutiny and argue in favour of 
according service users evermore procedural rights to ensure that such abuses 
are prevented. It is equally possible to point to the impact of cumbersome 
legal procedures upon the complex and subtle judgements psychiatrists are 
required to make, and argue that their imposition is antithetical to humane 
medical practice (Obomanu and Kennedy 2001, Sarkar and Adshead 2005). In 
recent years the political and policing systems have influenced debates about 
reform of mental health law in England and Wales. It is argued that the law is 
insufficiently oriented towards ensuring public safety and reform is needed to 
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encourage doctors to use the powers they have to compulsorily treat patients 
when a failure to do so might put others at risk (Sheppard 1996, Tidmarsh 
1997). The same theme has been heavily promoted in the popular press. It has 
also been suggested that rather than furthering the `jurigenic harm' which 
results from heavy handed debates about rights versus best interests, law 
could instead play a role in promoting healing by incorporating therapeutic 
objectives into its reasoning (Winick 2003). The former critique could be seen 
as an argument in favour of red light or prohibitive regulation whilst the latter 
mirrors arguments for green light or facilitative law in other areas which 
require regulation. In both cases however, law is conceptualised as capable of 
having direct and predictable influence over the behaviour of actors in other 
domains. 
Luhmann suggests that law is incapable of steering social change in 
this fashion (Luhmann 1997b and Luhmann 2004/1993). Neither prohibitory 
nor facilitative regulation can alter the normative closure of both law and the 
social systems whose operations it is attempting to influence. That is not to 
say such regulation will not have an effect, but its effects will be felt in the 
form of irritations to the operations of each social system, which will then 
respond by reconstructing the law in such a way as to minimise the differences 
between its own operations and those expected of it. As a result, simply giving 
mad people a `right to involvement' or to be consulted, might well alter 
practice, but possibly only to allow for the service user to attend meetings, or 
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whatever else becomes the minimum necessary to avoid excessive interference 
from the law. 
1.4.2 Where have all the people gone? 
"Partisans of the subject attack behaviourism, systems theory, information 
technology, survey research, and ask for the recognition of the subject. But 
they have forgotten what the word means. " (Luhmann 1986) 
Bankowski (1996) observes that autopoiesis leaves the individual stranded on 
the outside of numerous impenetrable social systems. Individuals have closed 
psychic systems but these are not capable of communicating directly with 
social systems. Nor are they able to directly observe the functioning of social 
systems. Instead their selves are reconstructed anew within each system. This 
total fragmentation has two consequences. One is that it causes acute 
pessimism about the possibility of humanism within social systems. There is 
no space for empathy or holistic approaches within systems theory. Systems 
cannot offer such responses, and closed psychic systems may make noise within 
the social world but can never communicate directly with the social. However, 
Bankowski is even more worried about the second consequence which is what 
Teubner's account of the operations of the law, honour and morality systems 
implies for individual responsibility. He argues that operations rely on 
individuals, and that it is incoherent to define the legal system without 
reference to those individuals acting within it. However, Luhmann's theory 
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does not suggest that social systems could function without the operations of 
individual psychic systems. Such an outcome would be impossible because 
psychic and social systems have evolved simultaneously and are mutually 
dependent upon each other for their operation. Selves are therefore important 
to systems, but also problematic. 
Cotterrell (1993) suggests that autopoiesis constructs a world where 
individuals have "not only lost control but in relation to which they might also 
absolve themselves of autonomous action". Bankowski argues that in legal 
terms this could create amoral disconnections between fragmented selves and 
their actions. Individuals are no longer required to take responsibility for their 
actions since it is not they, but the system operations which dictate outcomes. 
In addition, the closure of systems implies that we can never achieve consensus 
on whether responsibility was correctly exercised by the individual. 
To some extent these criticisms can be answered by the observation 
that they could be extended equally both to all forms of constructivist social 
theory, and all theories (including systems theories) which argue that social 
systems or institutions function to constrain the behaviour (or operations) of 
individuals/psychic systems. Paterson (1996) argues in opposition to 
Bankowski that the problem of individual responsibility has been exaggerated. 
Psychic systems may be constrained by the operations of social systems, but 
because the theory defines communications and not individuals as constitutive 
of such systems, individuals are capable of performing operations in multiple 
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systems. The choice of which system to operate within remains that of the 
individual. So health practitioners may choose to act illegally to secure an 
outcome which they think is optimum for a service user's health. Luhmann 
(1992b) suggests that because systems theory does not conceive of psychic 
systems being components of social systems, far from diminishing the status of 
the individual, it elevates it. Human beings should not be conceived of as cogs 
in machines, capable of acting in only one way because of the constraints of 
the system. From the perspective of the legal system, they remain responsible 
for their decision to act illegally, but from the perspective of the psy or social 
welfare system they may nonetheless have acted correctly. Choosing which 
system to operate under also requires the implicit acceptance of what kind of 
irritations from other systems one is willing to suffer. Paterson uses the 
example of honour killing: if one chooses to observe the honour system then 
one is faced with the necessity of acting when ones honour has been impugned, 
but this means also choosing the possibility of interference from the legal 
system (assuming the legal system in question treats honour killings as illegal). 
Of course, the individual acting within a community which widely respects a 
code of honour may feel highly constrained to observe it. But she nonetheless 
remains free to act in a different way, as is demonstrated by the fact that 
people can and do opt to observe minority religious and moral distinctions 
despite considerable pressure from the legal and political systems to conform 
to generic moral codes. 
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However, the question of what the consequences of the autopoietic 
closure of social systems are for individuals remains. And in particular what 
are the consequences for individuals experiencing mental distress. Some of 
these consequences are implicit in the accounts service users have given of 
being excluded from communications and of being talked over, and their 
resultant feelings that they are either not being listened to or are being 
consistently misunderstood. Neither empowering service users nor encouraging 
staff to be more empathic will automatically correct the blindness of the social 
welfare and psy-systems. In both cases these remedies appeal to some kind of 
underlying safety net of understanding which can rescue us from the 
consequences of closed discourses. But Luhmann explicitly states that systems 
theory precludes humanism (Luhmann 1986 p. 138), and also precludes a 
concept of power which could be redistributed in favour of mad people 
(Luhmann 1979/1975). 
As the quote from Luhmann at the top of this section suggests, he is 
critical of a belief in the existence of subjects that goes beyond the use of the 
term as analogous to individual or psychic system (both of which he prefers). 
The idea of a conscious subject capable of observing its own operations and 
therefore of having a transcendent 'self' s, he argues, outmoded. Instead he 
argues, the entities we call individual human beings are made up of an 
autopoietically closed living system, and an autopoietically closed 
consciousness or psychic system. Our psychic systems bear the autopoietic 
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characteristics of paradox, closure, self-referentiality, complexity, and temporal 
location. As a result, our consciousnesses are not available to others, we live 
with the illusion that we can communicate: "Even clever analysts have been 
fooled by this convention" (Luhmann 2002a). Communication however, could 
not exist without the social. Understanding cannot occur at the level of 
interaction between two minds, but only at the level of society, which has 
evolved contemporaneously with the evolution of language, text and concepts 
capable of being communicated. Teubner (2001) argues that the separation 
between mind and society which Luhmann posits is one of the greatest 
strengths of systems theory, since it avoids (evades? ) the problems facing 
phenomenologists trying to understand the role consciousness plays in meaning 
making (such as Husserl) and the role language plays in meaning making (such 
as Wittgenstein). There are two sites of meaning making, the individual and 
the social, and their closure to each other can be understood in precisely the 
same way as we understand the closure of the legal system to the political. 
Luhmann points out that it is possible for communications to be made 
about failures of communication, although the fact of their having been made 
does not imply that the misunderstandings will consequently be resolved 
(2002b). Continuing to make utterances indicates that the continuation of 
communication albeit under other terms and with a new understanding may 
be possible. However, as observed above, systems can place considerable 
constraints upon the freedom of individuals to choose which system their 
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operations take place within and consequently what understanding can be 
applied to the utterances they hear. 
1.5 Conclusion 
"... this is not a nice theory... °'(Luhmann 1986) 
When the implications of this theory for people with mental health needs are 
considered we seem to return to the same problematic which motivated 
Foucault to excavate the history of psychiatry: the silence of the mad in the 
face of psychiatric discourse. But his problematic now seems to carry an 
additional burden. What kinds of communications were made using those 
"stammered imperfect words without fixed syntax"? Can 'mad' utterances form 
communications, or if there is no social system within which they can be 
understood, are they inevitably just noise? 
51 
Chapter Two 
Madness: the absence of meaning 
2.1 The social location of madness 
Systems theory looks like an unpromising starting place from which to theorise 
about the social location of madness. Luhmann refuses to accept that it is 
feasible to theorise human behaviour on a grand scale (Luhmann 1995/1984 
pp. 210-3). Namely, we cannot build up a theoretical account of society that 
corresponds to or is grounded in the psychology of the individual. Instead, our 
model of society must be grounded in communications, and communication 
systems observe different rules to those constraining individual action. How 
can we start to define what madness is if the theory does not allow us to 
speculate about what is going on in peoples' minds? 
This chapter will argue that madness is located outside the social, 
because mad utterances by definition cannot form part of a communication. 
Madness can be understood, although not explained, by reference to what we 
understand as social meaning. Many efforts to explain the social implications 
of madness focus on describing the institutional apparatus which exists around 
madness but ignore the question of what madness actually is. Others take as 
read the pathological account of madness provided by psychiatry and ignore 
the question of whether madness has different social implications to physical 
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illness. This confusion is problematic for systems theorists. For Luhmann, 
medicine is simply a functionally differentiated system comprised of 
communications. One system amongst many, operating under the constraints 
imposed by its environment and by the operations of other systems. He does 
not discuss the distinction between psychiatric and somatic medicine in his 
work. Those who have used Luhmanns work to explore the problems 
encountered by the legal regulation of mental illness have tended to assume 
that psychiatric medicine is a branch of medicine as a whole and observes the 
code of sickness/health (Richardson and Machin 2000, Keywood 2003, Peay 
2005). But the very small amount Luhmann wrote on the function and code of 
the medical system indicates that this elision of psychiatric and somatic 
medicine is not sustainable. In a short paper discussing the absence of a social 
theory of medicine, Luhmann argues that the mind and body are both 
functionally differentiated and operationally interdependent (Luhmann 1983). 
Pain and physical discomfort occur when the body needs to ensure that its 
malfunctions become known to the mind. Ordinarily, the mind is unconscious 
of the operations of the body. And the function of medicine is to restore this 
mutual indifference of mind and body through identifying and treating the 
causes of the pain which might otherwise cloud one's consciousness. Luhmann 
does not address the phenomenon of madness. But madness cannot be solely 
explained by reference to a malfunction in the mind, or brain. The strongest 
proponents of a biomedical model of mental disorder would accept that even 
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where a physical cause can be identified the degree of distress experienced by 
the individual will be determined in part by the social response to her 
symptoms (see Shorter 1997 pp-326-7 for example). It is also the case that 
much mental distress is actuated by events entirely outside the body, such as 
the loss of a loved one. As a result, Luhmann's account of the function of 
physical pain cannot create a corresponding account of the function of mental 
pain. Something else must be going on. 
Madness does not necessarily manifest itself as physical pain (although 
pain is often used as a metaphor to describe the experience of mental distress) 
but as a breakdown in the relationship between the self and the social. 
Whether this takes the form of having excessively negative or fearful thoughts, 
or false beliefs about the nature of reality, the effect is to at least temporarily 
prevent the psychic system (or self or mind) from engaging in society. 
Madness also becomes a problem in the social world when psychic systems 
contribute utterances which are incomprehensible to the social system being 
addressed. Using Luhmann, we can redefine madness as incomprehensible 
utterances. Madness is then relocated outside the systems of meaning which 
make up our society. This in itself is uncontroversial. Madness, however 
defined, has always been located outside society or at least upon its margins. 
However, to follow Luhmann to his logical conclusion there are no mad people, 
there are only mad utterances, and if we make enough of them we may acquire 
the label mad. Although Luhmann never discussed the phenomenon of 
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madness, this point is made explicit in his description of the social function of 
the moral code: 
"... moral coding is always coding of communication. There are, in 
other words, no good or bad people, but only the possibility of 
indicating people as good or bad. " (Luhmann 1993) 
We can indicate madness and sanity in others, but in doing so we are applying 
a social distinction to their utterances. The threshold for acquiring the label 
`mad' clearly varies across time and between individuals, depending on their 
social situation. As with all social systems, knowledge about madness is 
socially constructed, in this case within a system of social knowledge of the 
self, which I will call the psy-system, because it is similar to what Foucault 
terms the psy-function (Foucault 200Gb pp. 85-7), and is made up of 
communications within and between the psy disciplines: psychiatry, 
psychology, psychoanalysis etc. 
What is also significant about Luhmann's theory of social systems is 
that he attributes many system operations to attempts at boundary 
maintenance. It is this boundary maintenance which drives madness to the 
margins and then makes every effort to keep it there. Mad utterances threaten 
the boundaries of social systems, and this provides all systems with a strong 
motive to collude in their exclusion. Theorising the social location of madness 
from a Luhmannian perspective allows us to bring together two separate 
phenomena which are not adequately explained by existing social theories of 
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madness. The first is the vast governmental apparatus aiming to achieve social 
control over madness, the history of which Foucault describes so brilliantly, 
and which can also be observed in the legislation and policy governing the 
treatment of mentally ill people today. The second is the very high levels of 
compliance with treatment and other interventions observed among people 
with mental illness. The great silence of the mad which Foucault attributed to 
the dominance of psychiatry is deafening. People with mental illness, when 
contrasted with other socially controlled groups, are rarely seen or heard 
except when demands are made that harsher controls be placed on them. 
Often their staunchest, and indeed only, audible advocates are those people 
whom some social control theorists would posit as their worst enemy: the 
psychiatrists, nurses, social workers and family members who stand in 
judgement upon their behaviour, seek to constrain it, and to restore them to 
the status of the functioning citizen. This paradox can be understood, if we see 
social control as resulting from two entirely separate goals. The first is the 
desire of social systems to silence what they cannot understand, and thus 
reduce the threat which madness represents to their operations. The second 
being the desire of individuals labelled mad to participate in future 
communications even when earlier utterances have not been understood. The 
first goal is often realised in a spectacularly clumsy and excessive fashion, 
whilst the second, which is well understood by `mad' individuals and those 
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close to them, is rarely acknowledged in the communications governing law 
and policy. 
2.1.2 Locating madness 
Madness has many locations. In the findings of biomedical research madness is 
located at its source: in a malfunction in the body such as the gaps between 
folds of brain tissue, in our genes, in our water supply, even in viruses (see 
Bentall 1990, Read 2004a). For practicing psy-system diagnosticians madness 
is behaviour that conforms to the lists of symptoms cited for disorders in the 
American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (APA 
2000) or the World Health Organisations International Classification of 
Diseases (WHO 2004). For some social theorists madness is located in the 
social roles individuals are expected to play: the person labelled mad may 
begin to perform the role of `mad' under the weight of social expectation 
(Scheff 1999). For others madness is what happens in mad places such as the 
asylum, it is not only located in the mad individual, but in the totalising 
effects of the institution (Goffman 1961, Goffman 1971, Rosenhan 1973). For 
some linguistics scholars madness is made up of meaningless statements 
(Rochester and Martin 1979). Madness has been seen as arising out of the gap 
between the power wielded by the psychiatrists with the authority to diagnose 
and the supposedly mad patient (Palmer 2000). And many people, including 
many service users, assert that a focus upon madness misses the point. They 
57 
argue that the meaning of madness is irrelevant whilst mental distress, 
misunderstood as madness, remains a real and problematic phenomenon that 
rarely receives a compassionate response (Scull 1989 p. 9, Beresford, Gifford et 
al. 2000). 
The fact that views diverge on what can be pointed to and described as 
madness `properly so called' demonstrates little, but it contrasts strongly with 
the huge swathe of utterances made every day about the problems facing mad 
people, the legal regulation of their lives, and the therapeutic interventions 
they need. It is clearly the case that the concept of madness has a kind of 
discursive integrity: we can all talk about it. This cohesion falls apart, 
however, when we try to establish what causes, promotes, heals or sustains 
madness. Making the claim that madness is evidenced by the absence of 
meaning does not resolve or invalidate any of these debates. But it does 
provide a starting point for talking more constructively about what exactly it 
is that social systems are trying to achieve control over. 
2.2 Madness and language 
Equating madness with an absence of meaning is not a new idea. It is implicit 
in the works of a number of theorists from a range of backgrounds including 
philosophy, psychiatry and psychology. It is, however, an idea with 
implications which have not been fully understood. To understand madness as 
a failure of communication does not undermine the logic of those disciplines 
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which try to restore meaning to mad utterances. The means by which the psy- 
system attempts this task are sometimes questionable, but the debate is 
worthwhile, if not always productive. Psychiatry is not rendered meaningless 
by the meaninglessness of madness. The fact that what we call madness is 
really a small number of utterances which cannot readily be understood raises 
significant questions about the role of society in responding to and attempting 
to silence and sustain mad utterances. This theory does not call into question 
the work of clinical researchers trying to identify the biomedical conditions 
which lead to the making of mad utterances. Or the work of psychiatrists 
trying to promote meaningful communication. Instead it explains why the 
degree of social exclusion people who have made mad utterances face is wholly 
disproportionate to the social impact of what they are saying. 
Foucault's accounts of the social location of madness vary. In his most 
celebrated work on the subject, a `History of Madness' (Foucault 2006a), 4 he 
suggests that his initial project aimed to account for the silencing of the 
madman, which began with the emergence of a psychiatric discourse about 
Foucault's work was published in France as `Folie et deraison. Histoire de la folie h 1' Age 
classique' in 1961. Three years later a heavily abridged version was published and it was this 
abridged version which was subsequently translated into English and published under the title 
`Madness and Civilisation' in 1965. In 2006 a complete translation of the original unabridged 
text was published in English for the first time tinder the title `History of Madness'. I have used 
the unabridged translation in this thesis. 
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madness in the 18'' century (Foucault 2006a p. xxviii). This discourse, he 
argued, supplanted an earlier discourse between reason and madness, which 
did not lead to the excessive cruelties of incarceration, exclusion and enforced 
silence, which were the hallmarks of the Age of Reason. The `History of 
Madness' is concerned with the subsequent development of psychiatric 
discourse, and not with this earlier period so Foucault provides little evidence 
to support the assertion that such a golden age ever occurred. Scull robustly 
criticises Foucault for naively assuming that the development of confinement 
represented a dramatic rupture between the past acceptance of folly and 
unreason, and the moralising discourse about madness with its exclusionary 
consequences that subsequently occurred (Scull 1989 pp. 18-20). Indeed, the 
quality of Foucault's historical scholarship has been more widely called into 
question for tending to ignore contradictory evidence, overstate his case and 
over-simplify the historical record (Midelfort 1980). Regardless of its validity 
as historical fact, the notion of an era in which madness spoke to reason is 
intriguing, largely because according to modern conceptions of madness and 
reason it is so difficult to imagine. 
Foucault does not return to this point in his later work, although lie 
repeatedly returned to the topic of psychiatric discourse. He relates in the 
`Archaeology of Knowledge' (Foucault 1973) that this was partly because he 
became disillusioned with the project he described in `History of Madness', and 
the possibility of reducing the complexity of discourse down to what was 
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essentially true prior to its emergence. Instead, he saw his task as capturing 
this complexity of discourse, and exploring its contingency. As a result: 
"We are not trying to reconstitute what madness itself might be, in the 
form in which it first presented itself 
. 
[although] 
... 
such a history of the 
referent is no doubt possible" (ibid. p. 47). 
This is frustrating, as he did expand very slightly, on what he thought 
madness might be in a short article, published as an appendix to the 1972 
edition of `History of Madness'. In `Madness: the absence of work', Foucault 
argues that madness can be understood as a non-language which does not say 
anything beyond itself, or code to any fixed meaning (Foucault 1995/1972). 
Instead, Foucault suggests that madness acts as a reserve of meaning, which 
exposes "that chasm where linguistic code and utterance become entangled', 
shaping each other and speaking of nothing but their still silent rapport ". 
Foucault goes on to explore the intriguing idea that madness is unable to 
create, or give birth to a work (the meaning of the title), but is nonetheless an 
empty space from within which the creation of literature may emerge. This 
linking of madness and the creative imagination has been made elsewhere 
(Becker 1978, Jamison 1996), and would suggest that the relationship arises 
because both madness and creativity represent a form of challenge to reason, 
and to what is already known and understood. However, what is most 
interesting about Foucault's piece is his description of madness as utterances 
which are not understood. 
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At one level it is obvious that madness can only be known in the form 
of utterances. Despite our casual references to disordered minds and mentally 
ill people, the psy-system has no `way of seeing' analogous to the clinical gaze 
which would allow it privileged insight into the operations of the self. We 
cannot predict madness, or know what form it will take until the person has 
spoken. We know madness where mad utterances occur. The point is made 
succinctly, by Rochester and Martin in their book `Crazy Talk', in which they 
describe a study of the disordered speech of people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. They point out that although disordered thoughts are seen as 
definitive of schizophrenia, we can only know that thought is disordered 
through incoherent talk: 
"To say that a speaker is incoherent is only to say that one cannot 
understand the speaker. So to make a statement about incoherent 
discourse is really to make a statement about one's own confusion as a 
listener. It is therefore just as appropriate to study what it is about the 
listener which makes him or her `confusable' as it is to study what it is 
about the speaker which makes him or her `confusing'. " (Rochester and 
Martin 1979 p. 3) 
Despite this observation, Rochester and Martin's study focuses on statements 
made by people diagnosed with schizophrenia, and they acknowledge this as a 
potential weakness (ibid. p. 51). Subsequent researchers have explored the idea 
that thought disorder could be better understood as a disorder of 
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communication, and a number of studies in linguistics have explored the 
grammatical features of the language used by people diagnosed with thought 
disorders in the hope of identifying what makes it incomprehensible (Bentall 
2004 pp 388-95). But this research has not explored the `confusability' of the 
listener, or asked whether social circumstances, as well as the content of the 
speech, contribute to this confusion. 
Szasz made a related point about the confusion created by mad speech 
when he observed that hysteria can be understood as a language comprised of 
non-discursive units such as crying, self harm, shouting etc. This language 
lacks a generalisable meaning content and can only refer to specific events. 
The function of psychotherapy is to transform the local and specific meaning 
the individual expresses through hysterical symptoms into a discursive account 
of her distress (Szasz 1973/1963 pp. 128-36). But again, Szasz fails to go on to 
explore the radical implications of non-discursivity outside the clinical setting. 
Lacan similarly recognises the primacy of meaningful speech in promoting 
psychological wellbeing, and perhaps contrary to Szasz, charges psychoanalysts 
with the responsibility to focus upon what the client says and resist the 
temptation to draw elaborate and false inferences about the meaning of the 
clients actions (or inactions) (Lacan 1989/1953 pp. 44-50). But again, his 
massively intriguing work on the role of speech and language in psychoanalysis 
does not ask what implications an absence of meaningful speech has for both 
the individual and her community in everyday life. 
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The underlying notion that madness is inherently incomprehensible has 
been criticised in different ways. Porter points out in relation to 
autobiographical accounts made by mad people that these accounts put: 
"... a different complexion on the claim so often made down the ages 
that madness is radically incoherent, unintelligible, meaningless. As 
often as not if the speech and behaviour of the mad person seem 
peculiar... it is because the mad person is deprived of the expected and 
approved environment for normal living. " (Porter 1987 p. 232) 
A similar point is made by Laing, although he founds his account on 
observations of his own patients. He argues that psychiatry has tended to 
accept too readily that the mad person is incomprehensible and then supplant 
her account of herself with a psychiatric account (Laing 1967). Both of these 
arguments tend to reinforce rather than rebut the central claim I am making 
here. Madness, properly so called, is a property of utterances and not people. 
What Laing and Porter are both observing in different ways is that the 
perception that an individual has made mad utterances has a dramatic impact 
on her audience. It is for this reason that madness has to be understood as 
resulting from interaction, rather than in glorious isolation. The opposite of a 
mad utterance is not a sane utterance but a chain of acts demonstrating 
effective communication. 
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2.3 Madness and communication 
Luhmann's definition of communication requires three stages: utterance, 
selection, and a subsequent act which demonstrates to the first party that she 
has been understood (Luhmann 1995/1984 p. 140). This definition highlights 
the self referential nature of communication. Efforts at communication fail 
more often than they succeed, and the reason for this is that communications 
rely on a tri-partite set of selections, all of which must coincide for the 
communication to occur. Communication occurs when the communicator 
(alter) believes that the communicatee (ego)' has understood the information 
conveyed, and she can then continue the chain of communication by making 
further utterances. For communication to succeed first alter must make a 
selection from all the possible utterances she could make as to what 
information she wishes to convey. An utterance in this context is simply an 
act which can be interpreted as indicating a selection to communicate on the 
part of alter. Gestures, noises, facial expressions and modes of dress are all 
capable of being utterances for the purposes of communication. Sometimes 
6 Because the third selection, between information and utterance, is decisive, and because this 
third selection is performed by the second party, Lulunann unconventionally refers to the second 
party as ego, and the first as alter. Luhmann's terminology has been followed here. However 
since mad utterances convey no information, when they are made the third selection cannot be 
performed and communication does not occur. Perhaps appropriately, this leaves the person 
making the mad utterance irrevocably cast as an alter, for whom no ego exists. 
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communication may be initiated by someone misinterpreting the 
communicative intent of another, for example by inferring that an act such as 
brushing a fly away indicates a welcoming wave instead. But Luhmann 
stresses that even in these circumstances the communicative intentions of both 
parties must be engaged: "There is no communication when observed 
behaviour is interpreted only as a sign of something else" (Luhmann 
1995/1984 p. 151). The ambiguity of certain acts and the difficulty of 
determining communicative intent arises frequently as a problem in the 
context of madness, for example, it can be hard to determine whether a 
suicidal act represents a `cry for help' and is therefore an extreme attempt to 
indicate mental distress, or is in fact the product of a `genuine' desire to die. 
Having identified an act as an utterance denoting communicative 
intent, ego must next select to attend to the utterance. Information itself 
implies a selection from what is known about the environment and ego must 
also select the right system within which to extract the information from 
alter's utterance. Communication failures can be readily identified when ego's 
response does not meet alter's expectation. If communication fails alter can 
modify her utterance and try again. This is the self-referential dimension of 
communication; we can only know it when the actions of the other conform to 
our own expectations. To an outsider, the actual transfer of information and 
meaning cannot be observed, only inferred from the conduct of the actors. 
(Luhmann 1995/1984 pp. 137-41). 
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If both parties share the understanding that they are, for example, 
communicating around the code lawful/unlawful then communication will 
succeed. But if alter makes an utterance intended to relate to the legal code 
and ego attempts to process it according to the code of the economic system 
(profit/loss) then it will fail. This selection of the wrong system, from alter's 
perspective, will occur frequently because all actors enjoy the freedom to apply 
meanings to utterances as they see fit and in accordance with their ability to 
comprehend their information content. But as long as ego wishes alter to 
comprehend her operations, she will try to select the same system as alter. 
Simple communication failure is so common that it cannot amount to a useful 
definition of madness. Otherwise the operations of all other social systems 
would appear mad from the internal perspective of each system. Systems 
appear to be able to distinguish between utterances which can be understood 
within a different system and utterances which cannot be understood at all. 
One way to explain this is to look at the form and content of 
utterances to see if distinctions can be drawn between mad utterances and 
those utterances made according to a code other than the system's own. Using 
King's example of a car accident as an instance of a perturbation which affects 
the operations of multiple systems we can see that the utterances `The car was 
worth £1000', and `The other driver was at fault' can readily enter into chains 
of economic and legal communication respectively (King 1993). If a party 
asserts that `The car did not exist' however, the statement is meaningless from 
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the perspective of all systems. The content of the statement does not need to 
be false for this perception to arise. If an injured driver made a point of 
asserting that her car did exist, then those around her might wonder if she was 
concussed. Individual psychic systems are capable of comprehending that an 
utterance may be interpreted in multiple ways (although they can only 
respond to one meaning at any one time). It follows that psychic systems are 
also capable of comprehending when a statement is patently incomprehensible 
across different system operations. Consequently, such a statement is unable 
to penetrate the boundaries of any system, or form part of any chain of 
communications. 
Mad utterances do not necessarily involve absurd or incredible 
assessments of reality. They may simply take an incomprehensible form. In 
their Communication Disturbance Index, Docherty et al. list six categories of 
speech disturbance observed in patients diagnosed with psychotic illnesses 
(Docherty et al. 1996). These are: vague references which are insufficiently 
specific, confused references which could equally refer to more than one 
referent, missing information references, ambiguous use of words where the 
meaning cannot be deduced from the context, use of what appears to be 
entirely the wrong word, and structural `unclarities' resulting from inadequate 
or absent grammar. Only some of these suggest the absence of a meaningful 
referent, and yet, by definition, statements with these attributes cannot 
readily be understood. 
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However, to understand its social function, madness cannot be reduced 
to the form and content of specific utterances. The statement `I want to die' is 
grammatically coherent, and refers to a person's subjective experience of the 
world in a form which makes it difficult to rebut. It is analogous in form to 
the statement `I want a glass of water', which no one would normally 
challenge, and yet, it is typically treated as unreasonable and rarely heard on 
its own terms. There are exceptions of course; where the honour system 
recognises suicide as a response to dishonour, then `I want to die' may have a 
socially acceptable meaning attached to it. And when an individual is in 
unmanageable physical pain, such that only death could end it, then the desire 
to die is seen as comprehensible. But outside these exceptional states, the 
assertion by an individual that she wants to die, which is made fairly 
frequently, is treated as a statement which means something other than what 
it says; that for example the person is irrationally depressed, or living in 
difficult circumstances, or lacks a clear perspective on the difficulties she has 
encountered. All of these interpretations load additional meanings onto the 
utterance which are not inherent to it and are not necessarily intended by 
alter, although they may be accurate when weighed against the information 
ego determines from the environment within which they are made. For the 
second order observer however, it is important to note that this absence of 
social meaning cannot be deduced from the form the utterance takes; it can 
only be inferred from the responses of the surrounding social systems. 
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2.4 Madness and mental distress 
It could be argued that `I want to die' is typically seen as an indication of 
mental distress and not madness, and that whilst madness is conceptually 
unstable, mental distress remains real and problematic. This is the line taken 
by Scull when lie argues, in a critique of `Madness and Civilisation', that 
Foucault failed to acknowledge the reality of the mental distress which 
afflicted the mad and which caused genuine social problems both for them and 
their families (Scull 1989 p. 9). In a more recent paper he makes the same 
criticism of Szasz and suggests that a common misreading of Goffman's 
`Asylums' is to conclude that it is the institution which creates the problem of 
madness, thus failing to examine what aspects of the patients prior history 
lead them there (Scull 2007). From within the psy-system, critics of the 
biomedical model of mental illness tend to argue that whilst mental illness is a 
questionable concept, mental distress is nonetheless a `real' phenomenon 
deserving of a better explanation (Read 2004b). Service users have also argued 
that they do not recognise their subjective experience of distress in the medical 
interpretations placed upon their behaviour (see Chapter One pp. 6-7). Within 
literature intended to promote public awareness, mental distress has recently 
been adopted as an acceptable substitute for terms which imply a medical 
model of madness when discussing symptoms such as sadness or anxiety (see 
for example Mind 2007 and Scottish Association for Mental Health 2006). It is 
an implicit assumption in these texts that mental distress is the thing that is 
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real and knowable, whilst psychosis or mental illness are categories imposed 
upon this experience by others. Scull argues that whilst we critique these 
latter categories we should not lose sight of the reality of the former. 
Mental distress however, only adds to our confusion about what it is 
we are dealing with. It is a mistake to assume that any challenge to an 
accepted ontology of madness represents an attempt to diminish the 
significance of the distress caused to the individual and those around her by 
unreasonable utterances. But asserting the reality of mental distress does not 
help us understand why this phenomenon should attract coercive 
interventions, social isolation and exclusion. If we ask `How do we know when 
mental distress is occurring? ' it becomes clear that mental distress functions as 
an interpretation of some types of verbal and non-verbal actions which are 
widely understood as indicating unpleasant emotions. Such indications may be 
very diverse: from tears to laughter. Mental distress may also be indicated 
through changes to the individual's physical state such as extreme weight loss, 
or through explicit statements pertaining to her state of mind. These 
indications can be questioned, challenged and discussed. They can stimulate 
communication and in some cases be resolved trivially. At the social level we 
readily distinguish between mad and sane distress. The person who cries 
because she has suffered a recent bereavement is seen as comprehensible, 
fitting within the range of expected responses whereas the person who exhibits 
the same response over a bereavement that took place long ago, may not be 
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understood so readily. Indications of mental distress do not inevitably give rise 
to social problems, such as causing further distress in those around the 
sufferer, or isolating the sufferer from others. Indeed, distress in the form of 
indications of negative emotions is so common it cannot usefully help us to 
understand why some manifestations of distress warrant such a dramatic social 
response. Conversely, the concept of madness does not inevitably imply mental 
distress. The person who adopts an entirely false and idiosyncratic set of 
beliefs about the world may exhibit no signs whatsoever of distress and yet 
could still be understood as mad. 
One obvious response to the question of why mental distress can in 
some cases give rise to the social problem of madness is tautologous: distress is 
distressing. This tautology is unhelpful, it does not help to explain why the 
ubiquitous experience of distress can in some cases be interpreted as the 
unusual phenomenon of madness. If we instead understand the problem of 
mental distress as one of incomprehension, we retain the possibility of 
discussing this lack of comprehension. Indications of distress are, like 
apparently meaningless statements, resistant to easy interpretation. If ego can 
clarify the intentions of alter, then non-verbal indications of distress can enter 
the chain of communications. If alter's intentions cannot be clarified, then 
these indications, like incomprehensible statements, drive the process of 
communication into the sand. Madness is therefore conceptually distinct from, 
though not exclusive of, mental distress. 
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In observing the social response to mental distress, it is also notable, 
that some people who have been diagnosed as mentally ill describe feeling that 
only their madness is seen as a significant problem whilst their mental distress 
goes unheard. Or as Shaughnessy puts it: 
"It's almost like walking up to the nurse wearing wet clothes, and the 
nurse treats you for a cold. The nurse then lets you walk out without 
changing your clothes. When you return the next day, the nurse 
wonders why you still have a cold. Similarly, I'm walking around a 
product of emotional and physical abuse, broken relationships, no 
meaningful employment, stressful housing 
- 
and I'm taking a tablet for 
the symptoms. " (Shaughnessy 2000) 
2.5 Madness as an anti-medium 
Madness is frequently identified with utterances which lack an information 
content. In everyday language it is mad to assert a state of affairs which is 
evidently false, mad to hear invisible voices, or to believe oneself to be God. 
However, the fact that it is possible for others to perceive these statements as 
false indicates that a prior order exists against which their meaning content 
can be evaluated. As discussed in the Introduction, the sheer improbability of 
this order arising at all, given the complexity of communication, was what 
stimulated Luhmann to engage with systems theory. Talcott Parsons had 
already observed that the condition of contingency (that nothing is either 
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impossible or inevitable), which he assumed to exist prior to human social 
interaction, makes successful interaction wildly improbable (Parsons 1968). 
Luhmann argues that the double contingency of communication is what leads 
to the emergence of social systems (Luhmann 1995/1984 pp. 104-14). Over 
time, psychic systems encounter each other, select to perform contingent acts, 
observe the response of the other system and modify their actions, until what 
appears to be coherence emerges. The evolution of social systems is made 
possible by the desire of psychic systems to reduce the contingency of their 
own operations. Contingency however, can never be eliminated, and 
communication, even in an era of functionally differentiated systems of 
communication, retains an improbable character, and can all too readily be 
undermined. 
Fortunately not all utterances are created equal, because some of them 
benefit from being conveyed through what Luhmann describes as a generalised 
symbolic medium of communication: 
"Generalised symbolic media of communication are primarily 
semantic devices which enable essentially improbable communications 
nevertheless to be made successfully. " (Luhmann 1998 p. 18) 
Luhmann identified love, power, trust and money as examples of such media 
(Luhmann 1979/1975, Luhmann 1995/1984 p. 161). Such media are able to 
bridge the double contingency of communication (Luhmann 1979/1975 p. 112). 
A generalised symbolic medium of communication is a mechanism additional 
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to language which guides the selections made by ego when attempting to 
comprehend the utterance made by alter. Love achieves this by reducing the 
need for explicit communication between the parties. Lovers can anticipate the 
desires of their beloved and so avoid the need to say aloud that which might 
threaten the unity created by their love (Luhmann 1998 p. 25). And holding 
power allows alter to influence the selections made by ego, but only within 
limits. For Luhmann, power is sustained by the possibility of employing 
coercion, but power diminishes as the likelihood of using coercion increases. 
Conversely, power increases as the freedom of ego to act other than as alter 
would wish increases, because the effects of power are most evident when ego 
has many viable and attractive alternative options available but nonetheless 
makes the selection alter would wish for (Luhmann 1979/1975 pp. 122-3). 
Madness, in addition to being non-discursive and thus incommunicable 
appears to function as an anti-medium. It attenuates communicative processes 
and reduces the probability of subsequent attempts at communication 
succeeding. For communication to succeed it is necessary for both parties to 
believe that they will meet with a reasonable degree of success (Luhmann 
1995/1984 pp. 142-3). Consequently communication is undermined, and 
contingency increased, by the failure of an utterance to make any sense. When 
a meaningless utterance is made, the availability of social systems will not 
avail the parties. Ego cannot parse the statement according to any established 
parameters, and so infers that the statement is incomprehensible. If ego 
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indicates that lack of understanding, alter can try again. But if alter's 
utterances repeatedly make no sense then ego may give up. The same thing, 
Luhmann argues, happens when we lie, or repeatedly present untrustworthy 
information (whether or not we intend to mislead) (Luhmann 1979/1975 p. 93). 
Time is important here, since in the short term time is able to resolve 
misunderstandings and confusion. Given time we can clarify 
misunderstandings, identify disagreements and expose falsehoods. Indeed 
madness is sometimes explicitly defined in relation to time. For example, the 
DSM IV-R states that symptoms of schizophrenia must persist for at least a 
month before an individual can be designated schizophrenic (American 
Psychiatric Association 2000). A single instance of saying something 
meaningless is unlikely to have much impact on the operations of other 
psychic systems. A sustained employment of meaningless utterances may, 
however, lead to the individual being designated mad. This designation 
reduces the credibility of the individual in question, and reduces the likelihood 
that others will believe their efforts to communicate with them will meet with 
success. 
Madness increases the contingency, and reduces the probability of 
communication. The function of discrediting madness is to reduce the 
complexity which other social systems are exposed to, and to protect the 
internally coherent system of meaning they have created from ambiguity and 
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confusion. It is therefore not surprising that efforts to discredit what mad 
people say are so widespread and destructive. 
2.5.1 Who or what can be mad? 
From a systems theory perspective, madness is evidenced by an absence of 
meaning which cannot be resolved quickly, and which consequently forces 
other systems to exclude it in order to reduce their contingency. Typically we 
understand madness as a designation pertaining to psychic systems. However, 
as discussed in Chapter One (pp. 49-51), meaning processing for Luhmann 
occurs both at the level of the individual and at the level of the social. Social 
systems such as law exhibit characteristics which enable them to stabilise 
meaning over time, such as the closure of their operations from those of other 
social systems, their capacity for reproducing their operations, and their ability 
to construct meaning self-referentially. If social systems can functionally 
differentiate themselves effectively, it may also be true that social systems can 
operate in a manner which is dysfunctional as opposed to merely un- 
understandable from the perspective of other systems. The un- 
understandability of the operations of other systems is a constant state of 
affairs for all functionally differentiated systems. Economic operations are 
meaningless from a legal perspective and so forth. However, social systems can 
also operate destructively or repressively in a way which curtails possibilities 
for other systems. This kind of excessive perturbation in the environment of 
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another social system is often colloquially described as madness. The law, the 
economy and the political system frequently garner the description `mad' when 
their operations look set to threaten the functioning of society in some 
fundamental way. Rather than seeing this as an improper use of a term which 
can only be applied to psychic systems, I would suggest that this is in fact a 
further instance of meaningless behaviour constituting madness, taking place 
within a different set of systems of meaning. Another instance of 
meaninglessness occurs when computer programmes crash, and are thus unable 
to interact with other programmes. To say the computer has `gone mad' when 
attempts to interact with it fail, is not to use a metaphor, but to quite literally 
describe an incomprehensible state of affairs. 
Madness then, is a discursive continuum without fixed boundaries, 
which semantically and analytically allows us to group together instances of 
incomprehension. Although the madness of psychic systems and their control 
by the legal and medical systems is the focus of this thesis, the same 
mechanisms of discreditation and control which characterise the social 
response to meaningless utterances can also be observed (albeit with very 
different ethical and social implications) in the interactions between systems at 
all levels. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Attempts to build up accounts that can explain the incoherence of our social 
response to madness have been confounded by a desire to understand madness 
sociologically in `all or nothing' terms. It is either a social construction or a 
real illness, but not both. Similarly, attempts to control madness are either 
wholly justifiable expressions of concern for the welfare of incapable people, or 
excessive abuses of state power. In practice, things are rarely so simple. The 
phenomenon of madness is, along with everything else we know, at some level 
a social construction. It is also profoundly and distressingly real. Social efforts 
to constrain or manage mad people are therefore an inevitable response to 
madness because left unchecked it threatens the fundamental building block of 
society: communication. 
This systems account of madness is not a theory with any major 
explanatory power. It does not help us to understand why some people make 
mad utterances whilst others do not. Nor does it help us to know what the 
`right' response to madness might be. The possible advantages of this 
approach are twofold. First, it makes it possible to theorise about the socially 
constructed dimensions of madness, without simultaneously having to 
challenge existing biomedical and psychological accounts of madness. 
Biomedical accounts have their place, and so do social accounts, and since 
they emerge within separate systems of meaning it is futile to attempt to unify 
them into one explanation for madness. Secondly, this theory generates 
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grounds for speculation about the social limitations imposed upon the 
individual designated mad. In recognising that madness exists outside the 
social, we can develop a clearer understanding of why people who make mad 
utterances experience such devastating social exclusion. We can also begin to 
understand why the law is so inadequate to the task of hearing what people 
who have made mad utterances have to say about their experiences. And we 
can develop a more useful description of the limitations that may be placed 
upon person-centred practices as a global policy within health services, i. e. 
outside the local confines of the therapeutic relationship. 
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Chapter Three 
Knowing the self: the fragility of the psy- 
system 
3.1 Introduction 
How is it possible for knowledge to exist about madness if madness denotes an 
absence of meaning? Since the emergence of the psy-disciplines in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a lot appears to have become `known' 
about madness. Mental illnesses have been categorised and diagnostic tools 
and treatment options standardised. A highly specialised language which 
describes madness, and its containment and cure, has developed. Even outside 
the confines of the mental health `system', in wider society, a large number of 
distinctions delineating madness are readily drawn, such as those between 
neurotic/psychotic, treatable/untreatable and psychosomatic/`genuine'. The 
operation of these distinctions within the domain of popular knowledge is 
rarely exact (Kennedy 1996, Sullivan 2005). Terms like `psychotic', 
`psychopathic' and `schizophrenic' are used interchangeably to indicate that 
someone is extremely mentally ill, with a subtext that he or she is likely to 
behave unpredictably and even dangerously (ibid. and Philo 1996) And whilst 
the term `neurotic' has entered the popular imagination, it is used to designate 
a raft of negative or anxious beliefs about the world, in this case with the 
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subtext that the belief is held unreasonably and in some contexts wilfully. But 
the existence of this vocabulary implies that those using it are confident that 
meaningful distinctions can be drawn between different madnesses, even if 
their own use of it is not especially consistent or precise. 
This chapter will argue that there exists a system of knowledge - the 
psy-system 
- 
structured around the distinction between madness and sanity 
which makes it possible to talk about madness. It will consider how this 
system's operations are differentiated from those of other systems, especially 
the medical system, and explore its coding, closure, and reflexive accounts of 
its operations. It will then examine existing accounts of the psy-disciplines and 
the historical conditions that contributed to their emergence and ask how they 
can be re-evaluated in the light of this generalised description of the psy- 
system. 
3.2 Knowledge of the self within interaction systems 
Before one can examine what kind of knowledge of madness might be possible 
within a Luhmannian frame, one first has to ask what kind of role the 
individual or the self plays in the social world. One criticism made of 
autopoietic systems theory has been that when the theory is applied at the 
level of the social, it seems to give an account of society in which the 
individual is inevitably alienated, excluded and atomised (Bankowski 1996, 
Mingers 2002). This is precisely Luhmann's intention. Society is not made up 
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of individuals, but of communications. He argues that the idea of a conscious 
subject capable of observing its own operations and therefore of having a 
transcendent 'self' s outmoded (Luhmann 1986). Instead the entities we call 
individual human beings are made up of an autopoietically closed living 
system, and an autopoietically closed consciousness or psychic system. Our 
psychic systems bear the autopoietic characteristics of paradox, closure, self- 
referentiality, complexity, and temporal location. As a result, our 
consciousnesses are not available to others; we live with the illusion that we 
can communicate when we are in fact always determining our participation in 
communication through self-reference. 
This creates, for systems theory, a `mind-communication problem' 
which Moeller suggests encompasses three distinct issues: the problem of how 
relations between the mind and communication are structured, the problem of 
how social conditions determine this structure and the question of what kind 
of agency the individual retains in a functionally differentiated society (Moeller 
2005 p. 81). The first of these questions is crucial here, because although the 
operations of both psychic and social systems are dependent on the availability 
of meaning, they employ different forms of operation: consciousness for the 
psychic system and communication for the social system (Luhmann 1995/1984 
pp. 98-9). The mind or self or psyche is inherently unable to participate in the 
social because its operations have adopted a different form (Luhmann 2002a). 
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One way in which the self is made sense of in the social is through the 
coding of behaviours as signs of mental distress. Signs of mental distress are 
read as emotional indicators, windows into the internal world of the person 
exhibiting them. These signs may be best understood within local informal 
systems of interaction. An interaction system is comprised of interactions 
between individuals within which localised and highly specific systems of 
meaning may arise, such as families and workplaces (Luhmann 1995/1984 
pp. 412-G). These interaction systems do not achieve closure in the way that 
social systems do, nor is closure necessary for their operations. Because 
meaning within these systems can be determined locally and only affects a 
small number of communications it can also be adjusted with comparative 
ease. The boundary of the system will either be self-evident to those who 
participate within it or readily redefined when new participants enter the 
system. For example, a visitor to a workplace will either recognise immediately 
that she does not belong to the local interaction system, or she will be invited 
to join in. 
Within interaction systems emotional responses to events may play a 
particular role in ensuring that vital aspects of interior experience are 
communicated to others. Behaviours indicating emotional responses may be 
readily interpreted as meaningful. Between lovers, friends and family members 
systems of meaning can rapidly emerge which make sense of certain acts or 
utterances and enable communication about people's mental state to take 
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place. It goes without saying that when an individual experiences mental 
distress it is generally assumed that those who are closest to her will exhibit 
the greatest understanding of her experience. This is possible because so many 
more communication possibilities exist between people who love and trust one 
another than between those who do not (Luhmann 1998 p. 24-5). This highly 
specific knowledge of an individual which is given expression only within 
interaction systems also has to be able to distinguish between ordinary 
happiness and mania, or ordinary unhappiness and melancholy. Where a 
person makes mad utterances or exhibits acute distress, her loved ones are 
typically best placed to identify this as madness. 
Historically, a distinction about the difference between madness and 
sanity could be generated anew in each interaction system and as with all 
interaction systems the meanings applied to this distinction could be fluid and 
variable. When Foucault talks of madness communicating with reason in the 
Middle Ages (Foucault 2006a p. 145), he is perhaps observing that within tight 
knit communities which have little contact with other communities, madness 
has to be engaged with and understood within the limited frames for 
generating meaning that are available. Nevertheless, where a person made 
frequent mad utterances or acts, then it was necessary to explain this madness 
outside the community, to those who might be able to help or at least provide 
refuge for the mad person. Failing this, the mad person could be simply cut 
adrift from her community because it lacked the resources to support her. At 
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first then, only one crude distinction between madness and sanity was 
required. Where madness was manifest it was treated as a self-evident state of 
affairs, a decision either to intervene or to neglect the person involved rested 
only upon the distinction between madness and sanity and not on complex 
categories of classification (tauchet and Swain 1999 pp. 174-5). 
But at some point this distinction ceased to be effective. There is 
widespread agreement that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
families not only ceased to be the primary locus for care-giving but their 
capacity to deliver care effectively began to be called into question. Large state 
funded institutions were instead created to accommodate and to cure the mad 
(Scull 1993 p. 33, Shorter 1997 pp. 49-53). In the same period a new form of 
knowledge about madness began to emerge which attempted to distinguish 
madness on a systematic basis, and to differentiate different madnesses 
consistently. 
3.2.1 Social knowledge of the self 
Attempts to make sense of the histories of the psy-disciplines have 
demonstrated conclusively that this knowledge emerged within a highly 
complex and still obscure set of interactions between social events. These shifts 
in society included economic change and the growth of market capitalism 
(Scull 1993), religious pluralism (Porter 1983), new forms of political life 
(Gauchet and Swain 1999) and the changing role of the state (Foucault 2000). 
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For Luhmann, all of these changes could be grouped under one heading: the 
shift from a hierarchically ordered to a heterarchically ordered form of society. 
Prior to the eighteenth century the social system in Europe was organised 
hierarchically and the functions an individual performed were determined by 
her place within this hierarchy. This hierarchical model held good across 
cultures, although in every culture and place it was expressed slightly 
differently. This model of system differentiation was extremely robust, as can 
be seen from the fact that the roles ordained for those participating within it 
were widely accepted as self-evident (Lulimann 1995/1984 p. 338). But 
nonetheless by the end of the eighteenth century Luhmann suggests we can see 
that Europe has already shifted towards functional differentiation. Social 
subsystems such as law and politics now distinguish themselves anew against 
their environment by reference not to their relation to the hierarchy but to 
their internal binary coding. Luhmann argues that this shift arises in specific 
relation to the Enlightenment. Rather than suggest that it was Enlightenment 
values which caused the system to call the hierarchy into question and 
generate new structures within which to differentiate social functions however, 
Luhmann argues that the Enlightenment was quite specifically the product of 
the explosion in criticism made possible by the printing press (ibid. p. 343). 
The printing press made texts available for comparison and these texts in turn 
exposed their surplus meanings, overlapping content, unclarities and confusion: 
87 
"The world itself could be compared to a book, written by God in partly 
illegible letters; and immediately Protestants, philosophers, and 
scientists began to read it in different ways. The unfamiliar no longer 
screens off possible dissensus, tension, and conflict. The social world is 
reconstructed in terms of `interests'. " (Luhmann 1988 p. 101) 
Baecker argues that the response of Descartes to this new knowledge of 
uncertainty was to call everything, including himself, into doubt, generating a 
new theory form: "self-referential restlessness" (Baecker 2006). This self- 
referential restlessness is exhibited in an attitude which cannot settle for an 
answer purely on the basis of extrinsic evidence. Instead, the individual 
infected with this new perspective recognises that her own inner convictions 
must be engaged before an answer can be considered sufficient. This drives 
individuals to begin to observe society at second order and generate reflexive 
accounts of the functions which each social system performs. Theories of law, 
economics, politics and morality all flourished in the period of the 
Enlightenment. This capacity to engage reflexively with the task of defining 
what constituted meaning within the system was an essential pre-requisite for 
their functional differentiation and autopoietic closure. 
In addition to generating new functionally differentiated social 
subsystems the eighteenth century also saw the invention of the individual. 
The individual is rendered homeless by the destruction of the comforting old 
hierarchy. Her social identity is now fragmented amongst systems, she can be 
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reconstructed anew as a legal actor, as an economic participant, as a member 
of the electorate, as a patient e In response, society reconstructs the individual 
as someone whose self-understanding determines her identity. The individual 
understands herself as distinct from her social environment, as carrying her 
own meanings within her (Luhmann 1986). In turn, functionally differentiated 
subsystems organise their interactions with individuals in ways which indicate 
that they acknowledge the autonomy of the individual. The political system 
endorses democracy as a means of securing political coordination, the economic 
system embraces the free-market within which consumer choices dictate 
priorities, even some legal systems (those of France and the US) acknowledge 
the possibility of fundamental rights which protect individual autonomy in the 
face of political coercion. 
Finally, this new account of the individual meant that new types of 
knowledge about human behaviour became socially necessary. Demographic 
data, statistics and survey reports all began to take on a new significance as 
the means by which each system could `know' its participants (see Hacking 
1990 pp. 9-11). Foucault characterises this explosion in data collection and 
interpretation as a practice of `biopolitics', a type of power practiced by the 
° To avoid anachronisms I have used the term patient instead of service user throughout this 
chapter. 
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state which serves to exert control over events affecting large populations 
(Foucault 1998/1976 pp. 139-42). From a systems perspective it is possible to 
reverse this argument and suggest that, far from achieving influence from the 
centre, the significance of this data lies in how it was employed by each system 
in a subtly different way. Since specific knowledge of the individual about 
whom a decision must be made is impossible, and since specific understandings 
of the form of selfhood of another can only be built up through interpersonal 
interaction, the insurance company, the judge, the doctor all make their 
decisions on the basis of what is `known' about individuals who share relevant 
characteristics. It is true that governments also make their policy decisions on 
the basis of population data, but this is only one of the many uses to which it 
is put. 
So between the early eighteenth century and the early nineteenth 
century we can observe a radical restructuring of society, a new social 
construction of the individual, and a new way of making the individual 
`knowable' to social systems which does not rely upon interpersonal 
communication with the individual. It is against this backdrop that a specific 
form of knowledge of madness emerges. 
3.3 The emergence of the psy-system 
The history of the psy-system is a divisive subject, with much antagonism 
shown between those advancing competing accounts of the interactions which 
90 
made the psy-system possible. In this context it is not especially necessary 
either to synthesise the findings of these accounts or to resolve their 
differences. There seems to be strong agreement that in the period between 
1690 (at the earliest) and 1890 (at the latest) a new set of distinctions with 
which to apply meaning to madness began to emerge across Europe. This new 
type of knowledge focussed on the symptoms of madness in a systematic 
fashion, and was interested in reformulating the old distinction between 
madness and sanity in a way that could be consistently applied to similar 
cases (see Berrios 1994 pp. 15-26). This new system of knowledge was 
concerned with classification and constructed elaborate taxonomies of 
diagnoses (Bentall 2004 pp. 12-29). It was also concerned with identifying and 
communicating the causes of mental illness and sought to ameliorate madness, 
not merely by rendering madness manageable but by identifying the root cause 
of the madness and eliminating it. Eventually, this system of knowledge 
became concerned with identifying its own internal rules for managing 
redundancy; for identifying information irrelevant to the system. It devised 
schedules for clinical interviews, diagnostic tests and checklists of symptoms to 
ensure that only those symptoms consistent with the condition were included 
in the diagnosis (see Lunbeck 1994 pp. 133-51). 
For Luhmann, the cultural shift in this period from hierarchy to 
heterarchy provides an adequate, if not especially nuanced, account of why 
new types of knowledge became necessary at this juncture. The power to 
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critique meant that the distinction between madness and sanity was no longer 
self-evident and had to be reinforced through the identification of information 
about madness. The power to critique also meant that therapeutic 
interventions were subjected to far greater scrutiny than had previously been 
the case. Those which did not work were observed and discussed, and books 
and journal articles debating their merits were published. However, those 
authors who have attempted to explain the emergence of the psy-system have 
emphasised a number of other significant events within this period which help 
to explain not just why this knowledge became necessary, but why it adopted 
the idiosyncratic form that it did. 
Foucault's account of this period is amongst the most famous. During 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he argues, a sequence of inter-related 
responses to madness arose. The first was the `Great Confinement', a mass 
institutionalisation of the impoverished within hospitals and workhouses, 
which began in the seventeenth century as a response to the desperate 
situation of many of the rural poor (Foucault 2006a pp. 62-9). Madness was 
one of many conditions which could lead to destitution. The mass 
institutionalisation of the insane arose in the context of a wider anxiety about 
the dangers posed by those who had been left destitute and desperate as a 
result of economic crises which occurred across Europe, which were in turn 
precipitated by numerous ongoing wars. The Great Confinement was only the 
beginning however because by the mid-eighteenth century a new trend was 
92 
evident in Germany, France and the UK: the creation of special hospitals for 
the insane (ibid. pp. 383-7). These settings aimed to treat the mad, rather than 
to merely contain their symptoms. At the same time medical knowledge itself 
was being reformulated in favour of achieving the cure rather than the 
panacea. The identification of panaceas had been the goal of early medical 
science. By the eighteenth century a new type of knowledge of treatment was 
beginning to emerge which identified specific cures for specific illnesses; 
knowledge of illness and of cure were therefore inter-related (ibid. pp. 306-7): 
"This was a domain where the constant and reciprocal relation between 
theory and practice was supplemented by an immediate confrontation 
between doctors and patients... this would require a common language, a 
communication at the very least imagined between doctor and patient. " 
(ibid. p. 307) 
Psychiatric knowledge emerged at the confluence of these two events. The 
creation of the asylums meant that those seeking knowledge of madness had 
patients available to observe and communicate with. At the same time, the 
wider shift in medical objectives towards promoting a cure meant that there 
was, for the first time, a motivation for producing a more precise typology of 
mental symptoms and descriptions of how these symptoms responded to 
specific interventions. Madness then, ceased to be understood as 
undifferentiated unreason, but began to be distinguished as a "specific object 
of perception": 
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"Forms now multiplied and doubles appeared; imbeciles were now to be 
distinguished from the weak-minded and the senile; disturbance, 
disorder and extraordinary sentiments were now no longer the same 
thing, and there was even a difference between the alienated and the 
insane, a division that seems enigmatic in the extreme to our eyes. " 
(ibid. p. 388) 
Most famously of all, Foucault posits a specific relationship between the power 
of psychiatric discourse and the consequent ability of this discourse to 
determine what constituted truth in relation to madness and thus supplant the 
mad person as the self-evident expert upon herself. This knowledge of mental 
symptoms and their management achieved enormous influence, such that the 
operation of power over the bodies and minds of the mad came to define the 
psychiatric profession: 
"The great asylum physician... is the one who can tell the truth of the 
disease through the knowledge he has of it and the one who can 
produce the disease in its truth and subdue it in its reality, through the 
power that his will exerts upon the patient himself. " (Foucault 2000 
p. 43) 
Foucault's account of this period in the history of psychiatry is richly 
textured and this summary ignores most of this detail, but even a summary 
helps to identify some of the themes that other historians have pointed to. 
Two types of fear were significant, a fear of unreason and a fear of civil unrest 
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among the impoverished and disenfranchised. Economic upheaval mattered, 
partly because it contributed to poverty and unrest, but also because the 
emergence of the modern state generated the conditions necessary for the 
central planning of welfare provisions, a phenomenon that occurred in 
England, France and Germany during this period. More specifically for the 
creation of a distinctive psy-system of meaning, it was necessary for the 
medical system to first embrace the idea that the body and its dysfunctions 
could be understood in atomised instead of holistic terms. Finally, Foucault 
identifies an aspect of psy-system knowledge that is still evident today: the 
specific types of madness the system identifies have a tendency to multiply, 
mutate and then become obsolete over time. 
A further theme is illustrated neatly by Porter who suggests that a 
distinctive Whig psychiatry can be observed emerging as early as the late 
seventeenth century, generated in response to the threat posed by religious 
faith rather than by poverty (Porter 1983). This psychiatric account of 
madness was needed to neutralise the threat to the social order made by those 
who claimed, as a result of their madness, to have spiritual authority and thus 
set themselves up in opposition to the established religious hierarchy. By 
neutralising the subversive effects of religious enthusiasm, this Whig 
psychiatry: 
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"... sought to normalize and condition the disturbed into the managed, 
conformist, accommodating, pluralist Georgian world of polite 
repressive desublimation. " (ibid. p. 48) 
The pre-conditions necessary for this distinctive psy-knowledge to emerge 
therefore included a challenge to existing forms of social hierarchy and an 
embrace of Lockeian Enlightenment values including the belief that madness 
could be cured with kindness. This theme of domesticating or taming madness 
is also picked up by Scull, although he argues that a discourse and set of 
practices associated with `taming' madness did not emerge as a sudden 
response to political change as Porter asserts, but instead developed gradually 
across the course of the eighteenth century (Scull 1983 pp. 55-79). However, 
most interesting of all, Porter argues that this psy-knowledge took a specific 
direction in favour of explaining and even flattering the neuroses of the elite, 
as opposed to merely containing the threat posed by the impoverished masses. 
Porter's thesis adds further force to the idea that a psy-system of knowledge, 
like other functionally differentiated systems, is necessitated by the 
restructuring of society away from simple hierarchies. 
Changing economic structures also affected the mad in a number of 
ways. Scull emphasises the significance of market economics in the late 
eighteenth century. Once set free from its hierarchical moorings, economic 
exchange within a free market was able to foster the generation of enormous 
wealth, but at the same time it destroyed the social obligations which had 
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formerly existed between employers and the employed. Whilst the poor were 
more mobile, those who employed them no longer shared their community and 
felt no specific sense of duty to secure their well-being. Consequently, a much 
larger class of profoundly impoverished people emerged in England and Wales 
who could no longer afford to provide for those family members who were 
unable to work. These families gratefully sought relief for their mad relatives 
in new state asylums (Scull 1993 pp. 29-34). Wright points out that evidence 
about asylum admissions in England and `Vales in the nineteenth century 
indicates that periods of confinement were often quite short and suggests that 
families might have been making strategic use of the asylum as an economic 
`coping strategy' with which to handle unproductive members temporarily 
when other forms of relief or support gave out (Wright 1997). Both suggest 
that poverty played a significant role in making mad people available as 
objects of study for the psy-system, where previously they would have 
remained invisible within the family. Bartlett emphasises that in identifying 
patients for admission the Poor Law officers appeared to play a reactive role 
rather than a pro-active one, in most cases only intervening after requests had 
been made by family members (Bartlett 1999 pp. 153-4). But the asylum only 
plays a role in providing care as a consequence of the economic system failing. 
A specific form of psy-knowledge is not required if family members with their 
highly specialised knowledge of the mad persons needs are primarily 
responsible for requesting confinement. 
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Scull does suggest that in some cases asylum admissions also 
functioned to achieve a specific economic end. The presence of impoverished 
mad people within the workhouses was seen to have a demoralising and 
disruptive effect within these institutions. The primary goals of the 
workhouses were economic; they sought both to make the indigent 
economically productive by requiring them to work, and also to communicate 
the moral importance of work to the wider population. Mad people who 
refused to work and who could not humanely be forced to work, undermined 
the principles along which the workhouses operated. Distinguishing them and 
arranging for them to be confined elsewhere thus appeared to serve a specific 
economic function, that of maintaining the efficiency of poor law relief 
(whether or not efficiency was actually secured by these means is another 
question) (Scull 1993 pp. 38-40). However, whilst the economic and psy-systems 
may have sustained each others operations during the nineteenth century it 
was other contingent events, including the birth of bio-medical science, which 
provided the conditions necessary for an elaborate system of psy-knowledge to 
emerge. 
Hacking argues, persuasively, that mental illnesses acquire both their 
form and their classification from the specific `ecological niche' they inhabit 
(Hacking 1998). He explores this through the figure of the fugeur, a person 
whose mental illness exhibited itself through going on long journeys without 
an obvious rationale, and without being able to provide an account of herself 
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on her return. He demonstrates that this diagnosis was first made in France in 
the 1880s, when a cluster of cases sharing these characteristics first came to 
light. The fugeurs in question tended to be men who lived in urban areas, had 
skilled work and sufficient disposable income to be able to disappear in this 
way without resorting to vagrancy. They belonged to a social category that 
had not previously existed in France. At the same time the railways enabled 
them to disappear effectively and anonymously in a way which had not 
previously been possible. Hacking argues that the presentation of mental 
illness as `fugue' (a diagnostic category which still exists but is now only rarely 
applied) came about in this precise ecological niche and no other. 
We can apply this metaphor to the psy-disciplines themselves. Efforts 
to construct a stable system of social meaning around the distinction between 
madness and sanity could have taken many forms. The form of the psy- 
system, its fragmentation, its relationship to medical knowledge, and the fact 
that it flourishes within therapeutic institutions, are all products of historically 
contingent events. 
3.3.1 Medicine and the psy-system 
Most of the historians cited above focus their attentions specifically upon the 
history of psychiatry, for it was psy-medicine which exhibited the earliest 
evidence of an internal infrastructure, and of external institutional support. 
But the coincidence of psy and medical knowledge emerging at the same point 
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and adopting overlapping forms could be just that. The invisibility of 
conscious has meant that psy-knowledge was and remains inherently fragile. 
As a result it survived through finding niches within which its accounts could 
be rendered plausible and looked at from this perspective, the medical `form' 
functioned as a carapace within which psy-knowledge could quietly evolve 
without fear of its weak epistemic underbelly being exposed. 
In a paper on the implications of decarceration for the social lives of 
mad people, Coffman makes the point that the medicalisation of madness is a 
new phenomenon, dating back only to the late eighteenth century. Since this 
Period the medical model of madness has gained considerable authority, 
despite the fact that most of the treatments offered in its name do not appear 
to work very well (Goffman 1971). Whilst there are still some cultural 
communities which employ religious, moral and symbolic codes to make sense 
of madness rather than a medical code, it is the medical coding of madness 
which enjoys the greatest degree of transnational and intra-community 
acceptance. Goffman suggests that this indicates that the medicalisation of 
madness serves social functions: "Were there no such notion, we would 
probably have to invent it". Goffman is pointing up a paradox: for all its 
shortcomings, psy-medicine has managed to generate a perception of its own 
self evidence, such that it does not need to be troubled by reflexive accounts of 
what it is doing. Other systems, such as the law, defer quite specifically to the 
authority of psychiatrists with their medical training and not other psy- 
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professionals in the determination of madness. But looked at from a systems 
perspective it is unclear whether psy-system communication can truly be said 
to occur under the auspices of the medical system. As I outlined in Chapter 
Two, it is not inevitable, or even convincing, that madness should be 
understood as belonging to the same order of dysfunction as physical illnesses. 
That is not to say that mental and physical illnesses are of a wholly 
different order, but that the social phenomenon of madness is far-more 
complex and wido-ranging than the concept of mental illness allows for (Simon 
1999). Simon, for example, distinguishes accounts of madness which adopt a 
medical form from accounts generated by other psy-disciplines because of the 
focus of the medical system upon the symptom as a discursive unity around 
which communication can be held (Simon 1996 pp. 6-11). The designation of 
madness as illness is therefore problematic because madness can only be 
known through behaviour (or as I argued in Chapter Two, through acts or 
utterances which cannot enter into chains of communication). Cconsequently, 
it differs from physical illness in that persons are not typically held responsible 
for their bodily dysfunctions, whilst they are held responsible for their actions. 
lie suggests that this guillotine of responsibility, that one should be held 
accountable for rationally chosen acts but discharged from responsibility for 
those over which one has no control, imposes a moral flavour upon 
dctcnninations of mental illness which is absent from diagnoses of physical 
illness. Of course the determination of the cause of a physical defect may also 
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have moral implications. Now that we are aware of the way in which lifestyle 
factors influence physical dysfunction, those suffering from physical illnesses 
are increasingly accorded sympathy to a degree corresponding to the extent to 
which they `brought it upon themselves'. 
Another important distinction between madness and physical illness is 
that, since madness can only be known by acts, there is no possibility of 
asymptomatic madness arising. An individual can be diagnosed with a wide 
range of bodily defects, even in the absence of symptoms which can be linked 
to the defects arising. These defects might in time give rise to problems, and 
one of the key methods medicine employs to improve life expectancy is to 
screen whole populations to identify and treat these defects, even before the 
patient herself is aware of them. Of course, a psychiatrist may suggest that a 
person is at a high risk of becoming mentally ill in the future due to 
observable genetic or environmental factors, but one cannot be schizophrenic 
in advance of the symptoms, in the way in which one can have cancerous 
tissue in one's breast without being able to discern it (Bentall 2001 pp. 95-116). 
Luhmann himself defined the function of the medical system as being 
to restore the mind and body to their usual state of mutual indifference, so 
that mental operations are not overwhelmed by awareness of bodily 
dysfunction as they are when pain, or fatigue, or unconsciousness are present 
(Luhmann 1983). Psychiatry does not perform an equivalent function for the 
body. If and when a patient's mad symptoms are determined to have arisen 
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from a bodily defect she will usually be referred on to a different specialist. It 
could be argued that, depending on what model of the mind one employs, the 
psy-system is seeking to restore indifference between the conscious and 
unconscious minds (Snyder 1999), or between the rational and emotional 
causes of behaviour (Bentall 2004 pp. 205-227). But debates about how best to 
restore calm to the troubled mind of the mad person do not take place 
exclusively within psychiatry, but across all of the psy-disciplines. 
In a further paper on the code of the medical system, Luhmann argued 
that it was often assumed that medicine prioritises health over sickness, but 
that in fact medicine actually has a distinctive knowledge only of pathology 
and not of health (Luhmann 1990). As a result, lie suggests that the code of 
the medical system exhibits a `perverse switch', prioritising the negative value: 
sickness over the positive value: health. It is this perversity that explains the 
medical system's failure to engage in building up a reflexive account of its 
operations. In other systems, it is the negative value of the code which has 
driven the development of reflexive accounts of the system's operations. 
Luhmann defines reflexivity as "communicating about communication" 
(Luhmann 1995/1984 p. 452), and it becomes necessary at any point at which 
system operations cease to be self-evident. Theories about the law are driven 
by the knowledge that legal operations demand their own legitimacy. Theories 
about the mysterious operations of capital arise for the economic system at the 
point where systems of exchange have become so complex that their 
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underlying logic is no longer immediately obvious. In both cases these systems 
had to justify their distinction and explain the negative value. The positive 
value of health, however, is apparent to anyone who has ever been ill, and the 
value of restoring patients to what is assumed to be the healthy status quo is 
therefore generally treated as self-evident. It is not surprising that reflexive 
accounts of the medical system only become necessary when medicine is in 
some way implicated in sickness as, for example, in the case of iatrogenic harm 
(Illich 1977). The dramatic increase in public and academic scrutiny of medical 
ethics means that it is no longer self-evident that the medical system does not 
engage with reflexive accounts of its operations. 
The psy-system can be distinguished in this respect from the medical 
system, because communications about psy-system communications are 
abundant. Two types of description of the psy-sytem are available. Partly as a 
result of the desire of the psy-disciplines to distinguish their practices from 
each other a great deal has been said about their social function/s, underlying 
logics and the conditions necessary for their emergence. Some of this 
communication is communicating about the operations of systems other than 
the psy-system. These works contribute to reflexive accounts of the operations 
of power (Foucault 2006b), the economy (Scull 1977), law (Foucault 1978) and 
risk (Castel 1991), but not necessarily to the operations of the psy-disciplines. 
Whilst these accounts might observe that the distinction between madness and 
sanity is distorted by the imperatives of other systems, they fail to either 
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collapse the distinction entirely or justify its continued observation. However, 
reflexive self-descriptions of their operations are also provided within the psy- 
disciplines. The philosophy of psychiatry, for example, attempts to explore the 
concept of madness using philosophical analytic tools, rather than treating the 
phenomenon as self-evident (Radden 2004). Psychologists and psychiatrists 
have promoted accounts of madness which highlight the shortcomings of the 
`biomedical model' but which, in turn, provide a further description of what 
psy-knowledge should really be aiming to achieve (Bentall 2004, Read 2004a). 
Psychoanalysis was founded upon a presumption that some madnesses are not 
self-evident, but instead wholly opaque, and definable only through close 
communication with the patient. Psychology similarly, in the early part of its 
history expended much of its energies upon distinguishing psychological 
`science' from the earlier accounts of human behaviour offered by the 
mesmerists, phrenologists and other newly supposed charlatans with whom the 
discipline had to compete (Rose 1997). However, these individual reflexive 
accounts do not generate coherent system boundaries, but instead multiple 
metrics according to which madness might be determined. The high degree of 
willingness to engage in reflection upon psy-operations exhibited by those 
communicating around this distinction is, therefore, a further characteristic 
which can be seen to distinguish psy-knowledge as a whole from the medical 
system. 
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The adoption of medicine as a convenient niche by the psy-system, 
does not rest purely on the perceived authority of medicine. The medical form 
and the use of medical concepts such as the symptom, aetiology, diagnosis, 
prognosis and cure to structure an account of madness does, as Goffman 
suggests, perform many useful functions. It allows for determinations of 
madness to be made ostensibly independently of culturally or religiously 
ordained moral codes, although as Simon points out, individual conduct is too 
inextricably entwined with perceptions of moral status for the two to always 
be successfully distinguished (Simon 1996 p. 9). It also allows for accounts of 
madness to mirror existing accounts of physical dysfunction which are readily 
understood. This is important because, as Chapter Two outlined, 
incomprehensibility is definitive of madness. Finally, placing madness in the 
same bracket as physical illness acts as a way of managing expectations about 
the future. All illness creates uncertainty. One important function the medical 
system performs is transforming the experience of something unexpected and 
therefore distressing into something which from the patient's perspective will 
(hopefully) follow a predicted path (Simon 1996 p. 10). However, the business 
of making prognoses about illness performs wider social functions than 
alleviating the patient's own anxiety. It makes the path of the illness 
comprehensible to others and enables the economic system in the form of 
employers, insurers, and the state, to make predications about their own 
ensuing liabilities. Drawing a parallel between physical and mental illness, 
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reduces complexity for the economic system by enabling it to employ the same 
schema for assessing financial liabilities in both cases. In some cases, the 
parallel proves less helpful. The courts in England and Wales have historically 
had difficulty determining liability in cases of psychiatric injury because of the 
problems these cases pose, both in terms of establishing whether the injury 
was foreseeable and in placing reasonable limits upon the extent of the 
defendant's liability (Napier and Wheat 2002, pp. 32-40). In this scenario the 
limitations of our social knowledge about madness (or perhaps in this case 
simply mental distress) are exposed. The historical preference of the courts to 
establish arbitrary `lines in the sand' around the limits of liability and 
foreseeability has been attributed to the uncertainty of psychiatric diagnoses 
and prognoses, and the huge debates that exist around causal explanations for 
madness (ibid., Mendelson 1998 pp. 287-90). 
Despite these factors, psy-medicine is far from immune to challenges to 
its authority. Psy-medicine has simply developed some very effective strategies 
to address the threat of fragmentation posed by the emergence of competing 
models of madness. Whilst hard to pinpoint precisely, the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries saw a dramatic flourishing 
in the accounts of madness available within society. By the 1880s advances in 
neurology had led to an awareness of the role of brain chemistry in epileptic 
behaviour and efforts to distinguish hysterical from epileptic seizures or 
absences (Hacking 1998 pp. 31-50). Paresis or general paralysis of the insane 
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was alleged to be caused by syphilitic infection as early as 1857, and by 1904 
doctors were confidently asserting, on the basis of statistical correlations, that 
the two were linked (Braslow 1996). These events both led to growing 
confidence amongst physicians and psychiatrists in particular that other 
somatic explanations for mental illnesses could be found. At the same time, 
psychology was emerging as a distinct discipline with a concern for explaining 
the bases of human behaviour. Rose cites the emergence of laboratories, degree 
programs, the establishment of journals and learned societies, all taking place 
in the US and UK in the period between 1875 and 1925. He suggests that: 
"In this way it [psychology] would gradually (and incompletely) 
distinguish itself from philosophy and ethics on the one hand and 
medicine and biology on the other, to form itself into a single, though 
inherently divided and fractured, discipline. " (Rose 1997) 
Psy-medicine could have disappeared completely at this juncture. By 
identifying those whose mad symptoms resulted from physical dysfunction, 
somatic medicine was able to reduce the size of the population properly 
understood as mad effectively. Whilst on the other hand, at a time when most 
medical interventions in madness were proving ineffective, the new science of 
human behaviour demonstrated by psychology could easily have taken over 
from psychiatry in managing the mad. And yet psy-medicine survived, and 
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even the strongest advocates for psychiatry can offer only a weak explanation 
for this: 
"... psychiatrists do essentially two things that their competitors on 
either side 
- 
the psychologists on the one side, the neurologists on the 
other 
- 
do not. Psychiatrists offer psychotherapy, which the 
neurologists generally speaking do not... And psychiatrists prescribe 
medications, which the nonmedical competition is not permitted to do. " 
(Shorter 1997 pp. 326-7) 
This neatly illustrates the way in which psy-medicine adopts the form 
available to it, and exploits attributes which make it distinctive. In the 
context of the nineteenth century, one reason why psy-medicine was able to 
retain its dominance over psychology was that the medical model of madness 
chimed with popular views on moral authority. Psy-doctors assumed the role 
of moral advisors to their patients who, by dint of their illness, were incapable 
of making their own moral judgments (Clark 1981). Psychologists lacked 
equivalent authority. At the same time psy-doctors lost patients to the 
neurologists, and in the US this led to angry stand-offs between the disciplines. 
And yet in response to this stand-off, Blustein observes the mental hospital 
superintendents (who represent the ancestors of modern psychiatrists) dealt 
with this `crisis of legitimacy' by actively seeking new models of madness 
which could adequately explain those madnesses which did not respond to 
physical interventions (Blustein 1981). 
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This constant re-engagement with its own differentiation is further 
apparent in the approach taken by the psychiatric profession in the late 
nineteenth century to the newly emerging psychoanalytic approach to 
madness. Blustein's account suggests that psychoanalysis became popular in 
the US at a point when psychiatry had already been weakened by its stand-off 
with neurology. The birth of psychoanalysis would appear to have further 
challenged psy-medicine because unlike biological accounts it locates the 
origins of madness entirely within the socially invisible internal operations of 
the psyche, although, like biomedical accounts, it attempts to explain this 
phenomenon independent of moral or religious distinctions. Instead psychiatry 
subsumed Freud's methods, in order to bring him within their fold and 
neutralise his subversive and demoralising impact on their newly emerged 
discourse (Ingleby 1983). Foucault argues that a popular misreading of Freud 
as delivering a `meaningful' account of madness was promoted by the `human 
sciences' as part of their drive to psychologise the individual and understand 
him as a subject in glorious isolation (Foucault 1995/1972). 
These internal inconsistencies and threats to the supremacy of a bio- 
medical account have by no means gone away, but unlike other medical 
specialisms, psychiatry seems abnormally willing to countenance a kind of 
methodological pluralism. Shorter (1997 pp. 239-87) argues that during the 
twentieth century psychiatry has had to adapt first to the challenges to early 
biomedical accounts of insanity posed by psychoanalysis and later to the 
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challenges to psychoanalysis posed by the re-emergence of the biomedical 
model in the 1970s. Shorter perceives psychiatry's ongoing flirtation with a 
diverse range of psychodynamic interventions as a product of the 
`psychologisation' of everyday life and sees this as a challenge to psychiatric 
`science' properly so called. But we could equally see psychiatry's willingness 
to employ a wide range of methods as a product of the uncertainty of psy- 
knowledge. Lakoff gives a nice example of this in a description of the work of a 
women's psychiatric unit in Buenos Aires which offered Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as an intervention. He quotes one of the clinicians who worked 
there as saying: "What I can't explain is how you could have a theoretical 
construct like lacanismo and medicate heavily without having your head 
explode. " (Lakoff 2005 p. 83, original emphasis). Regardless of the threat posed 
by psychoanalysis to a biomedical model of madness, Lakoff observed that in 
practice that the two approaches were more than capable of co-existing despite 
their fundamental contradictions. 
3.3.2 Morality and the psy-system 
Besides sickness/health, psy-knowledge also had to emerge in the shadow of 
another distinction, that between good and bad conduct. Luhmann argues that 
the moral code in Europe has historically been concerned with applying a 
distinction which is socially invisible. The moral person is the one who has 
wholly internalised the application of the good/bad code to her actions, but it 
111 
is of course impossible for her to communicate this fully to others. Ethical 
theories emerged to provide reflexive accounts of the moral code which enable 
the individual to provide a theoretical description of the basis for her 
behaviour (Luhmann 1993). 
So morality, like psy-knowledge, is concerned with a person's state of 
mind. And where an individual's conduct is consistently bad, the moral system 
is concerned with how this can be addressed. It is not surprising then that the 
moral code played a formative role in the development of some early 
approaches to madness. Moral treatment as it was practiced at the York 
Retreat, a hospice for mad people established in 1796, aimed to offer 
rehabilitation independent of medicine. At the same time, the term moral 
treatment was employed within the French psy-medical system to describe a 
pioneering approach to engagement with mad patients. Charland distinguishes 
moral treatment as it was understood at York from the term as employed by 
Pinel and Esquirol in France. Samuel Tuke, the founder of the York Retreat, 
built up an account of madness which argued that the humanity of the mad 
person was retained by dint of their `inner light' a moral sensibility which 
even the most extreme evidence of unreason could not extinguish. 
Consequently, treatment was offered on the basis of unlimited compassion and 
respect in the hope that this retained sensibility could still be reached and 
healed (Charland 2007). By contrast, Esquirol's description of the rationale 
underlying his mentor Pinel's practice of `traitement morale' placed an 
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emphasis on the view that the mad person always retained a `rational kernel', 
and that if sufficient efforts were made to communicate with the individual 
this kernel could ultimately be liberated and the patient restored to reason 
(ibid. and Gauchet and Swain 1999 pp. 230-3). However, despite these 
differences both models indicate a recognition that the self has to be 
understood not merely in relation to a model of a functional mind, but also 
within the context of a functioning system of interactions. By emphasising the 
significance of engaging with the patient Pinel and Tuke both implicitly 
acknowledged the possibility that madness results from a two way failure in 
communication, and not merely from within the defective individual. 
Interestingly these therapeutic institutions sometimes invoked the form of the 
family in their organisation, and likened their patients to children, even 
encouraging them to conceptualise their medical attendants as parents (see 
Foucault 200Gb pp. 84-7, Charland 2007). Perhaps this respect for the form of 
the family was based on the observation that interpersonal communication 
founded upon trust is generated far more readily within families than in the 
anonymous impersonal context of the asylum. 
It is possible to imagine the emergence of a system of psy-knowledge in 
which the medical form was not adopted, and instead the imperatives of the 
moral code provided the niche within which meaning making activity could 
flourish. Certainly, religious views on morality, the operations of popular 
morality, and the newly emerging therapeutic practices of the psy-disciplines 
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continuously intersected throughout the nineteenth century. And these 
intersections can sometimes still be observed today. Fuchs, for example, sees 
the pastoral care provided by ministers of religion, often in therapeutic 
settings such as hospitals, as overlapping with the operations of psychotherapy 
and yet retaining a distinctive character because it retains the notion of a 
transcendent soul which secular psy-practices typically avoid (Fuchs 2005a). 
And yet despite the significance of knowledge of social mores, the psy-system 
as it attempts to distinguish mad/sane has tended, like the medical system, to 
prioritise the negative value of its code and emphasise the description of 
madness over the description of sanity. 
3.4 Plumbing for the soul 
- 
the pragmatism of the psy- 
system 
The psy-disciplines recognise the profound limitations imposed upon their 
practice by the shortcomings of psy-knowledge. They have engaged with these 
shortcomings pragmatically, constantly redefining their operations in relation 
to the shifting sands of what can be considered to be their territory, or their 
functional differentiation. But the body of psy-knowledge they have generated 
as a consequence remains highly fragile. Whilst psy-professionals have 
considerable authority to ordain distinctions between the mad and the sane, 
their diagnostic categories are in a constant of flux (Horwitz 2002 pp. 67-79, 
Charland 2004), the medication they prescribe is criticised for being at best 
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ineffective (Kirsch et al. 2008) and at worst dangerous (see for example the 
recent scandal over the safety of Seroxat: Boseley 2008), and their ability to 
predict the outcome, particularly adverse outcomes, of psychiatric illnesses is 
demonstrably weak (Peay 2003 pp. 129-30, Szmukler 2003). The community 
psychiatric nurses and social workers who attempt to ensure that the welfare 
of mad people is secured, are nonetheless dealing with the social demographic 
most likely to be unemployed and living below the poverty line. This tension 
between fragile and elusive knowledge and the demand for practical 
intervention is neatly pointed up in the German slang-term for psychiatrists: 
`seelen-klempner' (soul-plumbers) (see Fuclis 2005a). 
The fragility of psy-knowledge is not surprising when one considers 
that the object of this knowledge is consciousness. Psy-knowledge can only 
communicate about consciousness and not with consciousness (Luhmann 
2002a). Fuchs makes the point that a parallel can be drawn between the 
systems theoretical account of consciousness as socially invisible and the 
psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious which defines the self as largely 
invisible, even to the self (Fuchs 1999). This invisibility means that for both 
theories individual consciousness is neither the subject nor object of the theory 
but an `un-jekt', something conceived of but unseen and inherently 
unknowable. Systems theory addresses this paradox by shifting the focus of its 
analysis away from efforts to make sense of social acts, to the level of 
communication, where notions of individual motivation become theoretically 
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redundant. However, psychoanalysis, because it aims to heal the self has to 
make attempts to transform this `un jekt' back into an object of knowledge, 
perhaps assembled from the gaps in meaning in what the individual says. 
What is available to the psy-system in the absence of a direct mapping of 
consciousness on to communication are a number of sources of information 
about the environment of the mind, all of which are of distinctly limited 
usefulness. One source is the utterances made by the possessor of the mind 
supposed to be mad. These will always be delivered through the imperfect 
media of language, text or image, and information will inevitably be lost in 
this translation, thus conscious attempts to comprehend the operations of the 
psyche always suffer from a shortage of information (Ort 1999). Another 
source of data for psy-operations is observations of the body and, most 
recently, of the brain. Again, representations of the physical operations of the 
body inevitably involve considerable information loss, and even once data is 
gained, its ambiguities make theorising about its implications extremely 
difficult (Read 2004a). The psy-system may also seek evidence from the people 
who care for the supposedly mad person. But all of the problems which apply 
to information extracted from the body and utterances of the mad person, 
apply simultaneously to information extracted from his or her loved ones: it 
may not be credible, it certainly doesn't reflect a priori access to the 
operations of the psyche, and it demands considerable post hoc theory building 
to become intelligible. It is the shortcomings of the empirically available data 
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about the psyche which have lead to the emergence of a plethora of different 
theoretical models of madness. Finally, psy-systems have to evaluate what 
they have learnt about the mad person in light of what is known about what 
is considered to be meaningful or rational behaviour within society as a whole. 
This information may also be ambiguous, as the work of transcultural 
psychiatrists has demonstrated (Littlewood and Lipsedge 1989, Bentall 2004 
pp. 122-7). It may also be hard to articulate what makes a specific behaviour 
abnormal. Bergmann (1992), in a study of psychiatric admission interviews, 
describes how psychiatrists deliberately avoided specifying what was abnormal 
about the patient's behaviour, instead leaving the patient to fill in the gaps 
and explain what she had been doing which precipitated the admission. He 
suggests that psychiatrists do this to evade the difficult task of explaining why 
the patient's behaviour was transgressive and required intervention. 
At the same time as dealing with the consequences this shortage of 
information presents for the system, the psy-system is placed under pressure 
from the legal system to provide meaningful distinctions between mad people. 
Foucault provides the example of the `dangerous individual', one who could 
not provide a satisfactory, i. e. comprehensible, account for her criminal acts 
although she might not appear to be `mad' in any other way (Foucault 1978). 
The French legal system in the nineteenth century had begun to determine 
lawful punishment upon the basis of `fitness': a crime must correspond morally 
to the punishment imposed. But the dangerous individual, whose motivations 
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could not be determined, challenged all efforts to determine precisely which 
punishment fitted the crime in her case. The psy-system was then called upon 
to furnish an account of the differences within and between mad and bad 
people in order to enable this distinction to be retained. Such a distinction is 
highly problematic to operate in practice, so much so that in writing about a 
trial held in 1975 Foucault was still able to observe the character of the 
dangerous individual bringing the legal system to a halt. This is just one 
example of a way in which the legal system demanded certainty from the psy- 
system. Chapter Six will argue that one way in which the legal system has 
addressed the fragility of psy-knowledge has been to allow the psy-system to 
largely determine the legitimacy of its own operations. But it is perhaps 
because of this tension between the need for certainty on the one hand and 
fragility on the other that the psy-system survived as a set of interconnected 
disciplines. 
The psy-system distinction between madness and sanity is 
communicated about by practitioners within a large network of disciplines 
- 
psychiatry, psychology, psychiatric nursing, neurology, psychiatric social work, 
psychoanalysis etc. These disciplines have in turn spawned their own offspring 
- 
forensic psychiatry, neuro-psychiatry, forensic psychology, neuro-psychology, 
forensic neuro-psychology and so on. The psy-system in this respect is quite 
different from the legal system, where disciplinary and system boundaries 
overlap considerably. Legal professionals are readily identifiable, and whilst no 
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one is precluded from communicating about the legal code, lawyers can be 
distinguished by the degree to which they participate in such communication 
and the comparative degree of success they enjoy when they communicate 
with each other. Lawyers may specialise, but they typically treat the topic of 
their specialism as self-evident. A family lawyer will not need to expend much 
energy on explaining how family law can be distinguished from criminal law 
for example, even though the two areas often overlap in practice. By contrast, 
sub-branches of the psy-system expend enormous energy on defining how their 
precise knowledge of psy is distinct, because their underlying subject - the 
operations of the self - is the same. This plethora of disciplinary constructs is 
less surprising if we consider madness according to the broad definition I 
provided in Chapter Two (p. 78): a discursive continuum without fixed 
boundaries, which semantically and analytically allows us to group together 
instances of incomprehension. 
We have seen how psychiatry survives the destruction of its paradigms, 
not by endorsing a single method (he who lives by the sword dies by the 
sword), but by defining itself anew as a different discipline to that which has 
been debunked (Ingleby 1983, Shorter 1997 pp. 288-9). In this way the 
fragmentation of the psy-disciplines actually helps to sustain the system, 
because whilst new definitions are created, no possible information is actually 
lost to the system. Although Freud has been debunked, the most hopeless 
cases can still be offered psychoanalytic treatment for want of anything better. 
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This hydra of a system remains fragile but it has an underlying resilience 
resulting from the fact that no matter how weak a psy-theory is it is still 
better than no theory at all. And if one psy-theory is helpful, ten may be even 
more helpful. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Many accounts of the emergence of psy-knowledge have emphasised 
discontinuities between the disciplines concerned. Even those applying a 
systems theory analysis have asked how different branches of psy-knowledge 
can communicate with each other (Simon 1996, Fuchs 1999). To suggest that 
in fact a functionally differentiated system of meaning has built up around the 
madness/sanity distinction seems counterintuitive. The breakdowns in 
understanding between these disciplines and the discrepancies between their 
different types of knowledge are far more evident than their continuities. 
Luhmann is often interpreted as suggesting that in order for functional 
differentiation to arise it must be possible to observe a decisive break; a point 
at which the system's self reference is operationalised. It is clearly not possible 
to do this in the case of the psy-system, to select one event as definitive of the 
system's own freedom from reference to another distinction 
- 
reference to a 
medical or moral distinction for example 
- 
is impossible. But, in any event, 
Teubner suggests an alternative view to Luhmann's: that it is possible to think 
of self-referential systems in terms of degrees of autonomy (Teubner 1993 
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pp. 31-46). In order for autopoiesis to arise, the system must be able to 
reproduce its own elements, so legal acts are constitutive of further legal acts, 
the reporting of medical diagnoses informs future diagnoses and participation 
in monetary exchanges makes future monetary exchanges possible. But 
Teubner also argues that all of the components of the system 
- 
the acts, 
boundaries, structures and processes it employs 
- 
must be cyclically interlinked 
for total autopoietic closure to occur. Thus autonomy increases as the system 
recognises its components, engages in reflexive communication about them 
(self-observation), is able to act to alter its operations on the basis of these 
communications (self-constitution) and links these processes together in a 
hypercycle (autopoiesis). 
Despite the absence of any agreement as to which event constituted 
the birth of psy-knowledge, we can observe a psy-system that conforms to this 
description. It can recognise its own institutional components, a psychiatric 
setting can be distinguished from a spiritual retreat for example. The psy- 
system has developed a highly sophisticated reflexive account of its own 
operations, characterised by a very low degree of agreement, but nonetheless 
generating considerable communication. Finally, psy-settings and practices 
have demonstrated that they are able to adjust on the basis of information 
available to the system about how best to apply the distinction between 
madness and sanity. This description may only be recognisable within Europe 
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and North America, within other parts of the world the psy-system may have 
only achieved relative autonomy. 
Acknowledging the possibility of psy-knowledge being organised around 
a meaningful distinction does not mean accrediting the psy-system with 
operating that distinction especially effectively, any more than acknowledging 
the existence of the legal system means that one endorses the content of the 
law. But observing the fragility of psy-knowledge suggests a further reason 
why discreditation processes are so entrenched in our society: not only is 
madness discredited, but knowledge about madness is discredited too. 
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Chapter Four 
Discreditation: Silencing the voices of mad 
people 
4.1 Introduction 
The exclusion of people who make mad utterances from society far exceeds the 
extent to which their presentation of unreason makes exclusion inevitable. 
This exclusion continues long after symptoms have become manageable and 
into areas of social life where the individuals ability to function has not 
necessarily been affected by her mental disorder. Madness, from a systems 
perspective, is definitively excluded from social systems. However, madness is 
a definition that in and of itself can only be attributed to utterances. It is 
through the work of the psy-system that mental illness becomes a label 
attached to an entire individual which can then be used to define the role she 
plays in society. 
This chapter will examine what happens to madness once it has been 
launched into the social world and how the social processes of discreditation 
and accreditation may account for the scale of this exclusion. These processes 
collectively enable social systems to reduce the complexity of the information 
they perceive about their environment and help to reinforce their boundaries. 
Discreditation processes are a response to the profound problems caused for 
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social and psychic systems by the unpredictable nature of mad utterances. 
Understanding what function these processes perform is a necessary first step 
on the path to ensuring that those who have made mad utterances are 
appropriately accredited and included within systems of communication. 
4.2 Differentiating social exclusion 
Although social exclusion was placed on the political agenda in Britain by the 
newly elected Labour Government in 1997, the definition of this term has been 
widely contested. Social exclusion is typically defined as the outcome of 
interactions between different types of social disadvantage; as for example in 
this definition given in a think tank report on the social inclusion of people 
with mental health needs: 
"Social exclusion can be defined as a series of interconnected problems 
around poverty, discrimination, unemployment, low skills, bad housing 
and poor health. " (Rankin 2005) 
However, identifying which disadvantageous factors contribute to social 
exclusion, and what the causal relationship is between occurrence and outcome 
has proven extremely difficult (Burchardt et al. 1999, Curran et al. 2007). 
These problems with the term have been so great that they have tended to 
obscure the other important question it raises 
- 
why do these factors 
contribute to social exclusion? In the context of this thesis then, social 
exclusion will have to mean two things. One is the comprehensible but 
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nonetheless complicated use of the term to describe the social problems which 
coalesce when people suffer from multiple social disadvantages. The other is an 
attempt to look at social exclusion through the other end of the telescope by 
examining what aspects of what people say lead to their experiencing 
exclusion, and why this problem may be exacerbated by their exclusion from 
the operations of multiple social systems. 
4.2.1 Defining social exclusion 
The term social exclusion is not new. It has been widely used in European 
social policy since the 1970s (Lenoir, 1974), although its meaning has shifted 
over time. It was originally coined to refer to those who were excluded from 
the benefits of social insurance in France, but came to mean those who were 
excluded from a wide range of different social spheres by dint of 
unemployment. It has been suggested that the development of the term in the 
European poverty research literature mirrors the problematisation of ghettoes 
and the underclass in the US (Burchardt et al. 1999). Research into the 
dimensions of social exclusion has tended to emphasise that unlike poverty, 
which is typically measured against income as either a relative or absolute 
outcome, social exclusion takes place across a wide range of social domains and 
that not everyone who experiences social exclusion will experience this 
exclusion consistently across all domains, or consistently over time. 
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Those concerned with social exclusion are typically aware that social 
structures may exclude, and that the problem cannot be conceptualised wholly 
in terms of the moral inadequacies of those excluded (as theories of an 
underclass suggest). They accept that it is not within the agency of individuals 
to alter the fact of their exclusion but they nonetheless conceptualise exclusion 
in terms of thwarted agency. For example, Burchardt et al. (1999) adopt a 
working definition which is oriented around the individual: 
"An individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically 
resident in a society but (b) for reasons beyond his or her control he or 
she cannot participate in the normal activities of citizens in that 
society and (c) he or she would like to so participate. " 
This definition implies that what is wrong with social exclusion is that it 
Prevents participation in society and thus diminishes quality of life. However, 
they do not frame their concerns in terms of social justice: the phenomenon of 
exclusion is unfortunate rather than inevitably unfair. An alternative is to 
adopt the approach employed by Walzer in his book `Spheres of Justice' 
(1983), in which he argues that social equity is based on the individuals right 
to inclusion within the group and is evidenced by their inclusion in a range of 
social spheres such as the economy, politics, the family and workplace. 
Societies which effectively exclude people from the benefits of any of these 
spheres are unjust, even where they have made a commitment to formal 
equality. As a result, large disparities in the distribution of social goods can be 
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seen as evidence of injustice. A definition of social exclusion grounded in social 
justice arguments clearly problematises relative poverty or unemployment 
without having to evidence the denial of agency to affected individuals. The 
exclusion is the problem in and of itself. But this ethically grounded approach 
does not appear (based on the absence of research evidence employing it) to 
yield a more useful definition from which to theorise the causes or effects of 
social exclusion. It is those employing participation based approaches who 
have done most to develop robust tools for defining and measuring the impact 
of social exclusion. 
The definition provided by Burchardt et al. is based on an analysis of 
the British Household Survey for 1991-1995. The five key areas of activity the 
authors see implicated in social exclusion are: low consumption activity; low 
savings activity; low production activity (e. g. unemployment); low political 
activity and low social activity (Burchardt et al. 1999). Although their 
statistical analysis exposes significant relationships between each of these 
factors, the relationships are not so strong that their coincidence is in anyway 
inevitable, or even especially probable when only one factor is evident. 
Importantly the relationship between these factors is not consistent; low 
consumption activity correlates strongly with all other factors, whilst low 
production, political and social activity correlate more strongly with each 
other than they do with low consumption or savings activity. They argue that 
attempts to define the `socially excluded' as a population with distinctive 
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shared attributes are therefore misguided, and that research activity should 
focus upon understanding these dimensions separately. 
However, understanding the strands of exclusion in isolation obviates 
the need for the study of social exclusion as a unified phenomenon. As some of 
Burchardt et al. 's related work shows it is the unexpected dynamics of 
exclusion, especially over time, which make it interesting. In a later study, 
employing a larger dataset, they demonstrate that the likelihood of an 
individual being excluded within one dimension over time, i. e. year on year, is 
much greater than the likelihood of the same individual being excluded over a 
range of different dimensions (Burchardt et al. 2002). So in addition to being 
weakly multidimensional, the problem of social exclusion is strongly persistent, 
and perhaps difficult to reverse. 
These seminal studies on defining social exclusion do not address the 
specific relationship between madness and social exclusion. But it has been 
argued in a number of policy documents and reports from the voluntary sector 
that mad people, defined as the population of people diagnosed with `severe 
mental illness', are also extremely likely to experience social deprivation across 
the dimensions associated with social exclusion (Mind 1999, Social Exclusion 
Unit 2004, Rankin 2005). However, the definitions employed in these reports 
vary widely. The definition in the report by Rankin quoted at the beginning of 
this section, is similar, though not identical to that suggested by Burchardt et 
al. and focuses on the multi-dimensional aspects of the problem. Whilst the 
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government's Social Exclusion Unit report `Mental Health and Social 
Exclusion' defines the problem in three ways: firstly as one of unemployment; 
only 24% of people with long-term mental health problems are in full time 
employment; and secondly in terms of economic cost: mental health problems 
are estimated to cost the British economy £77 billion per year. The alleged 
association between madness and poor living conditions comes a poor third. 
They argue that experiencing mental illness creates a cycle of exclusion, 
because it can lead to unemployment, debt and homelessness. But this is a 
purely theoretical construct; no quantitative evidence is advanced to describe 
how common this phenomenon is. The Mind report does not provide a 
definition of social exclusion but emphasises a quote from one of the 
participants in its inquiry: "Social inclusion must come down to somewhere to 
live, something to do, someone to love ". The political conception of the link 
between social exclusion and madness tends to pick up on the fact that 
exclusion is multi-dimensional and persistent, but also identifies an aspect of 
the concept which Burchardt et al. 's definition does not: that it is intransigent. 
All three of these reports concur when it comes to emphasising the fact that 
simplistic interventions, which tackle social exclusion along just one dimension, 
are not especially effective. 
In an attempt at a systematic review of the literature on mental health 
and social exclusion, Curran et al. (2007) observe that in their trawl of the 
research literature they found that definitions of social exclusion and of mental 
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disorder are not employed consistently. In addition, a wealth of information, 
particularly about the views of service users, is contained in the `grey 
literature' of which these three reports are good examples, and this is difficult 
to compare systematically with the findings of empirical research. There is 
therefore a danger that good quality qualitative data will be excluded from 
systematic reviews. Related concerns are raised by Fryers and Melzer (2003). 
Both reviews raise the interesting point that there is a great need for more 
robust hypothesis driven research into social exclusion. The field is beset by 
studies which adopt highly simplistic definitions of the term, and proceed to 
test very basic hypotheses, and this typically results in negative, and arguably, 
futile findings. For example, one study found that a government policy of 
requiring GPs to maintain registers of severely mentally ill patients did not 
appear to reduce the degree of social exclusion these patients experienced 
(Bonner et al. 2002). But this was hardly surprising since their report defines 
social inclusion as somewhere to live, something to do and someone to love 
and fails to assess whether these correlate with measurable outcomes. Many 
studies also rely on the measurement of social exclusion by service providers, 
but the indicators service providers employ are not necessarily validated or 
consistent across different health authorities, or even between teams in one 
health authority region (see for example Todd et al. 2004). 
If the intransigence of the problem is definitive of social exclusion then 
it would not be surprising if social interventions aimed at tackling it had a low 
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success rate. But as the research cited above makes clear, it is impossible to 
say what works in reducing social exclusion for mad people, because the lack 
of coherent definitions makes analysing research findings extremely difficult. 
The UK Government issued a 27 point action plan to tackle the social 
exclusion of mentally ill people in 2004 (Social Exclusion Unit 2004, pp. 95- 
113). This is to be monitored by an Independent Advisory Group, and 
progress towards their targets is to be measured using mainly existing data 
sources, such as the Labour Force Survey, and the annual figures collected by 
the Benefits Agency on the take-up of incapacity benefits. The report notes 
the problems with the validity and comparability of this data, but at this 
stage the Social Exclusion Unit have only committed to improving the 
evidence base in the future. Although most of the points on the Action Plan 
have now been implemented (National Social Inclusion Programme 2006), it is 
still too early for their impact to be evaluated. 
Taken together, these problems suggest that the difficulties with 
defining social exclusion arise from the fact that it is theoretically 
underdetermined. Attempts at robust definitions have been made, but these 
typically emphasise outcomes, and do not enlighten us when it comes to 
causes. In many cases efforts to define the causes of social exclusion lead to 
circular reasoning: poverty is believed to lead to social exclusion, but social 
exclusion in turn is defined as living on a relatively low income, or as having 
no fungible assets, which are both definitive of poverty. But however defined, 
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the work of most theorists of social exclusion in the UK has tended to focus 
upon developing a definition which can lead to better measurement of the 
scale of the problem, and hence a useful yardstick for measuring the outcome 
of targeted interventions. 
4.3 A systems theory of social exclusion 
The consensus that social exclusion occurs across a range of different social 
spheres and persists over time means that the concept lends itself well to a 
systems theory analysis. From a Luhmannian perspective, it makes sense that 
an utterance is likely to be excluded from the economic system if the person 
making the utterance does not have money or the means of obtaining it, thus 
depriving the individual of the chance of entering into whole swathes of 
economic communications (Lulimann 1995/1984 p. 461-2). Money is a medium 
which is crucial to the viability of economic communications. The ability to 
participate in the economic system is often a prerequisite for participating in 
other systems, which is why living on a low income correlates with the four 
other dimensions of social exclusion which Burchardt et al. explored. In 
contrast participation in politics (defined broadly as involvement in any 
shared cause, from the local to the global) is not necessarily a prerequisite for 
economic participation, so this indicator does not correlate as strongly with 
social exclusion as it does with other indicators such as employment or social 
activity. 
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However, whilst the relationship between indicators can be understood 
from a systems theory perspective, the fact that exclusion persists over time, 
requires an understanding of the way in which discredited utterances impact 
upon future utterances. This is easily seen when we look at the economic 
system, where the logic of discreditation and accreditation is made explicit in 
the use of credit checks and ratings. An existing history of participation 
renders a person creditable, whilst a history of non-participation; perhaps the 
failure to have previously bought financial products or hold a bank account, 
will discredit an individual (Luhmann points out that this failure to 
participate can in turn generate negative feedback and make future 
participation even harder: see Hagen ed. 2005 p. 40). Whilst the rationale of 
the calculations made about whether an individual should be accredited or 
discredited is made explicit in the practices of financial service providers, it is 
not inherently different from the rationale doctors apply when deciding 
whether a patient is likely to be genuinely ill, or that a jury employs when 
deciding whether a witness is telling the truth. Processes of accreditation and 
discreditation intervene all the time in attempts at communication, rendering 
some feasible and others not. Their impact is clearly not restricted to those 
who have previously made mad utterances. People's utterances may be 
discredited as a consequence of their own conduct: if they have previously lied 
for example. Or they may be discredited if their lifestyle associates them with 
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discreditable attributes: if they live in an impoverished area, or work in a 
discredited profession. 
The credit and debit model is helpful here, because it is clear that 
discreditation across one dimension at one time often has very little impact on 
the individual's ability to engage in other areas of social life in the future. If 
other aspects of their lifestyle or behaviour are creditable, then these may 
counteract the effects of an isolated discreditable feature. One reason why mad 
utterances lead to a wholly disproportionate discreditation response, is that 
madness threatens the operations of all systems, rather than just one, and as I 
will discuss later on, it is possible for systems to unconsciously collude in the 
exclusion of mad people. 
This emphasis on discreditation indicates that a systems theory 
analysis of social exclusion might have more to say about the processes which 
cause exclusion, than it does about the effects on people of being excluded, or 
the interventions which might help reduce its impact. As such, it is not 
necessarily a useful basis for developing a theory of social exclusion in 
isolation. But it does provide a useful starting point for theorising about why 
those who have made certain classes of utterance, including mad utterances, 
may suffer the effects of exclusion across a range of social systems. 
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4.4 Processes which discredit mad people 
If we return to Luhmann's definition of communication as discussed in 
Chapter Two (pp. 65-7) it is apparent that in selecting which utterances to 
take account of ego has to consider what makes an utterance worthy of 
attention. A number of factors may influence this selection: relevance, 
correspondence to reality, the esteem ego holds for alter, and whether or not 
alter has been discredited. The act of selecting an utterance does not demand 
that ego agree with the content of the utterance, only that she gives it her 
attention and indicates a response to it (Luhmann 2002b). Luhmann himself 
did not explore the significance of coding utterances according to the schema 
accredit/discredit. He did, however, emphasise the significance of the schema 
esteem/disdain and the role it played in sustaining the interpenetration of 
psychic and social systems. He argues that holding someone in esteem is a 
generalised symbol of the fact that `'others accord with the expectations one 
believes must be assumed for social relations to continue" (Luhmann 
1995/1984 p. 235). Esteem then, is an evaluation that relates to the whole 
individual, and is accepted reciprocally by human beings, most of whom 
acknowledge that the esteem of others matters to them. By acting as if esteem 
matters to them, human beings reinforce the coherence of the social order, 
despite their differences. However, esteem is only relevant to inter-human 
interpenetration and not to social interpenetration. Esteem matters within 
interaction systems because one may require the esteem of one's neighbours in 
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order to be able to call upon them in a time of need. Within functionally 
differentiated social systems esteem is not effectively communicated 
throughout the wide range of systems with which each psychic system must 
engage. For example, it ceases to be relevant once money enters the equation 
and labour is typically exchanged for a wage: 
"Fiere the inclusion of a human being's full complexity in that of 
another is not only unnecessary but is even avoided as a disturbance 
factor" (ibid. p. 239). 
Discreditation also performs useful functions for interaction systems. 
Discreditation and accreditation processes operate within these systems, but 
for different reasons. The utterances of a family member may be discredited if 
this serves to shore up other relationships within the system. The distinction 
between interaction systems and social systems allows for these two types of 
discreditation process to be understood as distinct phenomena. 
Unlike esteem/disdain, the distinction between accredit/discredit is not 
an evaluation of the whole individual. Instead accreditation is a process which 
directly assesses utterances and whether or not they should be accorded a 
value within the system. It is a distinction which is useful within a society 
comprised of functionally differentiated systems because it allows multiple 
systems to make use of shared information in order to determine how to 
evaluate an utterance. Accreditation processes are so widely employed that 
they frequently cease to be visible to those whom they concern. Systems 
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employ internal schema to identify discreditable attributes, which may render 
a person's utterances unworthy of attention, but these schema are rarely 
explicitly identified as operating a distinction around 
accreditation/discreditation. 
Social processes of discreditation affect those who have made mad 
utterances disproportionately. Systems employ a wide range of processes to 
discredit future utterances, and signal to others that the utteror should not be 
treated as credible. Some of these have already been theorised extensively in 
the literature on the sociology of mental illness, such as the effects of labels 
and stigma. In addition it is arguably the case that many of the benign 
interventions operated by the psy-system to protect the interests of mentally 
ill people, such as paternalism and normalisation, function to discredit their 
efforts to operate within other social systems. Processes of accreditation and 
discreditation are clearly generalised symbols, but they are effective at the 
level of social interpenetration as well as at the level of interpersonal 
interpenetration. Rather than existing prior to communication, they arise in 
response to utterances and are intended to have effects over time which are 
generalisable across different systems of communication, rather than simply 
between humans. A generalised symbolic medium such as love may increase 
the viability of communication between actors in love with each other, for as 
long as the love lasts (Luhmann 1998 pp. 20-3), whilst having a creditable 
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attribute, such as an educational qualification, is intended to have effects 
across a wide range of communication systems, and to last into the future. 
Labels, for example, have some of the most far-reaching discreditation 
effects, because they are readily transferrable and generalisable. Applying a 
label to a persons disordered conduct or speech serves to make the 
phenomenon more comprehensible to others. But this increase in 
comprehensibility relies on knowledge about the label being shared between 
actors. Although mechanisms, such as confidentiality, are used to control this 
transfer of knowledge, this is always balanced against the drive to maximise 
the functionality of the label, by increasing awareness of it. But in addition to 
being transferrable, labels also serve to generalise discreditation. If a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia in one case indicates that the person is prone to violent 
actions, then it may mean it in other cases too. This may mean that, even 
where someone who has made a mad utterance has never acted violently, they 
can nonetheless be discredited by association. The association of some labels 
indicating madness with horrifying events or disgusting acts represents one of 
the most extreme forms of discreditation. Of course, labels also serve to 
accredit, even labels indicating mental illness. Porter point out that in the 
seventeenth century a label of mental illness was not inevitably stigmatising 
and instead could be used to accredit women who would otherwise be 
condemned as witches (Porter 2003). It is still possible for a diagnosis of 
mental illness to accredit an act which might otherwise be understood as 
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wicked. For example, the mother who harms her baby may be understood as 
wicked unless and until she acquires a diagnosis of post-natal depression at 
which point she becomes a potentially good mother suffering a dreadful 
disease. 
One way in which discreditation pervades discussions of madness, for 
entirely benign reasons, is in the context of substituted decision making. Well- 
intended paternalistic interventions, whether legally authorised or not, 
function to continuously discredit mad people. Whilst the use of such 
interventions can be minimised, they nonetheless have the effect of reinforcing 
the view that having made mad utterances, such people may be less capable 
than others of reaching sound decisions about their lives. 
Another way in which a wholly well-intentioned project can 
nonetheless serve to discredit is in the efforts made to normalise madness by 
conceptualising it as the mental counterpart to physical illness. As discussed in 
Chapter Two (pp. 53-4), this attempt to elide the mental and the physical falls 
apart when we consider the social responses to madness and to physical illness. 
Mental and physical symptoms frequently coincide, but their effects on the 
ability of the patient to subsequently engage in social systems are wholly 
different. Normalisation presumes that since physical illnesses are real and 
worthy of sympathy, and mental illnesses have similar causes to physical 
illnesses, mental illnesses are equally real and worthy of our concern. But 
employing physical illness as the yardstick for `real' symptoms, only serves to 
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reinforce scepticism that madness by contrast is `all in the mind', and ignores 
the reality that much of the distress caused by madness arises at the level of 
the social. 
This brief list of discreditation processes is not exhaustive, and in any 
given case analysing the sources of discreditation is complicated further by the 
fact that these processes interact with each other and are not static over time. 
And in addition, whilst individuals are being discredited in some ways, they 
may also be benefitting from other social processes of accreditation which can 
serve to control or reverse discreditation effects. One way in which people 
diagnosed as mad may choose to challenge the social exclusion they experience 
is by building their own inclusive communities. The ways in which people 
engage with their identity as `mad' are diverse, as evidenced in the discussion 
of the labels mental health service users apply to themselves in the 
Introduction. They may seek to challenge the structures of the psy-system 
entirely and build communities within which inclusion is based on a shared 
non-medical conception of madness (Curtis 2000). Or they may actively seek 
to enjoy the benefits of having a medical label, which has been described as 
pursuing a `madness for identity' (Charland 2004), and see themselves as 
belonging to a special patient community, within which they are understood. 
Charland suggests that this active engagement with identity may be harmful, 
and cites the effects of pro-anorexia websites on susceptible young women as 
evidence. But actively engaging with a mad identity, whether medically 
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ordained or adopted separately, could in an era of identity politics, also have 
beneficial political consequences. For example, given the current focus on 
involving service users in policy making, an individual researching mental 
health law might find that identifying herself as a service user served to 
accredit rather than discredit her work in the eyes of others. 
Another and perhaps more challenging source of accreditation lies in 
the exploitation of victim status. To the extent that modern political discourse 
often emphasises the `rights' of the victim it may be politically worthwhile to 
be able to assert that one has experienced victimisation. However, Brown 
(1995 pp. 3-28) argues that the modern re-conceptualisation of the law as a 
guarantor of rights promotes a paradoxical relationship between injury and 
identity. Individual claims are founded on the assertion that the victim's 
rights have been violated through her association with an oppressed group. 
The injuries that minority groups suffer are, therefore, politicised which in 
turn helps to cement the social identity of the oppressed as victims. Brown's 
own analysis focuses primarily on the experiences of women. As I argued in 
Chapter One it might appear that mad people have not enjoyed the same 
degree of social emancipation as a consequence of the articulation of rights, as 
other groups of victims, and as Chapter Five (pp. 217-24) will argue the 
progressive movements established in the name of madness have failed to 
define a coherent identity for themselves. But it is nonetheless the case that in 
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the context of rights discourse within the legal system, belonging to a 
victimised minority group may serve to accredit rather than discredit. 
Accreditation and discreditation processes do not communicate equally 
well. The benefit of being accredited through ones status as a victim is less 
transferrable across systems besides law, than the discreditation effect of 
receiving a diagnosis of mental illness within the psy-system. Why are 
discreditation effects so pernicious? One reason is that they are often not 
articulated explicitly and are therefore difficult to challenge. Even if one 
assumes that schizophrenia is a robust diagnostic label, of no more or less 
medical significance than a diagnosis of chicken pox or a broken leg, it is 
clearly the case that the label schizophrenia carries a host of other 
connotations which are difficult to isolate and rebut. Another reason is that 
although recovery from mental illness is very common, the very small number 
of people who have enduring problems have a very high public profile. 
Consequently, madness and the discreditable consequences of madness are 
often presumed to endure for far longer than is necessarily the case. The time- 
binding function of discreditation 
- 
that it serves to protect systems of 
meaning from future meaningless utterances 
- 
is therefore rationalised to 
justify further discreditation. Finally, discreditation often results from 
emotional responses with a high transmission value such as disgust and horror. 
Our disgust at madness is not only a powerful motivator for discreditation; it 
is also readily communicated to others. Disgust and horror in particular are 
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also strongly normative; they tend to encourage those around us to 
demonstrate the same emotion. 
4.4.1 The functions of discreditation 
If we accept that discreditation processes are widespread, we then need to 
consider what functions these processes perform for systems. The answer is 
implicit in Luhmanns' theoretical starting point: that communication is 
inherently improbable because every successful communication has to 
overcome the problem of double contingency (see Chapter Two pp. 74). The 
prevalence of discreditation processes would suggest that they perform a 
necessary function for systems in increasing the probability of communications, 
but how? 
Luhmann has been criticised for the emphasis he places on the 
existence of binary codes which determine what can be understood within the 
system (Wolfe 1992, Grant 2004). Wolfe argues that this emphasis on codes 
leads Luhmann to make unnecessarily simplistic assumptions about the ways 
in which systems `reason' and determine the meaning to be applied to an 
utterance, whilst Grant suggests that Luhmanns account of communication 
does not engage adequately with the ways in which communication systems 
handle uncertainty. The implication is that Luhmann theorises codes as 
effectively and consistently distinguishing the meaning to be applied to an 
utterance, when in reality their application is frequently not effective or 
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consistent. Luhmann's use of codes is not exactly false, but it creates the false 
impression that systems are doing something straightforward which they are 
not. However, as Baecker (2001) puts it: 
"A system is not a mechanical device to ensure closure and to control 
everything inside it. Rather, a system is a highly precarious `dance' of 
ensuring a distinction between the system and its environment, which 
is the only way of ensuring the system reproduces itself. " 
This nicely emphasises the vulnerability of systems and the uncertainty they 
face. And this vulnerability is crucial to understanding the functions which 
discreditation processes perform. 
The identification of an utterance as mad is in itself a highly complex 
process. As the last chapter outlined, the psy-system, which operates upon a 
distinction between mad and sane people, is itself inherently fragile. It bases 
the distinctions it observes on something unobservable, the invisible operations 
of the psyche, and as a result has struggled to establish a coherent and 
consistent account of why mad utterances are made. But whilst the attempt to 
explain and respond to madness is the preserve of the psy-system, the 
identification and exclusion of mad utterances is the concern of all systems. 
Utterances may be deemed mad according to multiple distinctions: their 
information content, their grammatical form, the audience alter selects and the 
medium alter employs to deliver the utterances. These may all contribute to 
the assessment that such and such a statement is meaningless. Often initial 
144 
mad utterances will be identified as meaningful, and ego will expend 
considerable time and effort in trying to apply meaning to a string of 
utterances, before determining that communication is not actually occurring. 
In some cases, the failures may be mutual, with both parties failing to make 
sense of what the other is saying. Whilst in others, the individual making mad 
utterances, may simultaneously respond in ways which indicate that she has 
understood the other party, and thus cause confusion in their mind about why 
they have not understood her. These processes may be resource intensive for 
social systems. They may also be threatening and distressing to individual 
psychic systems. So one function discreditation performs is ensuring that in 
the future time and resources are not wasted by systems, both psychic and 
social, on the determination of madness. 
Another function which discreditation performs for systems is the 
reduction of complexity. Systems have to select from the sea of utterances 
around them the utterances to which they are prepared to attribute meaning 
and thus transform into information. This transformation is both necessary 
and problematic for system operations since information is necessary for 
communication, but also increases the complexity within the system. So the 
system will try to exclude as many utterances as possible, whilst nonetheless 
having to make some selections in order to continue its operations. Lulimann 
describes two distinct forms of complexity, environmental complexity and 
system complexity (Luhmann 1995/1984 pp. 26-9). The environment is 
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inherently complex. System complexity arises because the survival of the 
system depends upon its continuing to mark a distinction between itself and 
the environment. But each distinction marked by the system in turn gives rise 
to greater complexity within the system. Thus complexity emerges both at the 
level of the environment and of the system, giving rise to a paradox: "Only 
complexity can reduce complexity" (ibid. p. 26). Complexity reduction is the 
goal of the meaning-making operations of social systems, but they must create 
complex systems of meaning in order to reduce the complexity of their 
environment. 
Even after an utterance is transformed into information for the 
purposes of the system, internal system operations may seek to determine its 
redundancy. All information contains redundancy. The legal system, in order 
to maintain its own internal coherence, has evolved a complex system of rules 
of interpretation which govern exactly which pieces of information can be 
retained by the system and which must be discarded (Luhmann 2004/1993 
pp. 316-30). Reducing complexity is therefore in itself a complex process. Mad 
utterances form a part of the environment of all systems, and by definition 
cannot be readily included within chains of communication. But they mislead 
systems by taking the form of spoken or written acts which typically do 
communicate. Thus they perturb system operations, forcing them to make 
selections around the utterance, even if it lacks a meaning content to be 
referred to directly. For the psy-system, these communications around mad 
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utterances are the core of its operations. But other systems must also 
communicate around madness, generating complexity in the process. And 
because madness is unobservable, and thus typically unknowable, this 
generation of complexity does not necessarily reduce the complexity of the 
environment for the system. Subsequent meaningless utterances may not 
necessarily be manageable in the same way. To take the example of `I want to 
die' again, this statement will properly generate psy-system communications, 
and potentially medical and legal communications. It may also perturb the 
political system if made within a political context. And yet for the legal, 
medical and political systems, any communications they make about a single 
instance of this statement being made, may not be transferable to subsequent 
instances. The circumstances which give rise to the making of this statement 
are too diverse and `un-understandable' for robust responses to develop. This 
is why systems often employ an undifferentiated response to death-wishes and 
treat them all as undesirable events. Simply discrediting the source of a mad 
utterance reduces the perturbation effects of whole swathes of utterances 
before they have the capacity to disrupt. If `I want to die' is always 
understood as the product of a disordered mind, then it never needs to be 
engaged with upon its merits, regardless of the context within which it is said. 
Complexity reduction therefore extends beyond the need to rationalise the 
operations of the system. 
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Complexity reduction is also best achieved when social systems adopt a 
united front. An utterance, such as stating that one wishes to buy five cars 
because one cannot decide which colour one wants, takes a meaningful 
grammatical form, and expresses a wish which it would be within the power of 
most car dealers to grant. Thus it may readily enter a chain of 
communication. It might also be seen as mad, because it is so out of kilter 
with normal car-purchasing behaviour. If the economic system treats the 
utterance as meaningful then this may create problems for the legal system 
further down the line, if the purchaser cannot afford the cars, or wishes to 
have the contract declared void. When one event has effects on two systems 
simultaneously Luhmann terms this phenomenon structural coupling 
(Luhmann 1992b). Since a 'precarious dance', to use Baecker's phrase, cannot 
readily coordinate its operations with those of another such dance, the 
complexity reduction effects of two systems adopting the same response 
simultaneously will only arise inadvertently. However, systems can reinforce 
each others operations. If the legal system declares that the contract made by 
the over-enthusiastic purchaser is void because of her state of mind, then this 
will perturb the operations of the economic system, and in turn provide a 
motivation to exclude more potentially mad purchasers as early as- possible. 
Discreditation processes perform one further function, which is that of 
demarcating and cordoning off unreason to reinforce the boundaries of the 
system. Social systems achieve autopoietic closure against the odds, and their 
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ability to continue to produce their own internal order, relies on their ability 
to continue to exclusively operate their binary code, and perform the social 
function demanded of them. So for example, the legal system enjoys 
autopoietic closure only because it continues to function to maintain 
expectations about the conduct of other systems, despite counter-factual 
evidence that these expectations may be disappointed (Luhmann 1992b). If 
operating the code lawful/unlawful proved insufficient to perform this function 
(if political coercion were needed instead for example) then law's closure would 
be undermined. The contingency of closure, like the uncertainty inherent in 
communicative processes, contributes to the vulnerability of systems. 
Mad utterances don't simply threaten the internal operations of the 
system then, but also its closure, because they threaten the operation of binary 
codes. As discussed above, binary codes may not be adequate to account for 
the subtlety of communicative processes within systems, but they are logically 
fundamental to Luhmann's account of autopoietic closure. Luhmann defines 
codes as "totalizing constructions" which lead to "the contingency of all 
phenomena without exception" (Luhmann 1989b pp. 38-43). Within the legal 
system nothing is ever inevitably lawful or unlawful, since the existence of the 
counter-value always calls each distinction into question. However, codes are 
totalising only insofar as they extend to data which falls within their domain. 
Everything which demands a legal response must be either lawful or unlawful, 
but, of course, not everything demands a legal response. The operation of 
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these codes may be determined by guiding values such as truth (for the 
natural sciences), justice (for law) and property (for economics), but the codes 
the systems actually apply must be evenly weighted: the determination of 
unlawful conduct is as relevant to achieving the objective of justice as the 
determination of lawful conduct. Third values such as truth and justice, 
Luhmann suggests, can only emerge at the level of programming the system, 
to guide it towards correct behaviour (ibid. p. 43). 
Communication chooses whether or not specific events enter within the 
domain of a system. An event may never perturb the legal system at all if 
those involved in it can settle their differences outside the law. But once one of 
them goes to court, the operation of the code becomes necessary and 
inevitable. However, distinguishing between lawful and unlawful conduct is 
inherently hard, and controversial decisions can lead to political and economic 
repercussions for the legal system. Utterances which cannot enter into a chain 
of legal communications, because no meaning content can be determined from 
them, threaten to complicate legal matters and undermine the operation of the 
code. Excluding them entirely and at as early a stage as possible reduces the 
threat they pose. But because psychic and social systems are so wedded to 
holistic accounts of human behaviour they treat mad utterances as mad people 
and thus exclude considerably more than is necessary. 
However, taken together, the goals of rationalising system operations, 
reducing complexity, managing redundancy and preserving the integrity of the 
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system, can all help to explain why systems are especially quick to discredit 
those who contribute meaningless utterances. 
4.5 The functions of the emotions in discreditation 
Discreditation effects may well appear to have rational justifications, but 
discreditation is also sustained by reference to visceral and irrational responses 
to madness. For example, madness generates a disproportionate degree of fear 
in others, much to the frustration of those who point out that mad people are 
themselves rarely dangerous, and that if they are, they typically harm 
themselves (Wahl 1995, Busfield 2002). The suffering of mad people, unlike 
those suffering from physical illness, also inspires curiously ambivalent 
responses in others, in which disgust and disdain sometimes feature more 
heavily than empathy and compassion. Disgust plays a role both in placing an 
emotional distance between the mad person and the observer, and in 
communicating to others that this person should be discredited. Both 
responses will be discussed here. 
It has been observed that Luhmann pays insufficient attention to the 
social functions of the emotions, and consequently, that his theory fails to take 
account of the role emotions play in causing or driving particular social 
outcomes. Ciompi has argued that this failure to address the significance of 
the emotions is not just an oversight in Luhmanns's theory, but fundamentally 
undermines it because it means that the theory fails to account for the 
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underlying motor which drives individual psychic systems to collaborate in the 
production of social meaning and generate social systems (Ciompi 2004). 
Several attempts have been made to explore how differing models of the 
emotions might be understood within a Luhmannian frame (ibid. and see also 
Staubmann 2004, Stenner 2004 and Fuchs 2005b pp. 80-4), and the question of 
which model is most adequate will not be resolved here. However, emotional 
responses to madness clearly play a significant role in generating discreditation 
effects. The nature of these emotions and the impact they have upon 
communications can help to explain why discreditation effects are so difficult 
to reverse once they have been established. 
Luhmann understands the emotions as operating within the domain of 
consciousness i. e. within psychic systems, but not within social systems of 
communication (Luhmann 1995/1984 p. 269-75). Consequently emotions form 
part of the environment of the social, but are not in any way constitutive of 
the social. The role of the emotions in the social then is not readily observable 
and attempts to synthesise emotion and action to provide accounts of social 
behaviour are likely to prove inadequate. Within psychic systems, expectations 
are necessarily formulated in order to enable the system to negotiate its 
environment. We formulate expectations, act upon them, and understand our 
expectations as having been disappointed or fulfilled and can then use this 
experience to enable us to formulate future actions. Over time we may 
condense our expectations into claims: concrete demands placed upon the 
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social system which we are now so confident will be met that we may feel 
thwarted when they are not. Psychic systems hold both normative and 
cognitive expectations about the world. Cognitive expectations are those which 
we are capable of re-evaluating in the case of evidence to the contrary, for 
example I may expect my neighbour who has schizophrenia to act bizarrely 
and re-evaluate my cognitive expectations about schizophrenia when I discover 
that she is actually a very ordinary individual. Normative expectations are 
those which we sustain even in the face of disappointment, for example I 
expect that my neighbour will not maliciously damage my property. 
Regardless of how my neighbour actually behaves I retain the normative 
expectation that people should not behave in this way. Of course normative 
and cognitive expectations can overlap: I may re-evaluate my normative 
expectations when I learn that the people of Rome observe different norms to 
those I am used to. But normative expectations expose us to disappointment 
in a way that cognitive expectations do not (Luhmann 1985/1974 pp. 31-40). A 
normative claim in turn places the psychic system at an even greater risk of an 
adverse emotional response than a mere normative expectation. Lulimann 
suggests that emotions perform a function within psychic systems analogous to 
the function of the immune system for the body (Luhmann 1995/1984 p. 274). 
They sustain the operations of consciousness when it is threatened by external 
forces, either physical risks, or risks to one's social self, by enabling the system 
to act swiftly to shore up its operations without making reference to reason. 
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He also argues that to understand the phenomenon of emotion at the level of 
the psychic system does not require that distinctions be made between specific 
emotions. The task of specifying emotions only becomes necessary when we 
wish to discuss them, and to make sense of their social implications. 
By juxtaposing the functions of emotion and of reason Luhmann 
suggests that the two responses are separate. Contemporary theorists of the 
emotions have, however, argued that in fact reason and emotion are deeply 
intertwined and their operations cannot be readily distinguished in this way 
(see Damasio 1994). Luhmann's account of the function of emotions for the 
psychic system may therefore be inadequate. But an even greater problem, 
given that Luhmann's focus is upon the social, is that he ignores any 
possibility that emotions play a role in determining the operations of social 
systems. Stenner argues that whilst this is undoubtedly a blind spot, and this 
can be demonstrated by reference to the work done in the sociology of the 
emotions, it can be overcome by conceptualising the emotions as instrumental 
in transforming the operations of consciousness into communication (Stenner 
2004). Emotions should be understood as operating within a transitional space 
between psyche and society and not simply as belonging within the realm of 
consciousness. We can demonstrate this by pointing to how readily newborn 
infants communicate their emotions by crying, and in the process transform 
them into something external to themselves. It does not make sense to 
understand the infant's response to the shock of being born as resulting from a 
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conscious selection of available utterances, as if she could choose to simply say 
she is frightened instead. But her cries nonetheless communicate the 
information that she is distressed very readily. Rcognising the ability of the 
emotions to generate efforts at communication even in the absence of 
conscious selection can be understood as complementing rather than 
contrasting with Luhmann's own account of the usefulness of the emotions for 
the internal operations of the psychic system. 
4.5.1 Disgust and discreditation 
Emotions influence the viability of communication. And their effects can work 
in two directions: they can contribute to regulating the behaviour of the 
individual in relation to the social system and the functioning of the social 
system can, in turn, influence the emotions of the individual. Emotions can 
also interact with discreditation processes, reinforcing and also undermining 
them. Emotional responses can generate social consequences in a number of 
ways. But the most significant driver for discreditation effects is their 
normativity. Individual psychic systems rapidly become aware that the social 
system determines certain emotional responses as correct. Consequently we are 
strongly inclined to indicate specific emotional responses when we can observe 
them in others. Certain responses such as disgust can therefore spread rapidly 
across social groups. The presence of an emotional response to a specific 
stimulus may also reflect underlying social distinctions. So theorists have 
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variously argued that disgust reflects a distinction between moral/immoral, 
clean/unclean, taboo/not taboo, repress/express and solid/slimy (see Wilson 
2002 pp. 49-82). However one defines the function that disgust performs, the 
communication of disgust always marks an extreme distinction between society 
and its margins. To be disgusting is to be associated with behaviours which 
place one on the margins of social acceptability, it marks a more significant 
distinction than that observed within interaction systems between esteem and 
disdain. 
To take the moral distinction as an example, William I. Miller argues 
that disgust is of particular significance to the development of moral and legal 
regulation of human society (Miller 1997 pp. 11-8). According to this argument 
certain things are invariably, and almost universally, found to be disgusting 
and this disgust guides humans away from behaviours or physical objects 
which might prove to be dangerous sources of contamination. But disgust does 
not simply protect individual psychic systems from exposure to harm, but also 
communicates itself to others, motivating them to adopt the same attitude to 
the object of disgust and thus to protect whole communities. As Miller puts it 
disgust "communicates rather better than most emotions ". Whilst such a 
response may have been evolutionarily advantageous it also causes problems 
when disgust responses become confused or are associated with objects or 
behaviours which do not actually pose any risk. The evolutionary basis for 
Miller's account of disgust and the implication that disgust at some 
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contaminants is inevitable has been criticised for being unnecessarily 
essentialist (Wilson 2002 pp. 51-4). But leaving this aspect to one side, Miller's 
account of the social function of disgust as being to communicate the need for 
communal rejection is also identified by a number of others theorists of 
disgust. For example, Susan B. Miller (no relation) has argued that disgust 
works "in concert to reject and devalue outsiders" and is thus of particular 
significance when attempting to understand group psychology (Miller 2004 
pp. 153-62). She gives examples of disgust being consciously manipulated by 
racists wishing to justify their prejudices, but also argues that individuals can 
find their own outsider status disgusting. Thus disgust intersects with both 
shame and fear, legitimating (at a personal level) fearful responses and 
generating shameful ones. Disgust responses are often experienced as visceral 
and inevitable, they can obtrude upon others even without a selection to 
communicate them having been performed. And disgust responses can also be 
deliberately generated in order to increase the plausibility of a claim: the Nazis 
deliberately portrayed the Jews as unclean in order to convince the German 
people of the necessity of violence towards the Jews. Kolnai argues strongly 
that disgust is ethically relevant, it is not a sufficient condition for identifying 
that which should be shunned, but it is a useful starting point from which to 
identify conduct which we find morally abhorrent (Kolnai 2004/1929 pp. 81-6). 
Interestingly, he even uses mental illness as an instance of `moral 
putrefaction', a state of affairs in which the person's core being is damaged by 
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depravity, lust, or greed to the point where it "glows with a moldy 
phosphorescent sheen" (ibid. p. 84). Kolnai was writing in 1929, and this 
association is of primarily historical significance, but it is nonetheless 
significant because it so strongly links disgust to moral contempt and goes 
further to suggest that such disgust can usefully inform our determination of 
another's moral worth. 
Nussbaum argues, in contradiction to this, that because disgust is so 
powerful in its effects, and also so difficult to control, it is in practice a very 
poor guide to how societies should regulate themselves (Nussbaum 2004 
pp. 115-23). She has a point. Disgust may or may not have been a self- 
evidently useful response to danger in the past, but in complex modern 
societies it is frequently and evidently counter-productive. Far from 
simplifying our responses to the world it complicates them, it intertwines itself 
with other negative feelings, and with our more sober responses to that which 
disgusts us and generates confusion rather than certainty. However, to 
disambiguate disgust from our 'rational' responses to the world requires an 
ability to distinguish emotions and reason which, as mentioned earlier, may 
not always be possible. 
What does disgust have to do with madness? Disgust tends to be 
directed towards bodies and acts rather than towards words. This is why 
disgust at the bodies of mad people, the physical conditions in which they live 
and the physical symptoms they experience has been historically significant 
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and remains widespread. Madness is frequently associated with other 
phenomena which generate disgust such as defecation, vomiting and self-harm. 
Foucault picks up on an example of the association between madness and 
`vileness' being used for effect in a nineteenth century textbook on psychiatry: 
"Less than eight hours had passed [since the marriage] when the new 
wife as beautiful, fresh, and spiritual as she was young, discovered that 
the Count [her husband] spent his mornings and gave all his attention 
to making little balls with his excrement, lining them up in order of size 
in front of his clock on the mantelpiece. The poor child saw all her 
dreams evaporating. " (from Trelat's La Folie Lucide quoted in 
Foucault 2003 p. 151) 
Foucault selects the example to illustrate how madness was conceptualised by 
nineteenth century psychiatrists in terms of `bad family feelings' which 
contrast with the wholesomeness of `normal' family behaviour. But this 
breathless description also indicates that a particular disgust is warranted by 
the husband's behaviour, over and above that warranted simply by the 
unpleasantness of being exposed to excrement. This use of disgust by 
association has not gone away. In a House of Lords debate over new mental 
health legislation in England and `'ales, Lord Soley argued that compulsion 
against people with personality disorders could readily be justified and selected 
this example to make his point: 
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'Another case which came to me was that of a woman who had plenty 
of money and was not unintelligent, but her house was getting into 
ever-worse repair. I would have classed her without any hesitation as 
having a personality disorder. 
-Her house went downhill. She set fire to 
parts of it and began to use the garden as a toilet. You can do things 
about a garden being used as a toilet if you can show that it is a 
danger to others in terms of environmental health, but you cannot 
always do that, particularly if they bury it. Eventually, after five years 
of the neighbours putting up with this, I got a compulsory purchase 
order on the house... When we talk about patients' rights, we need to 
understand that for some people whose behaviour is disturbed and 
shows signs sometimes, but not all the time, of mental illness, we might 
need to exercise some control and restraint. If you do not, you are 
behaving like the bad parent. If you say, "Well, it's all right for her to 
go to the toilet in the garden and it is not harming anyone else", you 
are being a bad parent. "( Lords Hansard 10/01/2007 Col. 297) 
Disgust is a common response to faecal matter but the disgust in both these 
instances is not directed at the faeces but at the unusual behaviour displayed 
towards it by the mad person, by implication the mad person herself is 
disgusting. And in both instances, the disgust response is being played upon to 
justify interventions. 
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The bodies of mad people also become objects of disgust when their 
symptoms result in changes to their appearance. Torsos scarred by cutting, 
and the emaciated frames of anorexic people both invoke disgust as a response. 
This disgust is often linked to a moralising discourse about the undesirability 
of the conditions which led to these symptoms. For example, in the autumn of 
2007 there was a furore in Italy over the decision made by a clothing chain to 
advertise their brand with a photograph of an exceptionally thin woman, 
naked and gazing backwards over her shoulder at the camera, with an anxious 
expression and the accompanying slogan "No Anorexia". Their stated goal was 
to deter young women from developing eating disorders which they asserted 
were commonly caused by the images employed by the fashion industry (The 
Times 26/09/2007). But the underlying logic of the advert was that the 
woman's body it depicted was disgusting and that consequently her condition 
was disgusting and should be shunned. Indeed the images were deemed so 
offensive that the adverts were banned by the Italian Publicity Control 
Institute (BBC 20/10/2007). 
The social system can more effectively marginalise madness by making 
madness an indirect object of disgust. This disgust serves to attenuate efforts 
made at communication by mad people, and to further delegitimise their 
claims upon the social. Individual actors may seek to engage certain emotions 
for specific strategic reasons: for example to improve the likelihood of their 
utterances being treated as plausible. But it is important to note that disgust 
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is in no way a straightforward response. Miller distinguishes disgust and 
contempt as two distinct emotional responses which lead to a social 
demarcation, and suggests that contempt has been democratised and brought 
within the mainstream. As an instance of this he cites the fact that it is 
possible for marginalised social groups to feel contempt for dominant social 
groups, such as the contempt black people feel for white people (Miller 1997 
pp. 220-34). Disgust meanwhile remains marginalised, its political significance 
is uncertain, whilst its influence remains immense. Rather than clarifying how 
one should behave, disgust reminds the person feeling the emotion of her own 
complicity in the maintenance of a state of impurity. It is an ambiguous and 
distressing emotion to feel. So, while it can be employed deliberately to 
increase the effectiveness of other efforts to discredit mad people, it also 
complicates our responses, engendering sympathy, guilt and even shame on the 
part of those feeling it. 
4.5.2 Fear and discreditation 
Strong emotions can also simply motivate us not to engage in communication. 
If emotions help us to regulate our expectations about the world, if we begin 
to associate strongly negative emotions such as fear or disgust with certain 
communications, we will be motivated to simply shy away from 
communications about these areas. Fear of the unknown, for example, can give 
rise to efforts to compartmentalise and isolate that which we cannot 
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understand. Fear is strongly linked to disgust as an emotion which can be 
manipulated in order to maintain social distinctions between insider and 
outsider groups (Miller 2004 pp. 153-62). It has been argued that fear is more 
than ever a feature of our social life, implicated in changes in our social 
behaviour and a reduction in levels of social trust (Furedi 1997, Tudor 2003). 
Tudor's account argues that fear needs to be understood as operating within 
and being facilitated by a wider fearful culture which reinforces and 
legitimates fearful responses. As with disgust, it is necessary to move away 
from the notion that fear is a wholly intuitive and inevitable emotional 
response to certain stimuli. However, fear always implies the perception of a 
threat, and the fears which have the most profound impacts tend to be those 
which relate to threats upon the body. 
Fear of madness is not a new response. Foucault identifies a fear of 
madness and a corresponding fear of unreason flourishing in the late 
eighteenth century. A fear of unreason grew in the wake of an all-conquering 
enlightenment commitment to the promotion of reason, and fear of mad people 
as a visible manifestation of unreason was a related consequence of this 
(Foucault 2006a pp. 362-3). Fear continues to present itself in discussions of 
madness, but this modern fear appears to be quite specifically focussed upon 
the threat of violence posed by mad people (Link and Cullen 1986). Fears of 
contagion have been all but eradicated by the explosion in knowledge of how 
illness is transmitted, whilst fears of harm to the psyche caused by exposure to 
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madness tend to be limited to close family members of mad people (Thompson 
et al. 2002). This fear of violence is sustained by the ways in which madness is 
discussed in popular media especially film and television (Wahl 1995 pp. 56- 
83). Reports of mental illness issues in the news are also dominated by 
accounts of harm done to others by people with mental disorders, with 
comparatively little attention paid either to positive stories concerning mental 
illness, or to stories concerning suicide or self-harm (Philo 1996). Crimes 
committed by mad people are also not reported consistently, with media 
attention focussed on attacks which exhibit particular characteristics. In 
particular, attacks on strangers and attacks with a component of sexual 
deviance get especial attention (ibid. and Sullivan et al. 2005). Crimes are 
likely to get especial attention when they correspond to facts which have been 
presented in fictional accounts as well, and in some instances fictional accounts 
of madness even appear to stand in for psy-system accounts in convincing 
people that a given case of madness is really genuine. For example, Kennedy 
(1996) argues that this is what happened during the trial of John Hinckley for 
the attempted assassination of President Reagan. The similarity between 
Hinckley's offence and that perpetrated by the central character in the film 
Taxi-Driver (a film Hinckley was obsessed with) was used to demonstrate to 
the jury that Hinckley himself must not be guilty by reason of his insanity, 
but this evidence was achieved simply by repeated association, and was not 
endorsed by those experts who gave evidence. 
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Fear of madness may have begun as a result of anxiety about 
unreason, but it has developed an internal momentum which cannot easily be 
challenged either by reference to external authority, or to its own inherent 
redundancy. Both fictitious and true accounts of madness have become 
enmeshed, making a simple recourse to the `true' facts impossible. This leaves 
fear of violence dominating people's immediate responses to madness which 
significantly reduces the degree of esteem in which mad people are held by 
those around them. In both cases, the effects of disgust and fear can be seen to 
be played out in system operations, and may be particularly exposed during 
political deliberations on policy relating to mad people. 
4.6 Discreditation and identity formation 
Psychic systems are able to perform selections about social identity: they can 
choose which acts they perform and which utterances to make about 
themselves and in the process manage the impression they create. However, a 
psychic system can never `know' itself in totality, like all systems it has its 
own blindspots (Luhmann 1995/1984 p. 266), in order to understand her own 
social identity each psychic system must project expectations on to her 
identity which can then be tested against the responses she elicits (ibid. 
pp. 313-4). For the psychic system which has been socially identified as mad 
these expectations may be frequently disappointed. Madness does not provide 
an accepted social or political identity for many people (Barnes and Shardlow 
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1996, Hodge 2005b) and as outlined above identifying oneself as mad may 
generate considerable discreditation effects. There are people for whom being 
identified as mad is inevitable; those in hospital or those whose behaviour is 
distinctive and has lead to their being widely identified as mad within their 
community. But there are many people who are able to manage the mad 
component of their identity, by only revealing their label at points where it is 
either unavoidable (when applying for health insurance for example) or to 
those whom they already feel able to trust. Their willingness to embrace 
madness as a political identity is compromised by the fact that a label of 
madness may be something it is possible to conceal, unlike attributes such as 
being black or female or physically disabled. 
Those who advocate a politics of identity/difference argue that the 
assertion of both the relevance of difference and the reification of certain forms 
of social identity is essential within democratic systems (Young 2000). 
However, this can prove highly problematic for vulnerable groups. Connolly 
(2002) argues that all of us have fragile identities which we wish to protect 
and we do this offensively, by labelling those with attributes different to our 
own as intrinsically deviant in some way, thus shoring up our own self identity 
as good, normal and certain. As a result, those labelled deviant by the 
majority within a society are highly vulnerable because their exclusion results 
not merely from a passive indifference to the interests of minority groups but 
from an active attack on them which stems from the majorities own fear of 
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difference. Shared social institutions are both necessary to human wellbeing 
and formative of identity, but they also exclude and marginalise, and Connolly 
argues that this paradox of difference cannot be resolved, only endlessly 
addressed and engaged with through the political process. The ambivalence 
people feel about engaging with madness as an identity provides a partial 
explanation for the comparative instability of the mad civil rights movement 
despite its ability to be structured around a shared identity of victimhood (see 
Chapter Five pp. 217-24). 
4.7 How does discreditation intersect with stigma and 
labelling theory? 
Observing that mad people suffer discreditation is hardly new. Perhaps the 
most influential description of the causes of and effects of this discreditation 
has been provided by Erving Coffman in his book on stigma. Coffman defines 
stigma as a social response to "an attribute which is deeply discrediting" 
(Goffman 1990/1968 p. 3). Stigma, in Goffman's definition, generated a 
discrepancy between an individual's virtual social identity, which is composed 
of all the characteristics others assume her to have, and her actual identity, 
which is composed of the actual characteristics or attributes she possesses. 
This process is not inevitably negative. But mental illness is one example of a 
"trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he 
meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other attributes have on us" 
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(ibid. p. 15). Stigma pervades the social meanings applied to a specific 
attribute, so that even where misconceptions about specific labels are rebutted, 
the effects of stigma, can still be observed. The impact of a stigmatised trait 
can be influenced by attributes, such as how easy it is to conceal and how 
much it disrupts normal interaction between the stigmatised person and those 
around her. The stigma that attaches to mental illness is thought to have 
considerable impact on the lifestyles, health outcomes and even the degree of 
physical safety which mentally ill people enjoy. As a result stigma reduction 
has become a government priority, and anti-stigma campaigns are one of the 
strategies for mental health promotion outlined in the National Service 
Framework for Mental Health (DH 1999a). Stigma is also closely identified 
with the social exclusion of mad people (Social Exclusion Unit 2004 pp. 24-33), 
and with discrimination against mad people within the economic system 
(Sayce 1998). 
Stigma is theorised as a generalised social process which attaches to a 
specific attribute and has unspecified but immense implications for that 
person's future acceptance within the group. The rationale for this is not 
systematic, but is borne out of conceiving of a generic distinction between 
`normals' and `abnormals'. Coffman does not explore the origins of stigma, but 
Reidpath et al. (2005) suggest a structural account of the emergence of stigma 
effects. They argue that historically social groups needed to restrict 
membership according to a criterion of social value. People with low social 
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value are those whom it is feared will not reciprocate in an exchange of social 
goods; who will, in other words, `cheat' the system. However, employing a 
generalised concept of stigma, as Goffman does, does not necessarily generate 
useful accounts of what functions stigma performs. Goffman suggests that it is 
possible to generalise about stigma as it affects mad people, black people, gay 
people and disabled people, because all of these stigma effects are grounded in 
the disapproval of the majority for social deviance (Goffman 1990/1968 
pp. 151-3). In practice, the reasons why people are discredited on the basis of 
these very disparate attributes are distinctly different, and the functions their 
discreditation will perform also vary. 
Labelling theory goes further than Goffman's account of social stigma 
by suggesting that the label of mental illness not only leads to ill informed 
assumptions being made about the individual, but argues that these 
assumptions in turn perpetuate the supposedly deviant behaviour which is 
being stigmatised (Scheff 1999). According to Scheff's theory, applying a label 
to an individual alters the expectations of those around her, which in turn 
forces the individual to adopt the social role of `being mentally ill'. A person's 
social identity is then constructed upon the basis that she is mentally ill, and 
in time this becomes a stable component of her identity which she is not 
empowered to challenge or shake off. The aetiological dimension of Scheff s 
theory has been highly controversial, since it challenges the view that 
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psychopathological symptoms are biologically based, and instead suggests that 
mental illness is predominantly a social construction. 
Some of the critics of labelling theory have argued that the empirical 
evidence that societal responses such as stigma have such a major impact on 
individual behaviour is weak. Instead, it is argued that it is the mad 
individual's behaviour which causes the social rejection she suffers (Gove 
1982). However, Link et al. (1987) refute this. They suggest that although 
aggregate data taken from surveys about social attitudes to mental illness in 
the US demonstrated that, on the whole, attitudes were not as negative as 
either Scheff or Coffman might have supposed, there is nonetheless a 
significant section of the community which holds negative beliefs about people 
with mental illness, and in particular assumes that mental illness is closely 
correlated with dangerousness. Most importantly, people with mental health 
needs have no way of knowing who these individuals are in advance, so many 
conceal their diagnosis of mental illness as a defensive strategy. In a later 
study Link et al. (1989) found that when they surveyed current service users, 
former service users, and individuals who had never used services, about the 
effects of labelling the majority tended to agree that people with mental health 
needs will be rejected socially. Moreover, the strength of this belief amongst 
services users tended to have a significant impact on their help seeking 
behaviour: the stronger their belief that they would be rejected, the less likely 
they were to seek help outside the home. This held true even when the 
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severity of the person's psychopathological symptoms had been controlled for: 
that is the effect on their help seeking behaviour could not be explained as 
being the result of their holding false or excessively negative beliefs resulting 
from mental illness. They suggest a `modified labelling theory approach', and 
although they do not share Scheff's view that socially deviant behaviour can 
be explained as the result of having a label of deviance applied, they 
nonetheless agree that the widespread belief in the existence of negative social 
attitudes reinforces the mentally ill persons role as `deviant' and contributes to 
their social exclusion. 
Hacking proposes a further refinement to the way in which we 
understand the intersection between labels and identity. He argues that 
classifications of dysfunctional conditions such as mental illness generate 
`looping effects' which other types of labels do not precisely because the person 
to whom the label is applied is also interacting with those applying the label 
(Hacking 1986). Some formerly clinical labels such as homosexual take on a 
general social meaning. The homosexual may meaningfully apply the term to 
herself without any form of clinical diagnosis. Thus to argue, as some labelling 
theorists have, that the label homosexual creates the entirety of the social 
category of homosexual and the behaviours associated with the label is 
untenable. At some point after the creation of the category it took on a social 
and political significance of its own which cannot be reduced to the original 
clinical distinction. The same does not apply for many diagnoses of mental 
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illness. The labels that are applied to mad people have remained within the 
gift of the psy-system. These psy-system classifications then are a type of 
`interactive kind': their application influences the behaviour of the person 
being labelled and in turn the person being labelled influences the subsequent 
application of the label (Hacking 1999 p. 103). To take this argument full 
circle, Hacking in turn acknowledges the significance of Goffman's own work 
on the sociology of face-to-face interactions in explaining how interaction 
influences subsequent behaviour (Hacking 2004). He also argues that 
Goffman's work provides an example of an interactive kind in action. 
Goffman's work on the totalising effects of life within asylums (Coffman 1961) 
provided a classification for the disquiet the wider public already felt about 
the practices that occurred within these places. In turn, the availability of this 
classification of the asylum as a totalising institution contributed to the 
movement to close down such hospitals, thus rendering the specific description 
obsolete (although totalising institutions can still be observed). 
Discreditation is clearly implicated in stigma, but are discreditation 
processes as I have described them above analogous to stigma? I would argue 
not. Stigma is itself a poorly defined phenomenon, and the case for its generic 
effects is not made out. In the 40 years since Goffman's book on stigma was 
first published many of the stigma effects he has identified have been 
transformed. Attitudes to ethnicity, sexual orientation and even disability 
have shifted immeasurably. These changes could not have been predicted by 
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Goffman, because his focus on interpersonal sociology is unable to generate an 
account of how wholesale social change arises. The stigma associated with 
mental illness, however, has remained curiously resistant to change. I would 
argue that stigma may be a further example of an interactive kind of 
classification, and that the shortcomings of stigma as a functional account of 
exclusion have helped to perpetuate many of the effects Goffman described. 
For example, the focus of many attempts to de-stigmatise mental illness has 
been on normalisation. This reflects the underlying distinction between normal 
and abnormal applied by the stigma model of discreditation. Mental illness can 
be normalised by arguing that it is an `illness like any other'. The approach 
implies that physical illness represents the yardstick whereby the genuineness 
or otherwise of a socially dysfunctional behaviour can be assessed, which is 
problematic because as Chapter Two argued, madness will always fall short of 
the physical illness yardstick and will therefore always be comparatively 
discreditable. The ineffectiveness of this approach has been emphasised by a 
review of the empirical literature on anti-stigma, campaigns which found that, 
internationally, the public were more sympathetic to psychosocial accounts of 
mental disorder than biomedical accounts (Read et a]. 2006). Rather than 
accrediting mental illness, many anti-stigma campaigns served to further 
discredit people and to reinforce existing fears about the dangers of mental 
illness. It has been argued that campaigns to reduce stigma through public 
education are: 
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"underpinned by a view that those who stigmatise have the agentive 
capacity to behave differently, and that knowledge is all that stands in 
the way of the behaviour change" (Reidpath et al. 2005). 
In practice this has not been shown to be the case at a whole population level. 
Mental health surveys indicate that on some measures public attitudes to 
mental illness in the UK have worsened in recent years, despite a number of 
stigma reduction campaigns such as the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
`Changing Minds' campaign. In the UK in particular, more of the population 
now believes that not enough is being done to protect the public from 
mentally ill people than was the case in the 1990s (DH 2003, Shift 2007, Shift 
2008). 
4.8 Conclusion 
Although the case for stigma is not made out, the existence of stigma as a 
category indicates a widespread awareness that mad people experience degrees 
of disdain and discreditation which are out of proportion to the symptoms 
they display. Accreditation and esteem processes do, however, perform 
demonstrably useful functions for social and interaction systems, which may 
explain why crude attempts at re-accrediting mad people fail to have much 
social impact. 
Esteem functions exclusively within interaction systems, and can be 
best observed through the kind of micro-sociology Goffman specialised in. 
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However, the effects of esteem cannot simply account for the much wider 
exclusion from social systems which mad people encounter. To explain how 
this exclusion can arise, without the need for any face-to-face interaction, it is 
necessary to explain how a generalised code of accredit /discredit is employed 
by social systems, in order to filter out irrelevant information and maintain 
their boundaries effectively. This generalised code has a particular relation to 
utterances; those who are able to communicate meaning most effectively 
within the interaction systems to which they belong will be the people who 
enjoy the most widespread accreditation across other social systems. Mad 
people acquire their label through a failure to contribute meaningfully within 
communication and as a result suffer a high degree of discreditation. This is 
not to say this discreditation is justified, these processes are necessarily crude 
and function to exclude both meaningful and meaningless utterances from 
social systems. However, being excluded from social systems, especially the 
economic system, places mad people in a weak position to challenge their 
exclusion. Discreditation affects are not unique to madness: being associated 
with untrustworthy or criminal behaviour will have similar consequences for 
example. But discreditation effects will have less significant consequences for 
groups whose ability to communicate meaningfully is not assumed to be 
compromised by the attribute which discredits them. The specific relationship 
madness bears to meaning can help to explain why mad people suffer such a 
high degree of social exclusion. 
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The last three chapters have sought to outline how Luhmann might 
have understood the silence of mad people as a social phenomenon. Inspired by 
the idea of social systems, it has been possible to identify some key features of 
the social phenomenon of madness. In particular, I identify madness as evident 
when someone says something which cannot be understood. If efforts at 
clarification fail, `mad' is the residual diagnosis. Consequently, madness is 
inherently uncommunicative. However, it is rare for anyone to exclusively 
make mad utterances, and if they do go through a period of making only mad 
utterances this proves, in most cases, to be temporary. In Luhmannian terms 
it is not possible for a person to be ` mad', only their utterances can garner this 
description, but socially the term `mad' and any of a number of related labels 
are readily applied to someone once their madness is deemed manifest through 
their acts or utterances. 
This designation as mad has massive social consequences. Some of 
these consequences are inevitable, but many of them are wholly 
disproportionate to the degree of unreason displayed by the mad person. In 
addition the task, which is reserved for the psy-system, of determining when 
someone is `mad' (properly so called) is itself inherently difficult, because so 
little information is available to the system to aid it in making its distinctions. 
The next two chapters will examine the role of law and policy in redressing 
the enforced silence of mad people. The legal and political systems have been 
called upon to secure a number of outcomes for mad people: freedom from 
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arbitrary or excessive interventions, freedom from discrimination, and 
increasingly positive rights including rights to participate in decisions reached 
about their lives. But these systems have no internal account of madness to 
draw upon when reaching conclusions about applicants, and are as likely to 
discredit mad people as any other system. Can systems theory provide a more 
useful account of the limitations of mental health law than is provided by 
existing theories? 
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Chapter Five 
The promotion of involvement as a strategy for 
accrediting mad people 
5.1 Introduction 
Our society struggles to make sense of madness, and one of the consequences 
of this has been to allow processes of discreditation to flourish. Madness is 
incomprehensible and social systems excessively exclude the contributions to 
society made by mad people because they wish to avoid wasting resources on 
unsuccessful efforts at communication. Whilst the knowledge of the psy-system 
represents the most widely accepted schema within which to make sense of 
madness, the psy-system is in a weak position to challenge the discreditation 
of mad people because its own knowledge base is inherently unstable and 
consequently implausible, and because the system's autopoietic closure limits 
its ability to steer the operations of other systems. 
One strategy which may serve to reduce the degree of discreditation 
mad people experience is the active promotion of their right to involvement in 
the decisions which affect their lives. As outlined in Chapter One (pp. 14-30), 
the importance of involving health service users in decision-making is heavily 
emphasised in current healthcare policy, and the importance of participation is 
increasingly being given attention within human rights discourse too. This 
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chapter will ask whether involvement policies as they are envisaged currently 
can overcome the effects of discreditation and increase the possibilities for 
meaningful communication between mad people and decision makers. It will 
start by describing Luhmann's critique of the usefulness of social law and 
policy intended to steer specific social outcomes. It will then consider what 
kind of outcomes involvement policies are trying to steer services towards, and 
ask how effective involvement practices have been at achieving these 
outcomes. Finally, it will examine what reasons the existing research literature 
advances for some of the shortcomings of involvement policy and asks whether 
these can be understood differently from a systems theory perspective. 
5.2 Reforming mental health law and policy: the 
limits of steering 
Lulimann's model of society indicates that absolute control through 
communication is always impossible, since communication always leaves open 
the possibility of ego making a different selection to that intended by alter. 
The imposition of coercive force renders temporary control possible but always 
offers limited returns over time. Indeed the use of coercion is diametrically 
opposed to communication since as Luhmann points out: 
"the person exercising coercion must himself take over the burden of 
selection and decision to the same degree as coercion is being exercised 
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- 
for many cases we can even say that coercion has to be exercised 
where these is lack of power" (Luhmann 1979/1974 p. 112) 
Not only is absolute control through communication not possible, but 
communication itself is frequently impossible. As Chapter Six will outline 
(pp. 236-7), the legal system performs a stabilising rather than a controlling 
function upon society which it achieves through effective internal 
communication dependent upon its operational closure. Luhmann speculates 
that efforts to achieve social change through the law are limited by a number 
of factors. The first is that many modern legal systems are characterised by 
the complexity of the regulatory frameworks they prescribe. Legal systems 
have responded to the growing factual complexity of society by reaching 
decisions in a multitude of new ways, without a corresponding growth in the 
interdependence of the decisions reached (Luhmann 1985/1974 pp. 249-55). As 
the next chapter will demonstrate, the mental health legal system exhibits this 
low interdependence perfectly. Legal decisions reached by non-legal actors are 
reached with a low degree of uniformity (Peay 2003 pp. 14-5). There is also 
evidence which suggests that the underlying rationales for Mental Health 
Review Tribunal (MHRT) decisions may vary considerably (Perkins 2003 
pp. 126-9). Like cases are not treated alike, and MHRT decisions do not 
necessarily reflect a conception of the law which is shared with first order 
decision-makers (Peay 1989 pp. 70-1). And the analysis of case law on the 
MIIRT which I describe in Chapter Six shows that the High Court in England 
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and Vales itself employs quite disparate approaches to reasoning about the 
application of mental health law (although the outcomes in terms of who wins 
and who loses betray a high level of consistency). It is only at the level of the 
Court of Appeal and House of Lords that consistency in reasoning seems to 
occur. At this level there are only a few decisions to be reached, and the 
decisions that get as far as the higher courts tend to display a high degree of 
factual consistency; unusual or outlier cases having been filtered out by the 
system at an earlier stage. So we can achieve consistency in legal decision- 
making if we restrict our decision-making to a handful of cases largely 
concerning service users detained in special hospitals. Or we can make 
decisions which cover a wide range of circumstances. But we cannot expect, 
given the numbers of decision-makers and decision-making processes involved, 
to achieve the latter consistently all of the time. Luhmann argues that whilst 
this compromise position may be adequate it calls into question the usefulness 
of hard law as an instrument for engineering social change. 
Luhmann develops this idea in a paper entitled `The Limits of Steering' 
in which he employs the metaphor of steering as opposed to planning 
(Lulimann 1997a). Having observed that central planning can be 
counterproductive, Luhmann observes that many modern political systems 
have opted instead to employ techniques of steering. Steering does not involve 
prescribing specific outcomes, but framing choices in such a way as to provide 
incentives towards making the choices the political system wishes one to make 
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anyway. Luhmann's identification of this trend was prescient, since in the 
decade since this paper was written, steering appears to have become the 
preferred governmental response to engineering social change in many neo- 
liberal political systems. Steering always implies an attempt to reduce 
difference, to guide operations in such a way as to coordinate them 
successfully with the system's own objectives. For Luhmann, steering is 
possible in physical interactions, and occasionally within inter-human 
interaction. But steering of other social systems is always illusory; whilst the 
political system may be able to steer its own internal operations it is only able 
to produce effects within the environment of other systems which they will 
then adjust to, but these effects and counter-effects do not amount to steering. 
In these cases efforts to employ policy and positive law to `steer' social change 
are compromised, but Luhmann recognises that this is no longer merely a 
problem of complexity, but occurs as a result of the difference-minimising 
objectives of each and every social system. This argument implies that 
significant limitations apply to efforts to reform mental health law and policy 
to promote better or fairer outcomes for mad people. 
5.3 Mental health policy and the promotion of service 
user's voices 
As Chapter One made clear (pp. 14-23), in recent years there has been a strong 
trend evident in healthcare law and policy on healthcare towards the 
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accreditation of users of health and welfare services as the experts upon their 
own lives. In England and Wales, policies to promote service user involvement 
or participation in healthcare have been vigorously advanced and a series of 
specialist bodies have been created to promote such involvement at every level 
of health and social care decision making. These policies apply to mental 
health service provision too. However, the fact that discreditation processes 
and the possibility of coercion might undermine service user involvement is 
rarely acknowledged. 
A systems theoretical approach challenges the view that there are self- 
evident benefits for mad people resulting from policy and legal reforms 
intended to promote their involvement. At the same time it points up some of 
the limitations of efforts to challenge discreditation or exclusion which have 
failed to recognise how deep-rooted the social processes underlying these 
problems actually are. This chapter will review the evidence available on the 
effectiveness of involvement policies and ask how the strengths and weaknesses 
identified within the research literature can be comprehended from within a 
systems theoretical frame. 
5.4 The meanings of involvement 
The research literature on involvement in mental health services is still small 
and rarely addresses the issue of what is meant by involvement. However on 
closer examination a number of different definitions of involvement appear to 
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be being used, and the concepts underpinning these definitions are often very 
disparate indeed. The models of involvement that are most apparent within 
the research literature and reviewed here include involvement as engagement, 
involvement as participation and involvement as control. This diversity of 
interpretations betrays the fact that the term `involvement' is capable of being 
employed in different ways by different systems. 
5.4.1 Involvement as engagement 
As a major public policy initiative, involvement merits a mention in most new 
public policy documents relating to healthcare. Involvement, here, is typically 
described as desirable insofar as it helps improve health outcomes. For 
example a report on the evidence for patient and public involvement states 
that: 
"The outcomes for patients, for staff, for communities and for health 
are almost universally positive... patient involvement improves patient 
satisfaction and is rewarding for professionals. " (DII 2004). 
The website for the NITS Centre for Involvement states that: 
"We believe involvement drives a patient-led NHS by: 
  
improving the patient experience; 
" generating mutually supportive relationships between patients and 
professionals; 
" engaging with local communities; and 
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developing responsive and publicly accountable services. " 
(www. nhseentreforinvolvement. nhs. uk, accessed on 10/05/2008) 
And to reiterate Chapter One, the National Service Framework for Mental 
Health also states that 
"When service users are involved in agreeing and reviewing the [care] 
plan, the quality of care improves, and their satisfaction with services 
increases. " (DII 1999b) 
In all of these cases however, the evidence provided to support the assertion 
that involvement improves service user satisfaction is either weak or non- 
existent. 
One mechanism for achieving these purported improvements in 
healthcare for mad people is suggested by Latvala (2002). She argues that it is 
desirable to ensure that service users feel that they are active participants in 
their own care because this will make them more likely to cooperate with 
professionals. She sums up this model of involvement in a later study as: 
"The patient cooperates with professionals, sharing and modifying 
his/her individual and shared awareness of care during the processes of 
planning, implementation and assessment. The patient as a responsible 
participant in his/her care needs professional support, which helps 
him/her become aware of his/her own possibilities, be able to analyse 
these possibilities and find resources to manage with the mental illness 
[sic] and its consequent limitations and changes. " (Latvala et al. 2004) 
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For Latvala et al. patient-centred practice turns on the involvement of the 
service user. However, for involvement to work the service user needs to 
acknowledge her need for professional support, and modify her views on the 
care she receives through the involvement process. Promoting involvement is, 
according to this definition of involvement, analogous to promoting a good 
outcome for the service user since the two things are interdependent. 
This seems remarkably like the promotion of engagement with services. 
Engagement describe the process whereby service users are encouraged to 
build a relationship with staff (Gillespie et al. 2004). It has garnered 
considerable research interest in recent years because it is seen as central to 
the practice of Assertive Outreach (AO). AO teams aim to promote 
engagement by proactively following up service users who do not attend 
services, delivering services to the person at home (including holding care plan 
reviews at home), and actively discussing care plans, the reasons for them and 
possible alternatives with the service user. When combined these practices 
may increase the likelihood of individuals using services (Priebe et al. 2005) 
and the level of satisfaction with services they describe (Manfred-Gillham et 
al. 2002, Watts and Priebe 2002). However, the National Service Framework 
for Mental Health clearly states the object of securing engagement for mental 
health services in England and `Vales is to ensure personal and public safety 
(DII 1999b p. 53). Indeed service providers are instructed that if they think 
there is a danger of a service user disengaging then the care plan must state 
what measures are being put in place to reduce the risk to the individual, their 
carers or the public. In other words, in order to comply with the policy, 
engagement strategies need only be practiced to reduce risk, and are thus a 
product of a public safety agenda and not an emancipatory agenda to increase 
the control service users have over their own lives. 
Conceptualising involvement as engagement may, therefore, help to 
secure two distinct outcomes. One is the promotion of the service user's own 
health, but the second is better risk management. This model of involvement 
seems to leave little space for the service user's own values to influence 
decision-making. Promoting engagement can mean that greater opportunities 
for the service user to communicate her views will arise. But the fact that the 
desired outcome has already been defined by professionals and policy-makers 
means that the scope for actually altering the decisions they reach is limited. 
5.4.2 Involvement as participation 
Understanding involvement as engagement is consistent with current policy on 
service user involvement, which tends to emphasise the possibility that 
involvement will improve therapeutic outcomes. But it is not consistent with 
the meaning applied to involvement in much of the mental health research 
literature, especially the nursing literature. Instead, the research literature 
often emphasises a model of involvement which goes beyond simply securing 
the person's engagement with treatment. In these cases, involvement is 
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understood as implying that either service users have a right to participation 
in decision-making, or that their active participation should be encouraged. 
But the object of this participation is to enable the service user to 
communicate her values and to influence the decisions reached about her, 
rather than to merely secure her cooperation with care or treatment. 
Much of this research literature draws upon a wider literature on 
public or citizen participation. One of the most influential papers in this field 
has been Sherry Arnstein's 1969 paper `A Ladder of Citizen Participation', 
which defines participation as occurring on a ten-rung ladder with 
manipulation at the bottom and citizen control at the top. The idea of a 
ladder or continuum model of participation has been widely endorsed. Pilgrim 
and Rogers (1999), for example, argue that that service users can belong to 
three categories: user as patient, user as consumer, and user as survivor. In 
this last category service users campaign collectively for control of services, 
thus mirroring Arnstein's view that the apex of involvement is control. 
However, Pilgrim and Rogers emphasise that achieving involvement is the 
result of a dynamic played out between providers and service users. 
An alternative participation continuum is described by Hickey and 
Kipping (1998). They argue that participation represents an equilibrium 
between consultation and control in which the user is an equal partner in the 
decisions made about her care. They further distinguish between models of 
participation justified on the basis of consumerism and those justified on the 
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basis of democratisation. This is a valuable distinction, since there is good 
evidence that policy commitments to increasing service user involvement are 
generally justified on neo-liberal grounds which transform the citizen into a 
consumer and see choice as a crucial lever in driving improvements in services 
(Barnes and Prior 1995, Crossley and Crossley 2001). On the other side of the 
debate, participants in the service user movement have defined themselves as 
engaged in a struggle for civil rights, which parallels the disabled peoples 
movement, and see involvement in one's care as a central component of being 
accorded the full rights of citizens (Barnes and Shardlow 1996, Beresford et al. 
2000). As Hickey and Kipping point out, where one stands on the issue of why 
involvement is important will determine the limits placed on the degree of 
involvement possible. For example, it is not the intention of those advocating 
a consumerist approach to cede total control of services to service users. 
Other commentators have also raised concerns about the limits of a 
ladder model of involvement since it fails to take into account not only the 
existence and possible validity of competing agendas, but also the "dynamic 
and evolutionary nature of user involvement" (Tritter and MacCallum 2006). 
According to this view health service users are accorded insufficient agency in 
a ladder model. In reality service users may choose involvement at some times 
but not others, they may value relationships with certain service providers 
over others and as a group they exhibit far more diversity than the ladder 
model allows for. In trying to encapsulate what service users want from 
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services we need to be clear who the service users are. Arnstein's article 
assumed that anyone with a stake in the decision being made within the 
relevant geographical area should be assumed to have a potential contribution 
to make. However, these contributions may generate conflicts in their own 
right between service users, carers and the wider public. Tritter and 
MacCallum suggest that a multi-dimensional model of user involvement needs 
to be developed, in which different categories of user climb different ladders, 
leading to greater or lesser degrees of participation, dependent on their 
concerns which may overlap or conflict. This mosaic approach is not a 
normative model advocating control as the desired or desirable outcome for all 
citizens at all times, but they argue that it better reflects the complexity of 
promoting involvement. 
5.4.3 Involvement as control 
The summit of the ladder of participation envisaged by Arnstein is citizen 
control of services (Arnstein 1969). In mental health services this has been 
envisaged as mental health services staffed, managed and wholly controlled by 
service users. This understanding of what involvement `really' means is widely 
endorsed by service users and advocates (Connor and Wilson 2006). For 
example, the aspiration expressed in the highly influential `On our own' 
(Chamberlin 1988) was that ultimately all services for mental health service 
users would be run by mental health service users with minimal intervention 
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from external professionals. This aspiration reflects a particular account of 
mental distress, as a human condition best understood by those who have 
shared similar experiences. Individuals experiencing mental distress may need 
sensitivity and space in which to talk with those who empathise with them, 
but they do not need to be given labels which they do not recognise, or 
coerced into receiving treatment which they do not want. For Chamberlin, 
user led services will empower service users, at the expense of mental health 
professionals whom she believes are ultimately parasitic. It is an approach 
which treats the dominance of psy-accounts of the self as highly problematic. 
Involvement is understood as only the first step on the road to empowerment. 
Arguing that service users should be `involved' in their care planning when 
they do not have control over the decisions reached is mistaken. Placing 
control in the hands of service users obviates the need for person centred 
practice, rights to procedural involvement or service users forums. 
However, while involvement as control might not be an impossible 
dream, it remains, nearly 30 years after the original publication of 
Chamberlin's book a comparatively rare model for service provision. There are 
examples, especially from the US (McLean 1995), Canada (Nelson and 
Lomotey 2006) and occasionally in the UK (Truman and Raine 2002). But for 
user control to occur, considerable political will is needed and some 
commentators in the UK believe that service user activists are currently losing 
and not gaining ground in their campaign to achieve greater control over 
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services (Barnes and Bowl 2001). One study of user involvement in local 
service planning, found that projects initiated by service users only succeeded 
where existing funds could cover them, there was no motivation within the 
health authority to increase the total amount of expenditure on mental health 
services, even though it was the health authority which had initiated the 
service user forum which was being studied (Pilgrim and Waldron 1998). The 
authors point out that "the economic realm is the final and ultimate 
constraint upon user involvement". There is currently no top down policy 
agenda for promoting user control of services in England and Wales at present, 
so a growth in the development of user controlled services looks doubtful. 
5.5 The effectiveness of promoting involvement 
Given the plethora of values attached to the term involvement, measuring the 
effectiveness of involvement policies is a complex task. Involvement defined as 
engagement might be deemed effective if it promoted speedier or more 
sustainable recoveries from mental illness, or if it reduced the degree of risk 
service users or others were exposed to. Unfortunately demonstrating either 
outcome is complicated by the fact that indicators of engagement are 
themselves contentious (Gillespie et al. 2004, Priebe et al. 2005). 
Measurements of the extent of participation in decision making have also been 
used to determine whether or not involvement is happening. In some cases this 
leads to research findings which seem to imply that turning up is the same as 
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taking part. Downing and Hatfield (1999) for example wanted to evaluate 
whether the Department of Health's policy on the Care Programme Approach 
(CPA) was actually being implemented. The CPA is a care planning policy 
intended to ensure that mental health service users receive effective care in the 
community. The study followed up service users who were about to be 
discharged from hospital, and should therefore automatically be subject to the 
CPA, to see the extent to which practice matched policy. The measure 
selected for whether or not service users were involved in drawing up their 
care plan (a requirement of the policy they were evaluating) was attendance at 
the discharge review meeting. Since all of the service users in the study (n=35) 
attended the authors concluded that "involvement is clearly on the agenda of 
key workers ". However, since the discharge meeting takes place before 
discharge and 19 of the service users were subject to compulsory powers high 
attendance rates might not indicate voluntary or active involvement. What 
this finding shows instead is that service users were not excluded from care 
planning meetings. 
Trying to measure the degree of involvement attained by examining 
the procedures in place does however throw up some interesting findings. In a 
1997/8 survey of mental health trusts it was found that three quarters of the 
trusts surveyed claimed that service users were always informed of the 
contents of their care plan (Schneider et al. 1999). This became a requirement 
under a subsequent revision of the guidance on the CPA (DII 1999c) so one 
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might expect the number of trusts in which this was the case to increase. 
However in a later survey Carpenter et al. (2004) found that only between 
37% and 60% (depending on district) of service users were aware that they 
had a written care plan. When participation in the CPA does occur it does 
seem to correlate with increased satisfaction with services, although most of 
the research conducted in this field acknowledges that their focus has been on 
whether or not participation arises, not on the substantive content of such 
participation (Rose et al. 1998, Carpenter and Sbaraini 1997). As a result, the 
mechanism which causes this increased satisfaction is not known. And it is 
also possible for involvement to increase user dissatisfaction. A large scale 
study of service user involvement in care planning in Norway (n=1080) found 
that during care planning work healthcare professionals tended to identify 
service users as having a wider range of needs than service users did 
themselves. When this was the case multi-disciplinary teams tended to 
respond to the needs identified by the health worker, in the process offering 
more services than the user herself had requested (Hansen et al. 2004). 
Ironically, the researchers noted that many of the service users they 
interviewed described doing their utmost to avoid contact with what they 
perceived as intrusive and unwanted service provision. 
The limitations of measuring involvement through measures of passive 
participation such as attendance at meetings or receipt of care plans were 
highlighted by Peck et al. (2002). This study involved surveying professionals 
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and service users within a mental health and social care trust to find out to 
what extent both groups felt that service user involvement was actually 
occurring. The trust in question had already made pro-active efforts to 
increase the levels of user involvement occurring within both personal care 
planning and service planning. The study differentiated between `users as 
recipients of communication' (who have an essentially passive role), `users as 
subjects of consultation' and `users in control'. Although levels of 
communication with users were very high, with 100% receiving copies of their 
care plan for example, the levels of consultation were much lower, only 60% of 
service users at the initial survey felt that they had been consulted on their 
care plan, and this fell to 49% thirty months later at the second survey. The 
survey identified only one instance of a user actually describing herself as 
having control over a decision making process. 
Measuring the effectiveness of user controlled services is also 
complicated. There is the possibility that control is not itself an aspiration 
shared by all service users: the paradox of choosing not to have a choice. For 
example, UA Fanthorpe describes how depression makes her long for a lack of 
control. 
"When I'm badly depressed I long above all things to be a prisoner. I 
imagine this as a life where you don't make choices, where the pattern 
of life is plain and involuntary. Life in depression is like this anyway, 
but it retains the illusion of choice. If you had to do the sad things you 
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are doing because someone had ordered that you should, indeed 
because you'd deserved it the despair (you think) might go. " 
(Fanthorpe 1996) 
Similarly, mental health service users find that the power to make choices is 
only useful if it means a power to make choices that other people disagree 
with. Both fellow service users and professionals may disagree with individual 
choices. For example, Perkins found that when she chose ECT as a treatment 
for her depression it was her friends with mental health needs, and not the 
professionals, who disagreed vehemently with the choice she had made 
(Perkins 2000). 
Some researchers have noted the fragility of user led groups and 
services. This fragility is associated with a number of factors including poor 
fidelity with original service objectives, and continual problems in securing 
funding (Chamberlin 1988, Lindow 1995, McLean 1995, Pilgrim and Waldron 
1998). Interestingly Chamberlin (1988) and Lindow (1995) both identify a lack 
of `real' user control as a problem within some user run services. In both cases 
they found that where users had only peripheral control of service planning 
and delivery, professional accounts of mental distress quickly began to 
dominate and user-led challenges to these understandings were in turn 
pathologised. Another potential pitfall for user-led services is described in a 
study of an American user-run day service (McLean (1995). The author 
describes how the centre she observed had an empowerment philosophy and a 
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service user as manager, but was nonetheless ridden with continual internal 
conflicts, and service users expressed strong dissatisfaction with the way things 
were run. She points out that consumer control in this instance had been 
taken to mean consumers control things from the top down, i. e. they were 
employed as staff, but did not mean that bottom up control from those using 
the service had occurred. All of these studies were on a small scale, but they 
indicate how difficult it is to promote radical models of user involvement as 
control, against the prevailing political assumption that mental health services 
are best led by trained professionals. McLean also observed that the service 
she studied depended on funding from the state, this meant the service had to 
demonstrate it was the equal of more traditional facilities and this lead to 
them compromising their original goals. 
One explanation which could be advanced for the vulnerability of 
service user-led initiatives is that service users simply lack the competence to 
deliver services. One study of psychiatrist's views on involvement found that 
around half of those interviewed expressed reservations about service users 
having control over service delivery because they felt that their choices might 
not be rational. At the most sceptical end of the spectrum was the opinion 
that: 
"Most patients, or the patients I have been dealing with are 
-I don't 
think they understand what day it is really, they are willing to be 
advised by the consultants. " (Summers 2003). 
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The same caveat is raised (though not endorsed) by Roe and Davidson (2005) 
in a description of the development of the service user movement in the USA. 
However, a more positive picture of service user-led services is given in a study 
of such groups in Ontario, Canada (Nelson and Lomotey 2006). This study 
followed 79 service user participants over a period of 18 months and found 
that they participated fairly consistently in the user-led services they attended, 
and that their perceptions of the service were largely positive. The study did 
not control for outcomes in more traditional services (and they acknowledge 
this limitation), however their findings suggest that where service user-led 
organisations are well supported and provided with stable funding they can be 
successful and well liked by those who use them. This does not seem 
compatible with the view that service users who attempt to lead services 
should be automatically discredited on the grounds that they lack the 
necessary abilities. 
5.6 Explaining barriers to involvement 
Despite the range of meanings applied by researchers, policy makers and 
service users to the term involvement, the concept would appear to be 
inherently normative. It would appear that everyone believes involvement 
should occur, but they cannot always agree on whether or when involvement 
does occur. Consequently the range of barriers to involvement identified in the 
research literature is broad, and many of the categories of barrier overlap. 
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Many theorists have conceptualised barriers to involvement as 
structural, and reflective of the fabric of social life. However, those researchers 
who take the view that involvement is in the service user's therapeutic 
interests have also tended to focus on providing guidance to individual 
practitioners on how to achieve involvement as an outcome. As a result they 
tend to conceptualise barriers to involvement as practical and identifiable. For 
example the fact that service users often do not know they have a care plan 
acts as a clear practical barrier to involvement which needs to be addressed 
(Schneider et al. 2002). Survey findings in this area are surprisingly consistent, 
Rose (2003) and Carpenter et al. (2004) in separate studies both identified 
that the proportion of service users who knew that they had a care plan varied 
depending on the area from between 35% to 65%. Even within the health 
trusts which take the greatest pro-active steps to ensure that people are aware 
of the care-planning process around a third of service users still seem not to be 
kept informed. As a result, a number of researchers have argued that service 
users should ordinarily be copied into all written correspondence about their 
care (Carpenter and Sbaraini 1997, Downing and Hatfield 1998, Loveland 
1999, Schneider et al. 1999, Simpson et al. 2002). 
Rose points out that the attitudes of staff may explain why so little 
attention is given to sharing information with service users. Her survey found 
that many respondents were aware of their care plan but nobody had 
explained what it meant for them (Rose 2001). She cites her experience of 
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running a workshop for professionals, many of whom stated that service users 
weren't interested in care-planning. When she questioned them about how 
much effort they paid to explaining the function of the care plan she found 
that the average time spent discussing it with individual service users was 
around five minutes, whilst the average time spent training staff on care- 
planning was two days. Another practical problem is that staff may 
themselves lack necessary knowledge. Alexius et al. (2000) in a Swedish study 
looking at inpatient satisfaction with the information provided noted that 
service users were happiest with the information on medication which their 
doctors provided and least satisfied with the information their doctors offered 
on their legal rights or access to medical records, indicating perhaps that it 
was the areas where the doctors were most knowledgeable which determined 
their willingness to provide information. 
As was noted in relation to service user led services above, limited 
resources can also limit the extent to which a service user can influence the 
decisions reached about her care (Pilgrim and Waldron 1998). Limited 
resources mean that certain choices will be impossible to support. In addition 
complex arrangements will typically be in place to ensure that those resources 
which are available are allocated both efficiently and equitably. For example, 
in a typical care plan review meeting none of the professionals present will 
actually be in a position to make decisions about the allocation of funding, 
these decisions will generally be reached by other committees at which the 
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service user will not be represented, and at which the needs and demands of 
large numbers of service users will be considered simultaneously. For 
significant resources to be allocated to an individual, perhaps to fund specialist 
treatment, housing or help and support in the home a case has to be made to 
justify this expenditure for this individual, and service users can only make 
such a case with the support and agreement of those already providing care to 
them. 
In addition to not being able to directly influence or make the decisions 
about allocation of resources which affect them, poverty can simply preclude 
any form of participation. For example some service users describe being 
unable to attend meetings because they did not have the bus fare, or feeling 
self-conscious when they arrived because their clothes were not very smart 
(Pilgrim and Waldron 1998). Poverty can also be a distraction. When focus 
groups of service users in Canada were asked about empowerment many of 
them described poverty as a barrier because it caused practical problems, but 
they also pointed out that poverty meant that service users had bigger things 
to worry about than the contents of their care plan, such as ensuring that they 
had food on the table (Nelson et al. 2001). 
Finally, it is clear that a failure to communicate effectively between 
service users and providers prevents services users becoming meaningfully 
involved in the decisions service providers are making. Communication 
between healthcare professionals and service users is a large subject in its own 
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right, and many theorists are interested in the ways in which meaning is 
constituted intersubjectively in interactions between doctor and patient 
(Heritage and Maynard 2006, Godin 2007). This clearly has considerable 
significance for service user involvement for which the possibility of meaningful 
communication between user and professional has to be a prerequisite. 
Some of the communication barriers which occur between professionals 
and service users are perhaps already implicit in the way in which different 
types of knowledge act as a barrier. Service users have noted that lack of time 
to respond in meetings (Loveland 1998), not knowing what medical 
terminology or jargon means and feeling too shy to speak (Diamond et al. 
2003) all make communication difficult or impossible. Even more crudely, 
service users cannot communicate their wishes and feelings if they are unable 
to attend CPA reviews, are not invited to attend or are not even aware that 
the review is taking place. As has been noted above both of these 
circumstances occur frequently. 
In addition, some studies have explored how misunderstandings arise 
between actors in a setting. In the case of involvement, it would appear that 
both service users and professionals are capable of attributing motives to each 
other's behaviour which the other would not recognise. For example, one study 
employed focus groups to examine how mental health service users made use 
of primary care services (Lester et al. 2004). Amongst other concerns the 
professionals who attended expressed irritation at the fact that mental health 
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service users failed to make appointments early enough and waited until they 
were experiencing a crisis before seeking help. They attributed this to 
malingering, chaotic lifestyles or attempts to play the system. The service 
users however, described how doctors waiting rooms were often stressful 
environments, reception staff were unsympathetic, and there was often little 
privacy when it came to discussing their reasons for wanting an appointment 
with the receptionist. As a result they avoided making appointments unless 
absolutely necessary. In a later paper the authors attribute this to a wider lack 
of sensitivity to the specific needs of mental health service users on the part of 
primary care providers (Lester et al. 2006). However, even where the setting is 
oriented around mental health service users such as a forum for service user 
involvement, it has been noted that utterances made by service users may go 
unheard, be reformulated in such a way as to deprive them of their intended 
meaning by the more powerful actors present or be actively rebuffed and 
excluded (Hodge 2002). 
Most authors recognise that these practical barriers are in their turn 
caused by wider structural biases in society. In theorising why involvement 
policies do not always translate into involvement practice, or why involvement 
practices do not always translate into better outcomes for mad people, 
researchers have tend to focus on three major themes: power, identity and 
knowledge. These factors can in turn be understood as resulting from system 
differentiation. 
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5.6.1 Power and control 
Arnstein argued that public participation in decisions about public service 
provision was often deceptive, and that it was common for supposed 
participation strategies to be used to either manipulate public opinion or 
change the popular perception of the decision being taken (Arnstein 1969). For 
example, practices like setting up `advisory panels' can be used 
manipulatively, the role of those citizens who sit on them is often mere 
window dressing because they lack the knowledge or resources necessary to 
effectively engage in the decision-making process. As a result she argues that 
participation can only be rendered meaningful by a redistribution of power: 
"... citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the 
redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently 
excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately 
included in the future. " 
It is clearly the hope of many advocates for user involvement that mechanisms 
to increase involvement will challenge medical and social care orthodoxies and 
increase the power of service users (Hannigan and Cutcliffe 2002). But by far 
the most widely cited barrier to service user involvement is the difference in 
the degree of power wielded by those who provide services and those who use 
them. Interestingly, this critique has remained largely static throughout the 
last 30 years. When `On Our Own' (Chamberlin 1977) was published the 
author argued that unless community mental health services adopted a 
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bottom-up approach to service development the delivery of service in the 
community would only recreate the old hierarchies employed in hospital 
provision in which psychiatrists wielded the power and could determine which 
service users were allowed to raise `legitimate' concerns and which service 
users lacked the credibility to contribute to this dialogue. A critique of the 
political framework within which decisions about mental health service 
provision were made published in 1985 commented on the issue of public 
participation in mental health service provision that: 
"... it is extremely hard to get `the community' involved in `their' 
service, a difficulty easily ascribed to passivity when in fact it reflects 
the lack of control actually given to people in planning these services". 
(Banton et al. 1985 p. 179) 
A study of how adults with mental health needs participated in a local users 
forum, carried out twenty years later, described how the professionals present 
at this forum played a role in policing discourse and in determining what could 
and could not be placed on the agenda (Hodge 2005a). The author concluded 
that such policing amounts to an exercise of power which was of particular 
significance because the forum was not freestanding but had been deliberately 
convened by a Mental Heath Trust. As a consequence rather than yielding any 
control over issues of service delivery to mental health services users the forum 
was only able to endorse decisions already reached elsewhere. Harrison and 
Mort (1998) argue that this kind of exercise in public involvement serves 
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largely to legitimise managerial control within ostensibly pluralistic policy- 
making settings. They do this by taking on the semblance of the democratic 
process and thus appearing legitimate to the outsider, whilst remaining 
internally dependant on informal social networks which remain in the hands of 
managers. 
Any demands service users make of those who provide services must be 
mediated through individual health and social care professionals who must 
determine whether such a demand is reasonable or likely to succeed. Hodge 
(2005a) found that even when service users are involved in decisions being 
made only certain types of debate were constructed as `legitimate'. Finally, 
where involvement is employed as a "'technology of legitimation" (Harrison and 
Mort 1998), a problem which Arnstein clearly anticipated, it becomes easy for 
those who have power to argue that participation, even where it is passive, is 
equal to involvement and thus legitimises managerial or professional led 
approaches over service user led approaches. In these circumstances, when 
service users climb a few rungs of the ladder they may find it harder and not 
easier to climb to the top. Indeed, one of the problems with literature on the 
promotion of participation is that it often fails to distinguish between active 
and passive strategies. Passive strategies such as inviting service users to 
meetings, or copying them in to correspondence may be a condition of 
possibility for communication, but they do not reflect the huge structural 
imbalance that exists between service users and professionals. As the section 
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on the effectiveness of involvement policies made clear, the promotion of 
participation sometimes results in service users being invited to meetings at 
which they are not permitted to speak, or being asked to sign care plans which 
they have not been consulted upon. 
5.6.2 Knowledge 
"Different forms of knowledge are... encapsulated and kept separate from 
each other, so that they might co-exist alongside but they don't overflow 
and intermingle with each other, and there is this awareness of - oh 
this is professional knowledge and this is service user knowledge so 
obviously that's going to be an experiential thing 
... 
I think that is a real 
fundamental issue. " (a service user talking about sitting on a service 
user forum quoted in Hodge 2005b) 
As Hodge's interviewee noted, there continues to be mistrust within the psy- 
system of the type of knowledge which service users are likely to have. 
Summers' (2003) study of the views psychiatrists hold on user involvement, 
found that some psychiatrists objected to service user involvement where it 
conflicted with evidence-based practice. They argued that service user 
involvement should not be allowed to trump the `right' decision being made by 
health service providers. The view that service users lack the knowledge to 
make meaningful contributions to the decision making process is also identified 
as a barrier to involvement in a number of the empirical studies discussed 
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above (see for example Forbes and Sashidharan 1997, Pilgrim and Waldron 
1998, Peck et al. 2002, Langan and Lindow 2004, Lester et al. 2006). Faulkner 
and Thomas (2002) suggest that service user involvement and evidence based 
medicine (EBM) are based on conflicting logics. They argue that where 
conflicting views on contentious diagnoses arise EBM is "ill-suited to resolve 
the resultant conflict because it is unable to reconcile the values and beliefs of 
different stakeholders". This tension has often been seen as a problem for those 
working in mental health care and the problem of ensuring that service users 
values are upheld in treatment decisions has been the source of much debate 
(Hughes and Fulford 2005). Specific solutions, such as the adoption of a values 
based medicine paradigm to complement EBM have been put forward 
(Woodbridge and Fulford 2004). These tensions are not, however, restricted to 
medical practice, the practice of nursing and the logic of service user 
involvement can also come into conflict (Anthony and Crawford 2000). And 
whilst it would appear that attitudes to service user involvement are more 
positive amongst clinical psychologists than they are amongst psychiatrists 
(Kent and Read 1998), psychologists nonetheless acknowledge that the role of 
service users in care planning is typically to endorse the goals of a treatment 
plan determined by an expert (Soffe et al. 2004). 
Service users who may also be conscious of a tension in their role 
between expressing their views and being discredited, or saying nothing and 
suffering the consequences of inappropriate or insensitive treatment. The 
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values based medicine approach offers guidance to doctors anxious to ensure 
that service user's values are not compromised whilst they deliver the best 
treatment they can, but it offers no guidance to service users on how to 
convey their concerns without fear of discreditation or coercion. One widely 
promoted solution has been to incorporate the views of those using services 
into the mainstream evidence base by promoting service user participation in 
research, and thus ensure that what is known about the experiences of service 
users forms part of mainstream EBM (Oliver 1995, Faulkner and Thomas 
2002, Spiers et al. 2005). In this way the knowledge of service users can 
influence medical decision making without necessarily placing service users 
under an obligation to explain or justify their concerns. Faulkner and Thomas 
suggest that "Psychiatrists should attach as much importance to user led 
research in the processes of clinical decision making as they do to randomised 
controlled trials ". Glasby and Beresford (2006) argue that the notion of 
evidence itself should be re-evaluated, and recognition given to the fact that 
there are other ways of knowing the world than through randomised controlled 
trials and systematic reviews. They suggest a knowledge based rather than 
evidence based approach to planning care at both the micro and macro levels. 
This is a process which requires participants in policy making to ask what is 
known but also to ask what constitutes knowledge and who gets to determine 
this. Their suggestion of a method goes further than other commentators in 
suggesting how service user's knowledge of their own experiences and values 
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should not simply complement EBM but instead radically change the 
relationship between service user and professional knowledges. 
5.6.3 Identity 
" `I like `survivor'. My favourite saying is `We're still here 
- 
we've 
survived. ' A lot of the people who have been through this project have 
had horrendous pasts. But we're here, we've got here 
- 
we wouldn't be 
here if we hadn't. ' 
` `Survivor' I hate. You've survived as in you're still here but not as 
you should be. It implies you've come out the other end. 
-I haven't. '" 
(two service users quoted in Ferguson 2003) 
Ferguson's study looked at which terms people who use mental health services 
preferred to apply to themselves. No term came out obviously ahead among 
the 43 people he interviewed and all of the terms he suggested encountered 
strong opposition from some of those interviewed. A number of other 
researchers have highlighted the fact that people who use mental health 
services do not necessarily share a common sense of identification as service 
users (Wadsworth and Epstein 1998, Speed 2007, Forrester-Jones and Barnes 
2008, McLaughlin 2008). Services users when asked often comment on the 
tension they feel between their diagnosis, their status as service users, and 
their private sense of self. They also invest great significance in deciding which 
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labels they are happy to have applied to them (Barnes and Shardlow 1996, 
Hodge 2005b). In this respect mental health service users contrast with users 
of other health services who appear to concur that `patient' is a neutral term 
which they can accept if not positively endorse, and who dislike, but do not 
strongly oppose, terms which imply a provider/consumer relationship in 
healthcare interactions (Deter et al. 2005). 
As outlined in Chapter Four (pp. 165-7), social identity from a systems 
perspective is fragmented and reconstructed anew within each system. Work 
on labelling theory and on stigma has demonstrated convincingly that the 
label `mad' is widely discredited across social systems, and that where 
individuals have control over how they engage with this aspect of their 
identity, they may well choose to avoid being linked to it to avoid the wider 
repercussions that could arise (Corrigan and Keinlein 2005). One limitation, 
therefore, on the involvement of mental health service users in service planning 
in delivery is that they may have cogent reasons for refusing to participate in 
public forums. Whether such service users actually are deterred in practice is 
hard to determine. Since the closure of the Commission for Public and Patient 
Involvement in Health no single body is responsible for auditing the levels of 
public involvement in strategic healthcare service planning: the new NHS 
National Centre for Involvement acts as an advisory rather than a regulatory 
body. The bulk of research on public involvement has been qualitative in 
nature and therefore cannot tell us whether as a population mad people are 
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happy to participate in mental health service planning, although Hodge 
identifies that ambivalence about engaging with an identity as mad 
considerably influences whether or not people choose to participate in local 
service planning (Hodge 2005a). 
Another problem for the promotion of participation in particular, is 
that permitting participation is often constructed as a duty owed by the state 
to its citizens. The continued assent of citizens to the decisions reached by 
those in power is seen as fundamental to political legitimacy. Citizenship, 
however, is not simply a status which accords all people equal rights, but is 
instead a practice associated with ones degree of involvement in the 
community, and the way in which one exercises the rights accorded to citizens 
(Lister 1998). Historically mental health service users have been excluded from 
citizenship on the grounds that they lack competence. So before service users 
can even climb on to the ladder they need to be constructed as legitimate 
participants by the official discourses which determine who can and cannot be 
considered a citizen (Barnes 2002). These discourses often operate under 
normative imperatives which cannot easily bend to accommodate the different 
needs of service users. 
5.7 Systems and the involvement of mad people 
The contested nature of participation and involvement has been acknowledged 
by some researchers in this field (Thompson 2007). However, establishing 
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consensus on what constitutes meaningful involvement is likely to be 
impossible. From a systems perspective, the fact that different discourses 
apply different meanings to the same term can be readily understood as 
resulting from the fact that meaning in each case has been reconstructed anew 
with reference to the system's code. The tension, or irritation, this generates, 
can have positive consequences: it can encourage creativity and innovation in 
healthcare delivery, since it would appear that even where they feel daunted 
by the task of imagining alternatives both professionals and service users are 
dissatisfied with inadequate or tokenistic mechanisms for supporting 
involvement (Campbell 2001, Diamond et al. 2003, Soffe et al. 2004). 
It is unfortunate that this tension is not acknowledged by the 
Department of Health in their policy work in this area, and that government 
led innovation has tended to focus on the procedural dimensions of 
involvement. It is also unfortunate that government policy gives mixed 
messages about involvement as it applies to mental health service users. 
Overall, policy research, and the growing interest in research in this area 
strongly indicates that the problem of what service user involvement might 
mean and what implications it has remains a very current problem for those 
working within mental health services. This problem remains poorly defined. 
Re-defining it from a systems perspective means reconfiguring some of the 
problems which have already been outlined above as problems of 
communication. 
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Involvement and participation are sufficiently vague to allow multiple 
interpretations to be placed upon the term where they appear in legal and 
policy documents. For Luhmann, such policies will inevitably merely irritate 
the boundaries of the system to which they are addressed because they cannot 
themselves form part of a communication with the system. In the case of 
terms as vague as `involvement' the irritation is minor because each system 
has a wide range of approaches available to it which will enable it to 
assimilate effectively the policy upon the system's own terms. One example of 
this is the way in which involvement appears to have entered into many new 
psy-system communications about the management of treatment for mad 
people. Perhaps this is because involvement practices appear to correlate with 
the attainment of a psy-system objective: the promotion of better mental 
health. As Luhmann points out steering is itself a difficult outcome for 
political systems to achieve. In this case, it is made more difficult by the fact 
that it is not clear exactly what involvement policies are aiming to achieve and 
therefore what they are steering towards. Better risk management, better 
therapeutic outcomes, more efficient service delivery, more respectful service 
delivery and the greater social inclusion of mad people are all outcomes which 
have been linked to effective involvement practices, and yet it is rarely made 
clear in policy documents or guidance which outcome or outcomes are 
intended. 
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Having said that, there does seem to be some confidence amongst 
service users themselves that the promotion of involvement is worthwhile 
(Forrester-Jones and Barnes 2008). Involvement practices such as inviting 
service users to meetings and sharing information with them create the pre- 
requisite conditions for communication between service users and professionals. 
This possibility of communication can in turn lead to the user being able to 
exert some control over those decisions which are reached. For Luhmann, 
unlike his early mentor Talcott Parsons, control within social systems is not 
responsible for producing social order. Communication systems exist in order 
to communicate, not in order to control. Control however, is inherent to 
communication. Or as Baecker has put it: 
"A system is a way to communicate control if there is no other way to 
communicate. It is a way of considering how control is possible if 
control makes the controller and the controllee do away with degrees of 
freedom they would otherwise enjoy, and if it makes them resort to 
communication instead. Control... implies consent, if not collusion, on 
both sides of the control relationship even if that consent, which must 
be uncertain is at once dissimulated in favour of the establishment of 
an asymmetrical relationship. " (Baecker 2001) 
Individual control over the social world may be achieved in a number of ways: 
by entering into a legal contract, by seeing one's doctor or by buying 
something and entering in a relationship of exchange for example. But 
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wherever control occurs, communication must have occurred first. In the 
context of care planning, the service user has no possibility of exerting control 
over the decisions made about her life if no effort is made to communicate the 
content of these decisions to her. If care-planning meetings take place without 
the service user present, if information about her care is not shared with her, 
or if everything she says is routinely discredited and not treated as an 
utterance worthy of a response then no possible control through 
communication can occur. Equally, service providers are aware that 
communication is also a pre-requisite for control over the service user. If they 
cannot communicate with the service user about her care and treatment then 
their capacity to control her behaviour or to promote specific outcomes such as 
treatment compliance is hugely limited. When communication breaks down 
the imposition of coercion may be the only option available to them. 
The promotion of patient/user involvement in healthcare decisions can 
be understood then, as creating the conditions necessary for everyone involved 
to exercise control and counter-control over the decisions being reached. In 
practice, the creation of conditions does not amount to the actual achievement 
of communication, and the fact that service users still continue to feel that 
they are not able to communicate with service providers in many cases reflects 
this. In particular, the problems identified above with power, identity and 
knowledge can all be characterised as different facets of the problem of 
discreditation. 
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5.7.1 Service user knowledge and becoming a system 
Luhmann defines power as a medium capable of promoting communication on 
the one hand and attenuating freedom on the other. Significantly, Luhmann 
links power to the possibility of exercising coercion over others (Luhmann 
1979/1975 pp. 112-5). Power enables the holder to limit the range of the other 
parties responses not through the active exercise of coercion, or the breaking of 
the other's will but through neutralising the other's will. So the psy-system is 
powerful to the extent that its ability to exercise coercive force over resistant 
mad people acts as a constraint upon their behaviour. To the extent that this 
is irrelevant to mad people in selecting how to behave, it lacks power. 
In the context of care planning, knowledge of the power of the systems 
involved may undermine the willingness of service users to participate in care 
planning forums. The availability of power as a means for promoting the 
effectiveness of their communications means that the psy-system has limited 
reasons for altering its practice to better accommodate the values of the 
service user where these values do not correspond to the normative goals of 
the system. To take the example which Hodge gave of a service-planning 
meeting where the agenda was set beforehand by the service providers, this 
was only possible because those setting the agenda knew of the power they 
held (Hodge 2005a). In this instance, the power in question was largely 
financial. In being able to decide the allocation of funds the service providers 
had ultimate control over the decisions being reached by the meeting. Not 
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only this, but it was clear to those present, that the forum's continued 
existence was dependent upon the compliance of service users with the agenda 
of the service providers. 
One way in which individuals can counter the capacity for power 
which social systems have is to promote the creation of an alternative social 
system. Luhmann recognises social movements as examples of social systems 
structured around a specific goal which is perceived to be at odds with the 
actual direction of society (Luhmann 1995/1984 pp. 398-401). These systems 
are then able to generate meanings around the goal, to determine how it is to 
be defined, how it is to be achieved, even to determine their own history 
through reference to the goal. It has been argued that such systems provide a 
necessary corrective to the powerful social systems such as law, politics and 
the economy which determine the dominant values extant in any given society 
(Fuchs 2006). 
Those who see meaningful involvement in one's care, and possibly total 
control over its delivery, as the aims of the service user movement, see the 
origins of the involvement debate located within the service user movement 
(Chamberlin 1988, Tomes 2006). That is to say, at the point service users 
started asserting a voice which was constructed independently of medical 
authority, and which challenged the tenets of medical discourse, they were also 
demanding to be actively involved in their care and not just passive recipients. 
However, it has been argued that mental health service users may lack the 
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collective identity necessary to function as social movement and that the 
service user movement remains inherently fragile as a result (Barnes 1999). 
This leaves open the question of whether the service user movement at present 
constitutes a social system? 
It has been argued that the mental health service user movement 
began with the creation of the Alleged Lunatics Friend Society in 1845 
(Barnes and Bowl 2001 p. 27), or even earlier with a petition sent to 
parliament on behalf of the inhabitants of Bedlam in 1620 (Coleman 1996). 
The majority of those writing in this area seem to accept that these earlier 
movements were different from the user movement which began to emerge in 
the 1970s and 80s. Barnes and Bowl however, suggest that these early pioneers 
on behalf of service users were stifled by the emerging biologically based 
medical discourse which came to dominate accounts of mental distress during 
the 19th century. They argue that earlier movements did not differ significantly 
in terms of their objectives from those which succeeded them but the 
surrounding cultural climate did. It was not until the 1970s, when sympathy 
to counter-cultural accounts of mental distress began to grow, that a mental 
heath user movement was able to flourish. 
Crossley (1999) takes a different approach and suggests that earlier 
service user led campaigns never achieved the ability to reproduce their 
agendas across different fields of activity. Social movements, Crossley argues, 
drawing on Bourdieu, are networks of interaction which have the capacity to 
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transform practices within a specific social sphere, in this case psychiatry. This 
transformation however is achieved through changes in the operation of other 
related and overlapping fields of activity, including the media, parliamentary 
and legal fields. In addition, the transformation of psychiatry involves the 
transformation of service users too, who as a result of the movement begin to 
think and feel differently about themselves too. This is a result of the habitus 
(shared systems of perception, conception and action) which service users 
belong to also having changed. These changes have the ability to generate a 
resistance habitus, a particular habitus shared by core activists within a field 
who subsequently see their position differently and are able to use their 
transformed perceptions to influence others. In the case of mental health 
service users, Crossley argues that such a transformation came about with the 
creation of the Mental Patients Union (MPU) in 1973. The MPU was founded 
by a group of staff and service users at the Paddington Day Hospital, a radical 
therapeutic community in London which had been threatened with closure. 
The union rapidly extended the remit of its campaigning activities to take in 
providing legal advice to service users, lobbying parliament and talking to the 
media about mental patients' rights more generally. It was the scale of the 
campaign and the levels of public awareness that the campaigners were able to 
generate which distinguished the NIPU from all of its predecessors and also 
from professional led campaign groups such as the National Association for 
Mental Health (soon to become -Mind). However, by 1976 the MPU had 
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effectively ceased to operate, and in 1979 Paddington Day Hospital itself 
closed down. Crossley's argument that the 1970's witnessed the birth of a 
growing social movement is complicated by this fact. Although the late 1970s 
were marked by considerable campaigning activity on behalf of people with 
mental health needs, culminating in the Mental Health Act 1983, it would 
appear the bulk of this activity was neither initiated nor led by service users. 
There are conflicting accounts as to why the MPU and the therapeutic 
community which spawned it failed to survive (Baron 1987, Spandler 2006) 
and its demise should not necessarily be taken to mean that the fledgling 
service users movement was dysfunctional. The story of the MPU has some 
parallels with the story of user led services, and as noted above there are 
numerous structural reasons which account for their fragility. Rogers and 
Pilgrim (1991) argue that the service user movement only really began to be 
effective in the late 1980s and that it is the organisations which came to 
prominence in this period including Survivors Speak Out, the Hearing Voices 
Network and MindLink which really represent the birth of a service user 
movement in the UK. It is noticeable that the last two groups were both 
facilitated by larger national charities (the National Schizophrenia Fellowship, 
now Rethink, and Mind respectively) which paid the salaries of those service 
users who acted as coordinators. These groups were particularly active in 
campaigning against stigmatising media representations of people with mental 
health needs and in campaigning for greater rights for service users, and unlike 
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earlier groups they achieved some success, particularly with regard to placing 
pressure on service providers to increase service user representation within 
their service planning structures. 
But if, as Rogers and Pilgrim argue, sustained action leading to social 
change is what constitutes a social movement, then it may still be too soon to 
confirm the existence of a service user movement in the UK. At the time of 
writing the Mad Pride movement in the UK is not operating, although a 
campaign conducted under the umbrella of the international Mad Pride 
movement 
- 
Kisslt: The Campaign Against Psychiatric Assault 
- 
is still 
organising protests. Survivors Poetry survives, and Rethink still facilitates the 
Hearing Voices Network, but many other smaller campaigning bodies have 
either disappeared or been subsumed within larger non service user led groups 
during the last fifteen years. Whilst involvement has risen on the policy 
makers agenda, and the numbers of service users represented in forums 
determining service delivery issues has increased, the proportion who 
participate in service user-led groups, campaigns and services appears to still 
be very small. At the same time surveys looking at public attitudes to mental 
illness in England and Wales have noted very little improvement in public 
opinion over the last decade or so, with attitudes to care in the community 
actually deteriorating (DH 2003 pp. 6-8, Shift 2007 pp. 17-26, Shift 2008 p. 5) As 
Peter Campbell puts it: 
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"The great irony about service user action in the past 15 years is that, 
while the position of service users within services has undoubtedly 
improved, the position of service users in society has deteriorated. " 
(Campbell 2001). 
One explanation of this irony could be that the success of any emerging 
social movement is always the result of historical accident. It relies not just on 
individuals emerging capable of demonstrating a coherent voice but also on the 
existence of other social conditions within which the movement can flourish. 
Barnes and Bowl (2001) suggest that in the 1960s and 1970s public mistrust of 
institutions after a number of scandals, coupled with the development of an 
anti-psychiatry movement from within the profession, created the conditions 
which enabled service users to speak out and be taken seriously. Several 
commentators have observed that the growth of user involvement forums in 
the 1980s coincided with the birth of a consumerist perspective in healthcare, 
based on the neo-liberal view that the availability of choice within a free 
market of healthcare providers was the best way to drive up standards 
(Harrison and Mort 1998, Crinson 1998, Crossley 1999). The move towards 
greater service user involvement in this area could only come about because 
changes which affected all of healthcare policy occurred. Inclusion of mental 
health service users within the consumer led services agenda was never a 
priority for policy makers, instead it was an inadvertent consequence of a 
wider policy of reconstructing the patient as consumer. This dependence upon 
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external support and historical contingency means that the service user 
movement has never been able to determine its goal independent of the wider 
movement for better mental health services or to generate its own system of 
internal meaning. To this extent it is not a social system: 
"Only if a theory of movement is rich enough no longer to need initial 
or concomitant causes can one meaningfully speak of "social 
movements" and intend by this a self-activating process. " (Luhmann 
1995/1984 p. 400) 
There is of course an influential social movement which exists to promote the 
interests of mad people. But membership of this movement is not defined by 
having an identity as mad or as a service user. 
5.7.2 Identity and involvement 
The ambivalence people feel about an identity as mad is well documented (see 
above pp. 210-3). As outlined in Chapter Four (pp. 165-7) psychic systems are 
able to make selections about the aspects of their identity they choose to 
present to others. From a systems perspective we can see that concealment is 
sometimes the only strategy available to people keen to retain some space for 
communication within which they are accredited as capable of making 
meaningful utterances. 
This need for concealment may help to explain the absence of a stable 
social movement promoting the social status of mad people. Furthermore the 
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fact that we can choose how we present ourselves to others in modern societies 
can also help to explain why this movement has had difficulties transforming 
its observations from a collection of assertions into a common goal. Fuchs 
argues that one object of most social movements is to construct a coherent 
identity for their concerns which can be readily be communicated to others: 
the disparate voices of those concerned about the environment become the 
green movement for example (Fuchs 2006). Madness is typically understood as 
an absence rather than a presence, as a force which suppresses the `real' or 
`core' identity of the individual. Indeed this is how some mad people describe 
their experience of madness. In these circumstances it is difficult to construct a 
positive identity for a movement which seeks to assert the validity of a mad 
individual's self-understanding of their condition. 
The problem of the fragmentation of social identity does not simply 
undermine the coherence and feasibility of the service user movement. It also 
creates problems within private settings such as care planning meetings. 
Luhmann observes that in modern societies identity is constructed around a 
seemingly endless set of social distinctions rattier than linked to a small 
number of fixed labels such as commoner/gentleman or man/woman 
(Luhmann 1997 p. 627). Individuals now understand their social identity as the 
product of freely made `career' choices (ibid p. 742). As a result the individual 
is constantly testing her identity against the world and learning who she is 
from the subtle (and not so subtle) hints she picks up from those around her. 
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This complicates the promotion of new forms of involvement based around 
new and positive identities for service users. To unsettle the stable role of 
patient by asserting a new expertise based on experience creates a new 
dynamic within the setting. The `expert by experience' (formerly consumer, 
service user, client and patient, see McLaughlin 2008) has to relearn her 
identity. She may find that her social identity has not changed that much; 
that the expectations of those around her remain largely unaltered despite the 
change of name. Or she may find the change is significant and that suddenly 
she has to live up to a new set of expectations about her behaviour. These 
changes in expectation give rise to what Moeller terms `identity stress' 
(Moeller 2005 p. 92). The following quotes from an interview with a mental 
health service user on the topic of being consumer gives an illustration of this: 
`... I decided I'd take this stuff and asked specifically for it they didn't 
sort of suggest it to me... but I asked specifically if I could take this stuff 
and they gave it to me and it did work you know it sort of countered 
ehhm my anxiety' 
[and later in the same interview] 
`so I've started, sort have, more or less half come off it, and half not 
come off it. I wasn't getting, I was trusting in my psychotherapist and 
he says well maybe you're coming off it too quick and so I sort of went 
back on it. "' (Brian quoted in Speed 2007 p. 312) 
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In the many other extracts quoted from Speed's interview with Brian it is 
clear that Brian is someone with strong views on the usefulness of psychiatric 
medicine. It is only when it comes to discussing his own care that Brian's 
engagement with an identity as a consumer appears to be ambivalent. He is 
keen to assert that he is capable of making an informed choice about 
appropriate medication whilst later lacking the confidence to make an 
independent decision about whether to come off the same medication. Speed 
analyses this in terms of the degree of empowerment Brian enjoys. But this 
scenario could also be understood as resulting from the shifting sand of what is 
expected from those who use or consume mental health services. Brian may 
not be sure of what lie wants himself from services, and lie certainly is not 
sure what service providers expect from him. 
5.7.3 Knowledge as a limitation on involvement 
One function of involvement might be to increase the possibilities for 
generating knowledge within the psy-system (and also the medical, economic 
and political systems which are all implicated in the decision-making processes 
within which involvement is typically sought). Luhmann argues that learning 
is dependent upon a belief that information can be generalised about 
(Luhmann 1995/1984 p. 328). Psychic systems and social systems are not 
motivated to learn unless they have the expectation that having absorbed 
information they will be able to employ this to guide future decisions and thus 
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generate stability over time. However, at the same time learning relies on an 
ability to adjust one's judgment in the face of new information. The 
generation of knowledge is dependent upon those two conditions being met: - 
an expectation of stability and an openness to change: 
"Knowledge is therefore the condition for and regulator of learning 
processes, more precisely, for building learning possibilities into the 
existing structure of expectations. " (ibid. ) 
In order to describe the implications this has for service user 
involvement it is necessary to return to the distinction between cognitive and 
normative expectations. Cognitive expectations are, of course, more readily 
adjusted in the face of new information than normative expectations. 
Promoting communication between service users and psy-system professionals 
can also promote opportunities for adjusting cognitive expectations. Indeed, 
psy-system knowledge is largely dependent upon the possibility of such 
communication occurring because, as I described in Chapter Three (pp. 115-7), 
it has few other sources of evidence on which to found the distinction between 
madness and sanity. To take the example of a communication around whether 
or not a medication is effective, it will be easier for a service user to describe 
how a medication affects her if information about medication choices has been 
shared with her, her participation in discussions is encouraged and the 
professionals involved make it clear that an utterance has been heard by 
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indicating a response to it. The psy-system has the possibility of learning from 
the service user about the usefulness of the medication and the specific 
circumstances which make it desirable or undesirable. The service user may 
also revise her cognitive expectations about treatment on the basis of the 
information shared with her by professionals. 
Normative expectations are harder to adjust because their usefulness is 
in large part predicated upon their seeming stability. Psychic systems generate 
normative expectations in order to render the social world safer (ibid. pp. 325- 
6). The evolution of social norms is necessary for social order, and knowledge 
of these norms is swiftly transformed into `law', not necessarily law ordained 
by the state, but at least understood through the social codes which govern 
interaction (ibid. pp. 339-41). Social systems are in turn normatively closed 
which means that any adjustment of normative expectations has to occur from 
within in relation to the system's self-reference. No assault from the outside 
will result in a radical re-alignment of the norms of the legal or political or 
economic systems (Luhmann 2004/1993 pp. 464-74). This is where the 
effectiveness of involvement in promoting communication between service 
users and professionals becomes limited. The psy-system typically retains the 
normative expectation that it holds the most advanced knowledge available of 
the operation of the code madness/sanity. This is not blind arrogance, but an 
inevitable consequence of functional differentiation; if the system was not able 
to assert the validity of its own distinction it would be unable to continue to 
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operate. For the psy-system, the person making the mad utterance is not in a 
privileged position when it comes to determining whether or not she is mad. 
Her assessment of her madness is not inevitably better than an assessment 
performed by another. And in areas where psy-knowledge is perceived to be 
robust her personal assessment may well be worse. As a result the psy-system 
has a particular normative expectation about whose utterances should be 
understood as most credible. Or, in other words, who counts. 
The problems caused for involvement practices by the dominance of 
the evidence based medicine paradigm in mental health research (Faulkner 
and Thomas 2002) result from a combination of cognitive and normative 
expectations overlapping. To define an evidence base is to define the limits of 
generalisability of certain cognitive expectations. The function of doing this is 
to enable these limits to be communicated about more easily. The evidence 
base in medicine is meant to ensure that doctors are readily able to share 
knowledge about what does not work. However, in order to establish an 
evidence base the medical system has to generate normative expectations 
about what counts as evidence. These normative expectations in turn make it 
harder to communicate about the limits of knowledge, because successful 
communications must be founded upon shared norms. The difficulties doctors 
describe of communicating the value of evidence based medicine to the general 
public provide a good instance of one of the inherent limitations of this 
approach. As noted in Chapter Three (pp. 118-9) the psy-system is itself 
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engaged in a continuous internal debate over what should count as evidence. 
However, in the context of psy-system decision-making, the existence of the 
evidence based medicine paradigm provides another example of a normative 
expectation which can conflict with the promotion of involvement. If what the 
service user says conflicts with the evidence base the normative expectation of 
the psy-system is, typically, that the service user's views should be treated as 
weaker evidence than that which has already been endorsed through clinical 
research. 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined some of the different meanings and values applied to 
the term involvement in the context of research into the effectiveness of 
involvement policies and practices. However defined, the research literature 
has identified that involvement practices often fail to achieve meaningful 
changes in decision-making processes from the perspective of mad people. This 
has been linked to underlying problems of power-differentials, unstable or 
discredited social identity and unequal knowledge bases. 
Using the theoretical framework described in Chapters One to Four it 
has been possible to argue that these difficulties reflect some of the properties 
of interaction between social systems and between social systems and 
individuals. The issue of identity is manifested in two ways: the problem that 
mad people have not been able to generate a stable collective identity which 
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could be accredited as meaningful, and the problem that individuals labelled 
mad may feel ambivalent or even fearful about the consequences of owning 
madness as a component of their personal identity. The first of these can be 
explained through descriptive accounts of the emergence of protest movements 
and the conditions necessary for such movements to achieve their own self- 
reference. The second arises from the fluid nature of identity in modern 
society, which places continual demands upon the individual. As a result, 
generating a new positive identity for service users through the promotion of 
involvement throws up new challenges. But a further major problem is created 
for involvement by the fact that the psy-system has still not decided what 
meaning to apply to utterances made by service users. 
The literature on service user involvement has largely been generated 
within the psy-system. Most of the research cited above has been conducted 
by psychiatrists, psychologists, mental health nurses and mental health social 
workers and much of it has been published within the professional journals of 
these disciplines. This reflects the fact that normative adjustments are possible 
from the inside. The psy-system appears to at least acknowledge the 
possibility that changing its expectations about who should be heard may 
enhance its ability to perform the function of alleviating madness. This system 
also acknowledges that there are structural limitations placed upon 
involvement in practice. Different disciplines may respond differently to the 
challenge of promoting involvement, but the fact that these efforts to 
232 
communicate about involvement are structured around the promotion of 
meaningful communication as a therapeutic goal means that there is at least 
scope for a meaningful debate to take place. 
However, when involvement is discussed within the political system the 
same possibilities for debate do not appear to arise. The logic of promoting 
service user involvement is underpinned by an evident belief in the need to 
accredit service users. People who use services have a specific knowledge of the 
care they receive and as a consequence should be treated as meaningful 
contributors to decisions made about these services, whether at the level of 
personal care planning, or at the level of service planning. To accredit an 
utterance purely on the basis that a service user has said it is not to say that 
everything she says is automatically to be believed or acted upon. Otherwise, 
there would be no possibility of a highly accredited professional such as a 
psychiatrist ever being perceived to have lied. Instead, it is to assert that 
everything she says is potentially capable of being meaningful and is worthy of 
attention. This directly challenges the discreditation of mad people and as 
such demands that considerable social change be effected. But the issue of 
discreditation is never discussed in policy documents. At present no one has 
acknowledged the significance of the question of what it means to accredit an 
utterance simply by dint of the fact that it was made by someone who had 
previously made mad utterances. 
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Chapter Six 
The role of the legal system in accrediting and 
discrediting mad people 
6.1 Introduction 
The last chapter demonstrated that the political, economic and psy-systems 
(and to a far lesser extent the legal system) have actively engaged with the 
accreditation of mad people, through the promotion of service user 
involvement. In practice, the effectiveness of involvement policies and practices 
in changing the status of mad people is limited because the processes of 
discreditation which affect how systems respond to utterances made by mad 
people are still in place. In effect these systems are attempting to 
simultaneously accredit and discredit madness. 
This chapter will examine how the structural coupling of the legal and 
psy-systems in the context of mental health law can further serve to discredit 
and undermine mad people. It will examine these issues through a case study 
of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. But it starts with an examination of 
Luhmann's description of the social function of the legal system. 
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6.1.1 The significance of the law to Luhmann's theory- 
building 
Luhmann originally trained as a lawyer. Throughout his work on developing a 
social description of society capable of accounting for both order and 
complexity lie retained an especial interest in the function of the legal system 
within the context of a wider social order. Lulimann's descriptive account of 
the social function performed by the legal system was first outlined in `A 
Sociological Theory of Law' (Luhmann 1985/1974). But, as was made clear in 
Chapter One (p. 36), his theoretical development does not proceed along 
chronological lines. He described `Social Systems' (Luhmann 1995/1984) as his 
first book and stated that whilst his earlier work remained correct in its 
essentials it lacked sufficient focus upon the nature of communication and its 
role within systems 
. 
Luhmann returned to the law in `Law as a Social System' 
(Luhmann 2004/1993) which needs to be read alongside `A Sociological Theory 
of Law' and Luhmann's numerous articles upon the subject in order to 
understand how the law is functionally differentiated from other social systems 
and how it sustains that differentiation in the face of a complex environment. 
6.2 The function of the legal system 
In `A Sociological Theory of Law' Luhmann argues that the law evolves as a 
way of stabilising counterfactual normative expectations over time (Luhmann 
1985/1974 pp. 31-40). He reaches this conclusion by first returning to the 
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question of how psychic systems form expectations about the social world. As 
discussed in Chapters Four (pp. 152-4) and Five (pp. 228-30), individual psychic 
systems must generate expectations in order to be able to interact with and 
test the properties of their environment. When these expectations are met 
with a sufficient degree of consistency they may begin to condense into claims. 
Psychic systems generate both cognitive and normative expectations about the 
other psychic systems they encounter. When her normative expectations are 
not met in some way the individual may experience herself as disappointed or 
even threatened. Consequently, she may act upon these emotions in ways 
which generate further conflict and consequent social complexity. It is 
therefore in the interests of the social system to regulate the conduct of 
psychic systems in order to ensure that normative expectations are, typically, 
met. The forms that this social regulation takes are not inevitably legal. 
Luhmann discusses how a range of interaction systems including the family 
and the workplace are capable of exerting a regulatory influence over psychic 
systems (Luhmann 1985/1974 pp. 49-61). 
Regulation is not an exclusive function of the legal system, which is 
why Luhmann goes on to ask what uniquely differentiates the law from other 
systems (Luhmann 2004/1993 p. 143). He distinguishes theories which argue 
that the law operates as a form of social control, since social control is clearly 
a function exercised by a number of social systems. He also distinguishes 
theories which emphasise the integrative function of the law such as the work 
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of Habermas (ibid. and see also Luhmann 2002c pp. 187-93), since neither 
achieving consensus nor harmony is an observable function of the law, nor a 
probable outcome given the closed nature of legal communication. Instead, he 
identifies the maintenance and stabilising of norms over time as a function 
unique to the legal system. 
Law achieves this maintenance of norms through its time-binding 
effects and, unexpectedly, through its operative closure. By making 
communications as to what will be normatively approved in the future, the 
legal system, more than any other system, generates certainty about conduct 
in the present (Luhmann 2004/1993 pp. 147-56). But, the law's ability to make 
communications with time-binding effects depends on legal closure and upon 
its blindness to norms which have not previously been identified as legal, By 
asserting that only some norms count the law is insulated from the vagaries of 
ongoing social debates about `right' behaviour (ibid. pp. 156-62). 
The identification of this function alone does not explain the existence 
of an a. utopoietically closed legal system (Luhmann 1992a). Instead, we have 
to look at the attributes of social systems as described in the Introduction to 
understand how and why the legal system attains and maintains autopoietic 
closure. Luhmann's account of autopoiesis asserts that partial autopoiesis is 
impossible. How then do systems arise at all? Teubner supports an alternative 
view to Luhmann's: that it is possible to think of self-referential systems in 
terms of degrees of autonomy (Teubner 1993 pp. 31-46). In order for 
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autopoiesis to arise the system must be able to reproduce its own elements. So 
legal acts are constitutive of further legal acts, the reporting of medical 
diagnoses informs future diagnoses and participation in monetary exchanges 
makes future monetary exchanges possible. But Teubner also argues that all of 
the components of the system: the acts, boundaries, structures and processes it 
employs, must be cyclically interlinked for total autopoietic closure to occur. 
Thus autonomy increases as the system recognises its components, engages in 
reflexive communication about them (self-observation), is able to act to alter 
its operations on the basis of these communications (self-constitution) and 
links these processes together in a hypercycle (autopoiesis). Thus legal 
autonomy begins to emerge at the point at which legal communications are 
distinguished from other communications. At this point the legal system has 
to distinguish lawful and unlawful acts on the basis of a self-reference, which 
forces it to engage in reflexive accounts of its operations. These accounts 
generate norms for legal operations 
- 
principles which govern the internal 
operations of the code for example 
- 
and which in turn lead to the constitution 
of new elements. Eventually, the law itself becomes the arbiter of what kind of 
act or event can be constituted legally. 
6.3 The function of mental health law 
In most jurisdictions there exist documents in the form of statutes and cases 
which describe when it may be lawful to detain or force treatment upon 
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someone who has a mental disorder, how and by whom such decisions are to 
be reached and how mentally disordered individuals can challenge decisions 
made about them. When we refer to mental health law this is what we are 
typically referring to. However, the law in the systems theory context does not 
refer to texts or to institutions but to communications organised around the 
distinction between what is lawful and what is unlawful. When I refer to the 
function of mental health law here I am not asking what the function of these 
documents is, but I am asking what function maintaining a distinction 
between lawful and unlawful decisions relating to mentally disordered people 
performs for society as a whole and how this function can be differentiated 
from functions delivered by other systems. 
For example, social control may be achieved through law but it is 
exercised across systems. In relation to madness it is typically promoted 
through a structural coupling of the political and psy-systems. Mental health 
law certainly does play a role in determining when certain professionals may 
exercise social control (see Bartlett 2003), but if communications which 
purport to refer to mental health law are to be functionally differentiated from 
policing and psy-system communications then we need to ask if they are 
performing any functions beyond social control. 
It has also been argued that mental health law is necessary to protect 
fundamental rights, such as the right to liberty or the right to freedom from 
inhuman and degrading treatment. The effectiveness of mental health law in 
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achieving this protection has been questioned (Fennell 2005), as has the 
usefulness of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as they relate to mad 
people (ibid. and Richardson 2005). But these arguments suggest that the 
authors hold two normative expectations: that human rights law should 
protect the interests of mentally disordered people, and that mental health law 
should be grounded in securing the human rights of those it affects. Again, 
whilst it is clear that the law may play a role in ensuring that the expectation 
that fundamental rights will be protected is maintained, fundamental rights as 
expectations are definitively pre-legal. Luhmann defined fundamental rights as 
a multi-functional institution (Luhmann 1999/1957, quoted in Verschraegen 
2002). That is their operations are not functionally differentiated, nor are their 
implications limited to affecting the operations of one system. Instead 
fundamental rights generate claims that all individuals should be able to 
participate across a range of social systems such as the economy, politics, law 
and education. By enabling diverse participation in the social system, 
fundamental rights actually contribute to the maintenance of functional 
differentiation. Luhmann argued that the operations of the political system 
tended to have a colonising effect on other spheres of social activity. If the 
political system has the power to make binding decisions in respect of social 
life and uses this power indiscriminately, it jeopardises the functional 
differentiation of other social systems such as the economy and consequently 
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risks causing social collapse. The constitutionally enshrined protection of 
individual liberty actually helps to sustain the operative closure of the political 
system. By enabling individuals to challenge the authority of the state, 
constitutional rights act as a subtle and highly effective corrective upon 
operations of the political system which threaten to disturb the effective 
functional differentiation of society (Verschraegen 2006). This analysis is 
suggestive, but leaves open large questions about the operation of human 
rights, which unlike constitutional rights, are expected to exercise their 
functions in relation to all states, but in the absence of a unified political 
system. In a later short paper, Lulimann argued that fundamental rights are 
inherently paradoxical since their function is to positivise pre-positive law 
(Luhmann 1995b, quoted in Verschraegen 2006). This paradox can also be 
observed in the fact that the protection of fundamental rights continues to rely 
on their acceptance by states, despite their formulation at an international 
level. 
This description of fundamental rights makes clear that 
communications around the code right/not right perform functions distinct 
from those performed by the legal system. Mental health law, as it extends 
beyond the protection of fundamental rights, must be performing some further 
function for society. If we return to the view that law serves to ensure that 
normative expectations are preserved over time, and despite disappointment, 
we can see that certain normative expectations are clearly indicated by the 
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content of mental health law. These include the expectation that individuals 
will not be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty: they have freedom to make 
choices regarding their bodies and their lives, and that if individual liberty or 
freedom is compromised individuals will be entitled to protest their treatment. 
They also include expectations that the state will intervene beneficently in the 
interests of people unable to identify what is in their own best interests, and 
will exert control over those who may act to harm others. But these normative 
expectations have not been generated by the body of people who are already 
deemed to be mentally disordered. Instead, they are the expectations of the 
non-mentally disordered population who typically feel confident that their own 
expectations of liberty, beneficence and personal security will not be suddenly 
disappointed. By maintaining a seemingly coherent distinction between lawful 
and unlawful decisions in these matters, the mental health legal system seeks 
to ensure that the majority of the population feel able to rely upon the system 
to operate fairly and judiciously in relation to the minority it applies to, and 
consequently to operate effectively in relation to themselves if they were to 
become mentally disordered. The existence of evidence that the operation of 
the law is in practice arbitrary or excessive or inadequate only becomes 
problematic once belief in these shortcomings in the law widespread enough to 
undermine these expectations. 
The protection of fundamental rights and the maintenance of social 
control are both relevant to the operations of mental health law. Evidence of 
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abuses on the one hand, or of inadequate control on the other may be the 
disturbance which generates a structural coupling between law and the psy- 
system or the political system which can then result in legal communications 
being made about madness. But the law's distinctive function from a systems 
perspective is to maintain expectations about how control will be exercised 
and rights protected, not to either exercise that control itself or ensure the 
protection of those rights. 
6.4 Discreditable witnesses 
- 
legal responses to 
service user testimony 
The legal system lacks any immanent account of madness by which it could 
distinguish mad and sane utterances. In addition, having discredited mad 
people themselves, the legal system tends to rely primarily on psy-system 
evidence. To this extent the legal and psy-systems are structurally coupled. 
For example, an operation within the psy-system to ensure that a person 
receives treatment in hospital becomes a legal operation at the same time. The 
legal system has not developed a description of when madness demands a 
response which can be operated independently of the psy-system. The 
complexity and fragility of psy-system knowledge and the inherent 
incomprehensibility of madness help to explain this. However, this generates a 
double-bind for mad people seeking to challenge decisions reached about their 
lives. In order to determine whether or not the psy-system has applied the 
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legal distinction correctly, the legal system has to have recourse to the 
expertise of the psy-system. The decisions involved rarely involve an appraisal 
of evidence which can be determined objectively. Since it is the psy-system 
and not the mad person which is of greatest relevance to the determination of 
the correct application of the law, the expectations of mad people, when they 
are widely discredited across other social systems, are also largely irrelevant to 
the legal system. 
Testimony from mad people about aspects of their own lives becomes 
evidence for the purposes of the legal system in a variety of contexts. When we 
discuss mental health law we are typically referring to bodies of civil and 
criminal jurisprudence and statute which explicitly relate to the distinction 
between madness and sanity. Mad people's evidence may therefore be relevant 
to the Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHR. T) when deciding whether or not 
to order that a service user be discharged from a compulsory order. It is 
relevant to the judicial review of administrative decisions made by agents of 
the state when deciding how to apply the provisions of mental health statute. 
This section will examine what happens to the testimony of mad people in the 
context of the tribunal and of the judicial review. However, the testimony of 
mad people may also be relevant in other circumstances. It may be relevant to 
the criminal justice system when deciding whether a defendant is fit to stand 
trial, or is capable of being criminally responsible for the act in question, or is 
not guilty by reason of insanity. The question of the weight to apply to the 
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testimony of a mad person may also arise if the complainant or another 
witness has a mental disorder. And under tort law the court may sometimes 
be called upon to decide whether a certain psychiatric injury was the 
foreseeable consequence of a tortious act and may therefore need to ascertain 
from the victim the extent of her injury and the nature of the harm she 
suffered (see Chapter Four p. 197). 
Direct testimony is, of course, not the only way in which people who 
have been determined as mad provide information which may generate legal 
communications. Legal communications around the lives of the mad are 
typically made outside the courts, through decisions made under the civil 
mental health system. This section will not look at how these legal 
communications affect the lives of the mad. Instead, it will examine whether 
and how the legal system accredits evidence given by mad people as 
information relevant to drawing a distinction between lawful and unlawful 
conduct. It will argue that testimony provided by people with mental health 
needs is discredited to a greater degree than testimony provided by other 
applicants, defendants or witnesses. 
6.5 The Mental Health Review Tribunal and the 
assessment of applicants 
In England and Vales, decisions to detain people with mental health needs 
under the civil jurisdiction are not made by the courts. Instead, in a move 
intended to both normalise admissions and enhance their relevance, most 
decisions to admit a service user to hospital without his or her consent must 
be made by two independent doctors (one of whom must be approved under 
s. 12 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA)), an approved social worker, and 
the service user's nearest relative (s. 2 and s. 3 MHA 1983). After admission 
however, the service user has the right to challenge this decision at a Mental 
Health Review Tribunal (MHRT). The MHRT sits within the hospital, and 
conducts its hearings in a quasi-inquisitorial fashion. It asks both the service 
user and the professionals responsible for her care to justify their reasons for 
seeking or opposing discharge. The service user is entitled to non-means tested 
legal aid in order to fund legal representation in order to counter the evidence 
advanced by the hospital as to why detention is necessary. 
The MHHRT provides a useful case-study for examining how the law 
evaluates the evidence provided by mad people. Do IMIRT decisions reflect 
the discreditation of madness? And is psy-system expertise favoured over the 
service user's account of herself? 
6.5.1 Describing the MHRT 
The creation of a specialist tribunal to hear mental health cases in England 
and `'Vales was recommended in the Report of the Percy Commission (Royal 
Commission 1957). The Commission advocated a wholesale overhaul of 
existing mental health laws in the process abolishing the existing processes for 
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civil commitment and placing responsibility for the decision to admit in the 
hands of doctors. The MHRT was intended to ensure that service users who 
had been admitted at the behest of doctors were nonetheless able to challenge 
their detention. It was intended as an appeal procedure additional to the 
power service users have to complain of their detention to the managers of the 
hospital they are detained in. When the Mental Health Act was reformed in 
1983 the powers of the MHRT were extended so that it was able to hear cases 
relating to service users detained under s. 2 of the MHA and cases relating to 
restricted service users; service users who could otherwise not be discharged 
without the approval of the Home Secretary. In effect, tribunals have powers 
to hear cases relating to any service user liable to be detained in hospital 
except those detained under short-term emergency admission procedures, or 
those remanded by the courts pending a hearing. 
S. 65 of the MHA provides the legal basis for the MHRT, and Schedule 
2 of the Act broadly specifies the structure and administration of the MHRT, 
but more detailed guidance on the procedures tribunals must follow is laid 
down in the Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules (SI 1983/942). The 
Tribunal panel typically consists of a President, who must be legally qualified; 
a medical member and a lay member. On the day of the hearing, the panel 
will convene before the hearing to discuss the application. The medical 
member will also conduct a brief assessment of the service user before the 
hearing. During the hearing the service user and the hospital may both employ 
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legal representation to make their case. The hearing is intended to be fairly 
informal and not adversarial, and the tribunal president takes responsibility 
for ensuring that all parties are given an opportunity to make their case and 
question those giving evidence (Perkins 2003 p. 75). All three members of the 
panel may raise questions about the evidence presented before retiring to make 
their decision. Perkins found that the time taken for deliberations was 
typically brief, in more than 40 of a sample of 61 tribunals observed she found 
that the deliberations were conducted and the decision and the reasons for it 
written up within 15 minutes (Perkins 2003 p. 79). The panel must decide 
between ordering a discharge or not. If ordering a discharge they also have to 
consider whether it should be absolute or deferred until a specific date. In the 
case of service users who are detained subject to a restriction order under s. 41 
MHA the MHRT may also place conditions upon the discharge, such as the 
need for ongoing supervision in the community. In 2006,8778 applications 
were made to the tribunal of which 11% resulted in a discharge being ordered. 
Of these discharges 48% were absolute (Mental Health Act Commission 2008 
p. 170). 
6.5.2 What does a tribunal hearing achieve? 
The tribunal ostensibly exists to ensure that service users who may be 
unnecessarily or unjustifiably detained have access to a hearing with a power 
to discharge them (Eldergill 1997 p. 20). However, in addition to its ostensible 
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function it is clearly the case that the tribunal is capable of securing a range of 
quite disparate ends. 
Legally, granting service users access to an independent hearing ensures 
that the powers to detain under the MIIA are nonetheless compliant with Art 
5.4 of the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees a right to 
speedy determination of the lawfulness of ones detention by a court in the 
event of a deprivation of liberty. Practically, the possibility of independent 
scrutiny places an additional pressure upon the detaining authorities to ensure 
that their decisions are both justifiable and that they can be communicated 
effectively. As with the other safeguards afforded to service users under the 
MHA, the fact that a right to a tribunal hearing exists serves to reassure the 
wider population that the imposition of compulsion should not pose a threat to 
them (unless and until they are properly mad). Although the evidence on 
service user's views of the tribunal is scanty, the tribunal does not appear to 
ensure that service users themselves perceive either the original decision to 
detain or their continued detention as legitimate (Peay 1989 pp. 52-3, Ferencz 
2003). In addition, the tribunal does not appear legitimate in the eyes of 
doctors, many of whom express concerns that the hearing will have an adverse 
impact upon the service user in circumstances where discharge is in any event 
an unlikely outcome (Peay 1989 p. 65-6, Obomanu and Kennedy 2001) 
In system terms the tribunal maintains the general public's expectation 
that arbitrary or unjust detention will not be imposed upon sane individuals. 
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The decision to detain is inevitably massively discrediting in the eyes of 
others. It indicates not only that the person is mad, but also that her madness 
could lead to risky or dangerous conduct. It also indicates that the person, in 
resisting admission, does not recognise the severity of her own symptoms. So 
one further possibility is that the Tribunal acts as a body capable of re- 
accrediting the service user after she has been discredited in the eyes of those 
caring for her. A tribunal hearing resulting in a discharge could be a powerful 
way of communicating that the service user is either not-mad or not- 
dangerous. However, it does not appear that the tribunal achieves this end in 
practice. The tribunal panel base their decision upon a limited knowledge of 
the service user, which cannot be compared to the knowledge enjoyed by the 
professionals caring for her. A tribunal decision to discharge will not normally 
convince those caring for the service user that her detention is unnecessary, 
only that they have not made their case sufficiently clearly to the panel (Peay 
1989 p. 65-6). Similarly, a tribunal decision to allow continued detention will 
not typically convince the service user that her detention is necessary (Peay 
1989 pp. 47-9, Ferencz 2003). 
6.5.3 Views of service users on the MHRT 
Relatively little work has been conducted into the views of the service user on 
the MIIRT in England and `Vales. Peay, in a study of MART practice in a 
special hospital setting, found that the service users she interviewed recognised 
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that their chances of success were small (Peay 1989 pp. 42-5). They were aware 
that success depended heavily upon whether or not their psychiatrist 
supported their application, and they expressed frustration with their 
psychiatrist's opinion but not with the MHRT panel for following it. Perhaps 
most significantly some of them voiced the opinion that making an application 
was still worthwhile because it allowed them to show hospital staff that they 
were serious about being discharged. Consequently, being refused a discharge 
did not necessarily amount to a setback. Even more intriguingly, many of 
them wanted their files to reflect that they had made every effort to secure a 
discharge, because to fail to make these efforts would be "really crazy" (ibid. 
p. 44). This is intriguing because it suggests that service users did not view 
MHRT decisions in and of themselves as having an impact on their 
accreditation and consequently their freedom. But they did believe that 
engagement with the MHRT might accredit them in the eyes of others, 
particularly those others who really had the power to order their discharge. All 
of the service users in Peay's sample were resident in a setting where periods 
of admission were typically very long (a two-year admission was described as 
short, ibid. p. 47), and many of them had attended multiple tribunal hearings 
in the past. By contrast, in a study examining the experience of service users 
in other settings as well, Ferencz found that service users (most of whom had 
no prior experience of the tribunal) typically had high expectations of the 
tribunal process in advance and felt confident that once their case was made 
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they would be discharged (Ferencz 2003). As a consequence they described 
their feelings of disappointment after the hearing as particularly acute. In 
particular, service users reported feeling that they were not listened to or that 
they were not understood, they found the tribunal process confusing and they 
felt powerless and distressed afterwards. The views of service users contrasted 
sharply with the views of the panel members who were interviewed for the 
same study, most of whom felt that service users were listened to. Although 
the panel members acknowledged that the process was often distressing for 
service users, they did not see the distress as something they could address. 
These are significant findings for two reasons. Firstly, it would seem 
that some service users experience tribunal practice in England and Wales as 
anti-therapeutic. The study in question doesn't suggest that the hearing 
process causes long-term distress, but the short-term distress the tribunal 
process causes to people who are already experiencing mental illness requires 
justification in itself. However, identifying how tribunal practice would need to 
alter in order for service users to avoid this distress is no easy task. Freckelton 
has described, with reference to tribunal practice in the State of Victoria, 
Australia, how panels can address the therapeutic needs of service users 
(Freckelton 2003). And the Mental Health Review Tribunal for New Zealand 
has explicitly stated that it sees its role as protecting rather than undermining 
therapeutic relationships (Diesfeld and McKenna 2006). But the guidance 
available from these jurisdictions may have limited applicability to the 
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situation in England and Vales. For example, Freckelton emphasises that the 
length of time allotted to hearing cases places considerable limitations on 
ensuring that service user's therapeutic needs are met. An MIIRT panel in 
Victoria, for example, may hear and reach a decision upon up to 10 cases in 
one day. The MHRT in England and `Vales allows far longer for hearings, 
with most taking longer than an hour (Perkins 2003 pp. 126-7), and yet it 
would seem that even with these more favourable conditions, service users still 
report feeling confused and ignored. 
Secondly, these findings suggest that more work needs to be done to 
identify whether the MHRT actually makes service users feel that their 
hospital admission is reasonable and justified or whether it simply adds to 
their sense of resentment. Findings from coercion studies conducted in the US 
have shown that perceived coercion correlates strongly with the degree of 
perceived procedural justice service users encounter (Monahan et al. 1995, 
Iliday 1997, Poythress et al. 2002). In contrast to the courts in most US 
states, the MHRT does not get to review the decision to admit, only the 
decision to discharge. Perhaps this means that the service user has already 
developed a firm view on the coercion she has suffered before her MHRT 
hearing. The ability of the MHRT to challenge this view and suggest that the 
`system' is still fair and reasonable is therefore heavily compromised. This is 
purely speculative however, because so little data on service user views of the 
tribunal exists at present. All that can be said confidently on the basis of the 
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little evidence available is that service users sometimes describe the MHRT as 
a location within which they are unable to communicate, and that they do not 
see it as playing a significant role in accrediting them as experts on their own 
lives. 
6.6 Evaluating the role of discreditation processes in 
the reasoning of the MHRT 
Tribunal decisions in England and Wales are made available to the service 
user and to the detaining hospital, but they are not published. This means 
analysing the adequacy of tribunal reasoning as it relates to evaluating the 
service user is a difficult task. There have been some empirical studies 
conducted in England and `Vales which look at MHRT practices and at their 
reasoning (Peay 1989, Machin and Richardson 2000, Perkins 2003). Close 
analyses of tribunal reasoning have also been conducted in jurisdictions where 
tribunal decisions are published (Diesfeld and McKenna 2006, Diesfeld and 
Sjöström 2007). The evidence from these sources will be examined here. 
Tribunal reasoning is also discussed in the context of judicial review hearings 
relating to tribunal decisions. These discussions only imperfectly reflect the 
content of the tribunal's decision, and the role of the discreditation and 
accreditation of service user evidence in judicial review will be discussed more 
fully in the next section. 
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6.6.1 The medical member 
The role of the medical member in what is ostensibly a legal hearing appears 
immediately anomalous. Although one of the alleged advantages of specialist 
tribunals over courts in general is their perceived ability to draw upon both 
legal knowledge and specialist expertise (Leggatt 2001, para. 1.12), most 
tribunal panels in England and Wales consist of lawyers. The lawyers in 
question will be expected to have specialist knowledge of the types of dispute 
the tribunal addresses but this knowledge is expected to be specialist 
knowledge of the law, and not of a related discipline. There are other 
exceptions to this general rule beside the 11HRT including the Special 
Educational Needs and Disability in Schools Tribunal (SENDiST), which 
consists of a chair who must be legally qualified and two specialist members, 
typically people with experience of special education (s. 5 Special Educational 
Needs Tribunal Regulations 2001) and the Care Standards Tribunal which 
requires two lay members experienced in the provision of social care (s. 3 and 
s. 5 Protection of Children and Vulnerable Adults and Care Standards 
Tribunal Regulations 2002). But the role of the medical member remains 
distinctive, because in no other tribunal are members with specialist expertise 
expected to conduct their own independent assessment of the person the 
review concerns. Lay members of the SENDiST for example, may well have 
the professional qualifications necessary to assess a child's special educational 
needs, but they nonetheless do not carry out this task. 
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This dual role has attracted legal criticism for failing to conform to the 
requirements of natural justice (Richardson and Machin 2000). By acting as 
both a witness and a judge in the same hearing the medical member 
undermines the independence and perceived impartiality of the MHRT. In 
addition, because the medical member's assessment of the applicant takes 
place almost immediately before the hearing, the applicant does not always get 
the opportunity either to learn the outcome of the assessment or to challenge 
it. It has been argued that this situation breaches the service user's Article 5 
rights. According to this argument, the presence of the medical member 
undermines the ability of the MHR. T to qualify as a court capable of making 
an independent and fair determination of the service user's status. However, in 
R(S) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2002] it was held that the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal Rules make clear that the medical member is 
expected to assess the service user in order to form an opinion, but not to 
prejudge the outcome of the hearing. The role of the medical member, 
therefore, is only a threat to the impartiality of the tribunal if there is 
evidence that she has formed a concluded opinion prior to the hearing. 
Irritatingly, this ruling does not evaluate the symbolic impact that having a 
possibly, if not actually, biased panel member has upon the service user's 
perception of the fairness of the tribunal. And it also ignores the fact that the 
service user is not in a position to demonstrate at what point the medical 
member reaches her concluded opinion. But the case does demonstrate that 
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whilst the human rights argument is plausible it has not yet been endorsed by 
the courts. 
The position of the medical member also causes practical problems. 
The Mental Health Act Commission has reported that tribunal hearings are 
frequently delayed because of difficulties in convening a panel with a full set of 
specialist members (MIIAC 2008 para. 4.66-69 and MIIAC 2006 para. 4.108). 
The particular difficulty of recruiting medical members has also been referred 
to in case-law, as one of the many explanations offered by the MHRT for 
delays in holding hearings (see R (KB, MK, JR, GM, LB, PD and TB) v. 
MHRT and Secretary of State for Health [2003] para. 65-75). Although the 
medical member cannot work for the hospital within which the service user is 
detained, these difficulties in recruitment mean that it is sometimes impossible 
for the MHR. T to ensure that the medical member is not also employed by the 
NHS Trust which runs the hospital within which the service user is detained. 
The Court of Appeal has held that this degree of proximity does not give rise 
to an appearance of bias which undermines the independence of the Tribunal 
(R (PD) v. MHRT [2004] EWCA Civ 311), but this practice may also reduce 
the credibility of the MHRT in the eyes of applicants. 
So the role of the medical member is already legally and practically 
problematic. From a systems theoretical perspective it is also necessary to ask 
what function this position on the panel performs. Tribunal decisions have to 
communicate a legal distinction; they have to distinguish between lawful and 
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unlawful detention. But they can only do this by reference to a therapeutic 
distinction. The tribunal's role is not to determine the legality of the original 
decision to detain, but whether or not continued detention is necessary. They 
can only answer this question by asking whether or not the service user's 
therapeutic interests will be better served by continued detention or not. In 
effect they have to observe the psy-system distinction between madness and 
sanity. 
The law itself is structured around this distinction. Before admission is 
possible the service user must have a mental disorder for the purposes of s. l 
MHA, the other conditions which must be met in cases of compulsory 
admission must in turn flow from the evidence that the service user meets this 
requirement first and foremost. Regardless of where the burden of proof lies in 
the hearing, the terms have already been established by the psy-system. 
Whether it is for the service user's doctor to demonstrate that she has a 
mental disorder for the purposes of s. 1 MHA or for the service user to 
demonstrate that she does not, the hearing turns upon a psy-system 
distinction. But this psy-system distinction translates only imperfectly into a 
coherent legal distinction. To find a language within which to express this 
distinction coherently relies on the ability of the panel members to move 
between legal and medical terms. The professional knowledge held by the 
medical member can therefore be a useful tool for the panel in transforming 
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medical evidence into adequate reasons for a legal decision (Richardson and 
Machin 2000). 
This view of the role of the medical member may help to explain why 
the medical member in practice tends to communicate her views on the service 
user's mental state earlier in the process than is advised. Rule 11 of the 
MIIRT Rules states that the medical member shall conduct an assessment of 
the service user prior to the hearing, but the Guide for Members of the 
Tribunal (DH 1996) advises the medical member not to disclose the results of 
her assessment at the pre-hearing meeting. The results may however, be 
discussed during the hearing and in the subsequent deliberations. Studies of 
MHRT practice have found that it is extremely common for the medical 
member's assessment to be discussed at the pre-hearing meeting (Richardson 
and Machin 2000, Perkins 2003 p. 43). The reason for the guidance is that the 
findings of the assessment represent new evidence which the service user is 
unable to challenge if it is raised before the hearing. But Richardson and 
Machin suggest that it is unrealistic to expect the medical member to suppress 
her views upon the service user, and the other members of the panel 
interviewed in Perkins' study all reported finding the medical members 
evidence extremely useful. This would tend to confirm the view that the legal 
and lay members of the panel find the availability of specialist psy-knowledge 
especially persuasive in reaching their own decisions about the facts at hand. 
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6.6.2 Credibility and the tribunal 
Perkins found that during the tribunal hearing the panel questioned the 
service user in a manner quite different to that of other witnesses. In some 
cases efforts were made to catch the service user out in order to expose the 
service user's underlying beliefs. This implies that the panel started with the 
assumption that the service user had not fully disclosed her motivations for 
seeking discharge and that there was more information available `under the 
surface'. The same assumption was not made about the reasons given by the 
service user's psychiatrist or social worker reasons for opposing discharge 
(Perkins 2003 pp. 72-3). Similarly, during their deliberations she found that a 
key issue for the panel was in deciding whom to believe. In most cases the 
bulk of the evidence lay in the conflicting accounts provided by the service 
user and by those who had assessed her. It was rare for more tangible evidence 
to be available. As a result, the panel had to determine the credibility of all 
those who gave evidence and in the process consider what motivation each 
witness had for providing a false account. In these circumstances it was 
common for the service user not to be believed, since her motive for lying was 
assumed to be self-evident. It was also common for family and friends of the 
service user to be seen as non-credible. It was rare for the same consideration 
to be given to the motivations of doctors and other professionals, but where it 
was considered it was inferred that they would wish to discharge the service 
user if possible in order to conserve scarce resources for others (ibid. pp. 89-93). 
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Whilst this is a rational assessment, it is also only partial. It is clear 
that in assessing credibility the panel has multiple resources to draw upon 
when reaching a decision about the service user. They can examine her 
previous medical history, the reports of two or more medical experts plus 
evidence from social workers and nursing staff. By contrast, the panel may 
know little or nothing about the past history of the other witnesses. No quasi- 
independent evidence about their credibility is presented. They are typically 
accredited on the basis of their professional qualifications and the panel must 
form its judgement on the basis of what they believe to be true about people 
who perform the professional role in question, and what they can infer from 
the nature of any written evidence provided and the behaviour of the witness 
during the hearing. Perkins did find one example of a professional being 
discredited on the basis of her behaviour during the hearing but this was 
exceptional (ibid. p. 92). 
So credibility is central to the decision reached by the tribunal. As 
Peay found, credibility may also influence the decision of the service user to 
seek a tribunal hearing. But the tribunal decision is not in itself seen as 
credible, either by service users or by those caring for them. Nor does a 
favourable tribunal decision appear to confer credibility upon the service user. 
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6.6.3 Problems with insight 
Another major criticism of the tribunal has turned upon the way in which 
non-legal terms such as `insight', `compliance' and `best interests' are 
employed in their reasoning. The use of these terms can be seen as indicative 
of the problem of pretextuality (Perlin 1999, Freckelton 2003). These terms 
act as pretexts for justifying continued detention, and in the process allow the 
panel to avoid the more complex task of trying to describe in precise terms 
how the specific symptoms the service user exhibits map on to the legal 
criteria for detention. By way of contrast, Peay points out that if law and the 
psy-system are autopoietic, terms such as `best interests' offer a useful 
communicative resource around which `creative misunderstandings' can emerge 
(Peay 2005). By employing the same term, whilst applying different meanings 
to it, the legal and psy-systems can maintain the appearance of normative 
coordination whilst remaining effectively closed to each other. The inherently 
subjective dimension of any assessment of best interests then becomes 
invisible, as both systems layer their own interpretations upon the term and 
ignore its defects. Something similar may happen with the term insight, which 
is a notoriously imprecise concept with quite different lay and clinical 
meanings (Diesfeld 2003). Even the clinical significance of insight is heavily 
contested (fi yer 2000). 
The problem of `insight' is raised by Perkins. She found that in the 61 
MHHRTs she observed; insight was the single most commonly discussed 
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symptom during both hearings and deliberations (Perkins 2003, p. 104). Insight 
in this context raises two problems for service users. In most cases the panel 
seemed willing to accept the medical assessment of the service user's level of 
insight (ibid. p. 65). It is perhaps difficult for the service user to counter this 
assessment because any assertion that her symptoms are different to those 
being outlined may in itself be interpreted as evidence of a lack of insight. 
Secondly, Perkins found that even where insight was not identified as an issue 
by the clinicians giving expert evidence it was still raised during deliberations. 
She cites one case in which the lay member asserted during deliberations that 
the service user evidently lacked insight, and this view was supported by other 
panel members despite the fact that no medical evidence suggesting this had 
been introduced during the hearing. Insight, then, is sufficiently vague that 
even lay members of the panel may feel confident in their gut assessment of 
this symptom. 
The Mental Health Review Board (MHRB) in the State of Victoria, 
Australia, publishes some of its decisions. These decisions have been used to 
analyse the ways in which insight is employed to make explicit the reasons 
behind the panel's decision (Diesfeld and Sjöström 2007). There are of course, 
big differences in practice between the Victorian MHRB and the NIHRT in 
England and Wales. In particular, the knowledge that their reasoning will be 
made available to a wider audience may well influence the panel to reach for 
more objective terms to describe their reasoning than is the case in England 
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and Wales. However, Diesfeld and Sjostrom's study of the use of insight in 
MHRB reasoning is still instructive because it demonstrates very clearly how 
insight can be used to mean more than one thing even within the same 
decision. In their analysis of 25 decisions they noted that insight was referred 
to in 19 cases. Of these 19 cases, 13 concerned the application of s. 8(1)d of 
the Victorian MIIA 1986, which asks whether the service user refuses or is 
unable to consent to treatment. They describe how, in employing insight to 
justify or explain a decision, the panel reasoned about its relevance in two 
distinct ways. Firstly, the panels reasoned that lack of insight causes non- 
compliance with treatment, in effect meaning that the service user is at high 
risk of refusing treatment in the future. Secondly, they reasoned that a refusal 
to take treatment or to comply with a treatment regime indicated a lack of 
insight and perhaps ongoing mental health needs. Most notably, they found 
two cases in which both sets of reasoning were applied: 
"In RD, the board first discusses insight as the cause of non- 
compliance: 
`She lacked sufficient insight into her illness to comply with the 
treatment that was required for the alleviation of mental illness. ' 
However, later in the same decision the board construed non- 
compliance as evidence of lack of insight: 
`Her denial of the existence of a major mental illness and her 
continuing refusal to take antipsychotic medication unless constrained 
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to do so are further illustrations of the absence of a requisite degree of 
insight into the nature of her mental condition. '" 
As the authors point out, it is impossible for the service user to escape from 
this circular reasoning. They also note that insight tended to be understood as 
an absolute attribute; either the service user had it or she did not. This does 
not reflect either the clinical or lay meanings applied to the term. In lay 
discussions of insight a person has insight into something specific; it is not a 
general description. And in clinical discussions, insight is understood as 
occurring along a scale, with most service users displaying considerable 
variation in the degree of insight they exhibit over time (Cuesta et al. 2000). 
So what work is this circular and conceptually anomalous term doing in such a 
decision? 
Insight is inherently imprecise because, like many psy-terms, it refers 
to a state of mind which is inevitably invisible to the panel. As a result, it can 
only be discussed through reference to behaviours or utterances which are 
visible. Such visible conduct might include a failure to take medication, or 
unwillingness on the part of the service user to agree that she has a mental 
illness. But these behaviours are open to more than one possible 
interpretation. Non-compliance with treatment may indicate that the service 
user has (correctly) assessed that it is not helping her, or it may indicate that 
she is incapable of understanding that the treatment will help her. A failure to 
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agree with a diagnosis may be a symptom of a mental illness, but it may also 
be an assertion that the service user is fully aware of the possibility of mad 
interpretations being placed upon her utterances, but that she does not agree 
with this interpretation. 
So an assessment of insight is a complicated task since it relies on 
being confident of three separate things: that the behaviour or utterance being 
made is capable of indicating a lack of personal insight, that no other 
reasonable interpretation can be placed upon the behaviour, or, if other 
interpretations are available that these are less convincing than the preferred 
version and that reasons for this can be made explicit. In clinical practice, the 
assessment and engagement of insight may well form part of an ongoing 
therapeutic dialogue with the service user. By attempting to convince the 
service user of the correctness of her assessment, the therapist is also exposed 
to the different interpretation the service user has placed upon her own 
behaviour. Like most psy-terms, insight is not something of which a wholly 
objective assessment can be achieved, although there has been a trend within 
psychiatry to medicalise insight and attempt to define its absence, and the 
implications of this absence more precisely (David 1990). Insight, then, has 
some value as a classification of one visible dimension of psychotic illness; 
when the service user acts in a way which indicates that she does not 
understand that the world places an interpretation of madness upon her 
conduct. The difficulty the MIIRT has in engaging with this term is in 
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appraising the significance of such a slippery concept within their decision- 
making. This difficulty does not arise because panel members are incapable of 
understanding the slipperiness of the concept, but because the format of the 
tribunal and the demand that a legally binding decision be reached in every 
case is simply not conducive to ongoing dialogue. In this context we can see a 
discreditation logic very clearly at work. By employing insight in an 
undifferentiated fashion: the service user either has insight or she does not; the 
panel is able to effectively discredit the insight-less service user's own 
testimony about her life. This discreditation is not performed because of any 
underlying negative agenda, but simply because there are inherent internal 
and external constraints placed upon the tribunal which considerably weaken 
its ability to engage critically with testimony from mad people. 
6.7 Judicial review and the mad person as applicant 
There is no appeal mechanism from the MHRT but service users who wish to 
challenge a tribunal decision can make an application for a judicial review of 
the decision in question. However, a judicial review offers only a limited 
remedy in most circumstances. It can review the legality of the decision 
reached, but it cannot substitute its own decision for that reached by the 
Tribunal. The court is only empowered to quash the original decision and 
remit it to another hearing. In addition, the court is expected to review the 
case on the basis of the evidence available to the hearing at the time, and new 
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evidence cannot be adduced at the hearing, although in cases concerning 
Convention rights the power to assess the merits of the case will be interpreted 
broadly. 
6.7.1 Content analysis 
A brief content analysis cannot tell us much about the way in which the legal 
system in these cases responded to evidence from mad people. But it can help 
to describe the wider context within which individual decisions are reached. 
To this end, this section analyses all of the judicial reviews made of decisions 
reached by the MIIRT between January 1998 and January 2008. For the 
purpose of this analysis two databases of English caselaw were searched, 
LexisNexis and the JUSTIS Mental Health Law Reports. The terms MHRT 
and Mental Health Review Tribunal were both searched for in the casename 
field. The search identified 83 cases of which one involved the MHRT as an 
applicant, seeking a review of a Home Office decision. This decision was not 
included in the analysis. Of the remaining 82 cases 68 had been heard at the 
High Court and a further 14 had been appealed to the Court of Appeal (a 
complete list of all cases is provided as Appendix One). Breakdowns of the 
outcomes for applications for judicial review and for appeals from these 
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decisions are provided in Tables One and Two. 7 From this crude analysis 
alone it is notable that service user applicants are on average much less likely 
to be successful at first instance than other applicants, apart from their 
relatives, although they enjoy greater success on appeal. 
Review initiated by Applicant 
successful 
Applicant 
unsuccessful 
Total 
Service user 16 33 49 
Home Secretary 10 0 10 
Hospital/health authority 4 2 6 
Relative 0 3 3 
68 
Table 1: Applications for judicial review heard by High Court. 
7 It should be noted that where applications on similar facts were decided together these have 
been disaggregated. One case in particular; R (KB, NIK, JR, GM, LB, PD and TB) v. IMMHRT 
and Secretary of State for Health, should be noted because in this case (which concerned the 
time taken for an MHRT hearing to be arranged) all seven applicants were successful. If these 
seven applications are identified as a single case and the same is done with a linked claim for 
damages (R (KB, MK, JR, GM, LB, PD, TB and B) v TMHRT and Secretary of State for 
Health) then the figures appear considerably less favourable to service users as applicants. 37 
cases were heard relating to applications taken by service users of which just 4 were successful. 
To make sense of these numbers it should be noted that two of the applicants who were 
successful in the first time limits ruling suffered only minimal distress and were consequently 
not awarded damages. 
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Appeal taken by Appeal 
successful 
Appeal 
unsuccessful 
Total 
Service user 5 4 9 
Home Secretary 1 1 2 
Hospital/health authority 1 1 2 
MHRT 1 0 1 
14 
Table 2 Appeals from decisions reached by the High Court 
Overall the numbers are small, and the numbers of cases taken by 
classes of applicant other than the service user are particularly small. It is not 
possible to draw any predictive inference from these figures, but the broad 
pattern they display is nonetheless notable. The Home Secretary is always 
successful when challenging an MHRT decision at judicial review; service users 
are only successful on one in three or maybe one in four occasions (see 
footnote 2). In order to assess whether the courts treat service user and non- 
service user applicants differently it is necessary to look more closely at the 
form the rulings take in these cases and at the reasoning they apply. 
The largest single group of applications lodged on behalf of service 
users concerned the adequacy of the reasons given by the Tribunal for its 
decision (n=18). It was also the case that four of the cases taken by the Home 
Secretary concerned reasons for the decision. Twelve cases concerned the time 
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taken to organise a hearing, and whether or not this breached the service users 
Article 5 rights, and a further nine challenged the tribunal for failing to follow 
its own procedures either before or during a hearing. Seven of the cases taken 
by service users concerned natural justice, and raised problems such as 
whether the standard of proof (which is the civil not the criminal standard in 
MIIRT cases) is the appropriate one. 
The relevance of evidence is harder to assess. New evidence relating to 
the decision cannot be introduced to the court for the review, since they are 
not meant to review whether or not the decision made was correct, but simply 
whether or not it was reasonable or rational on the basis of the evidence 
available to the panel at the time. However, in R (Wilkinson) v. RMO 
Broadmoor Hospital [2002] the court held that it was appropriate, in cases 
involving Convention rights, to conduct a full merits hearing including cross 
examination of expert witnesses. The case in question concerned the decision 
to administer forced treatment. Even with this more stringent standard of 
review, the court held that the decision to administer treatment under 
compulsion was lawful, and the European Court of Human Rights later upheld 
the view that Wilkinson's rights had not been compromised (Wilkinson v. UK 
[2006)). The Wilkinson approach has only been followed in a small number of 
subsequent cases all of which concerned treatment decisions (R (PS) v RMO 
[2003], R. (B) v. Haddock [2006]). Merits reviews of cases concerning the service 
user's Article 5(4) right to a speedy determination of the lawfulness of her 
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detention are included in the reasoning in Wilkinson but they have not been 
performed in practice. None of the cases concerning MHRT decisions 
considered here adopted this level of review. Nevertheless in examining the 
adequacy of the reasons given by the MHRT for its decision the courts have 
had to examine the evidence available to the panel in question. It is 
problematic for the mad applicant that her evidence to the Tribunal will 
normally have been given orally and that it is therefore not available for the 
courts to review. Occasionally a statement made by the service user may be 
referred to by the court. But this occurs in only nine of the 82 cases considered 
here. By contrast statements made by psychiatrists are referred to in 33 of 
these cases. 
Simply describing the types of decision reached and the evidence 
referred to by the courts in reviewing MHRT decisions may be doing the 
courts in question an injustice. Overall only a small proportion of judicial 
reviews result in the original decision being overturned. Even the discrepancy 
between the high probability of success enjoyed by the Home Secretary 
compared to the low probability of success enjoyed by service users may be 
accounted for by the fact that the decisions questioned by the Home Secretary 
concern dangerous offenders with mental health needs and do not reflect 
decisions relating to mad service users as a whole. To establish whether the 
courts actually exhibit a consistent bias against accrediting the evidence of 
people as relevant and in favour of discrediting their accounts, it is necessary 
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to look far more closely at the substance of the decisions reached. Three 
specific subsets of these cases will be considered here: those in which the 
adequacy of the tribunal's reasons are challenged in some way; those in which 
it is asserted that the tribunal misdirected itself in deciding whether the 
service user's mental disorder was of a nature or degree to warrant continued 
detention; and those cases in which evidence of service user consent is 
adduced. 
6.7.2 Adequacy of reasons 
The tribunal is required to provide reasons for its decision (MHRT Rules, 
r. 23). Typically these reasons are provided on a pro forma, which will be 
circulated to everyone involved. However the MHR. T Rules allow the panel not 
to fully disclose their reasons to the service user if they feel that this might 
"adversely affect the health or welfare of the service user" (MHRT Rules, 
r. 24). Machin and Richardson (2000) sum up the findings of the case law on 
the MHRT's duty to give reasons as follows: 
"... in order to be adequate the tribunal's written reasons must comply 
with the following: 
(i) they must not merely recite the statutory criteria; 
(ii) they must deal with the substantive points raised; 
(iii) they must give sufficient material for the parties to know if an 
error of law has occurred; 
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(iv) they must make it clear whether they are dealing with the 
presence of mental disorder or the issue of risk; 
where there is a conflict of medical opinion it may be necessary to 
indicate why one view was preferred over another. " 
The cases from which these principles were derived were all decided in the 
1980s, and yet the adequacy of the reasons provided by the MIIRT for their 
decision continues to be the single most frequently raised ground for review. In 
some respects this is not surprising, since reasons will always contain elements 
of subjective judgment and will therefore always be more contestable than 
other aspects of tribunal practice. However, it is significant that when the 
Home Secretary and health or hospital authorities challenge the tribunal on 
the basis that it has provided inadequate or irrational reasons for its decision 
they are far more likely to meet with success than service users. In this 
sample, the Home Secretary won on all four of the occasions upon which lie 
challenged the adequacy of tribunal reasoning; hospital authorities won five 
out of seven `reasons cases' whilst service users won only four out of 18 such 
cases. 
In examining the cases in more detail, even more discrepancies come to 
light. There is a consistent thread in judicial reasoning that where a Tribunal 
is faced with conflicting expert accounts they have discretion as to which 
account to favour. Furthermore when the reasons stated for their decision do 
not seem to cover the facts, judges in some cases seem quite willing to `read-in' 
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justifications for their decision from the other evidence available to the 
reviewing court. The practice of `reading-in' sometimes favours the service 
user. In the case of D (R (Mersey Care NIHS Trust) v MHRT 2003]) a health 
authority had challenged the decision of the MHRT to discharge D on the 
grounds that the medical evidence available supported D's continued detention 
and that the reasons stated did not address all of the evidence provided. The 
court held that the reasons were themselves brief but adequate and that in 
any event it was possible to elucidate from the surrounding witness statements 
precisely why the Tribunal had reached the decision that it did. A similar line 
of argument was adopted in the case of W (R (Epsom and St Helier NHS 
Trust) v MHRT [2001h, in which it was held that it was possible to infer from 
the phrase `taken in the round' that the Tribunal had considered both the 
service user's past history and her future prognosis in deciding to order her 
discharge. However, in most cases where the adequacy of the tribunal's reasons 
are questioned by the service user, the practice of elucidating the 
reasonableness of the panel's decision from the surrounding evidence works 
against the service user's interests. Because the courts interpret the existence 
of evidence which could support the tribunal's decision as evidence that the 
tribunal's decision is reasonable (see Rv MHRT ex p. Manns [1999], R (N) v 
MHRT [2001], R(PTV) v MHRT [2002], R (CS) v MHRT [2004] and R (RD) 
v MIIRT [2007/). To give just one example, in the case of PIV the service user 
argued that the tribunal had been mistaken as to his legal status, and had 
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failed to distinguish between whether or not he had a mental disorder 
requiring treatment and whether or not he posed a threat to public safety, in 
reaching their decision not to discharge him. The court ruled that the reasons 
given were nonetheless adequate because it was clear that the decision they 
made could be rationally reached even had the MHRT been aware of the full 
facts. This was despite the fact that the error the tribunal panel had made was 
in assuming that PW was still required to serve a prison sentence upon 
discharge (the sentence had in fact expired, so an order for discharge would 
mean that he returned to the community) and that this error was clearly 
implicated in their reasoning because they stated that they were concerned 
that a return to prison would jeopardise his health. It is not hard to imagine 
that they might have reached a different conclusion with regard to discharge 
had they been apprised of the facts. 
This willingness to `read-in' the reasons which the tribunal should have 
stated is also not applied consistently. There are a number of cases where the 
court demands that the MHHRT explicitly justifies its decision in its statement 
of reasons, and is willing to issue a quashing order if reasons are not stated, 
even in cases where a reading in might be possible. The leading case in this 
area found that the guidance to tribunals: 
"... does not expressly state, but it does imply, that reasons must be 
given for the acceptance or rejection of disputed evidence, although it 
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is not usually necessary for these to be lengthy. " (R (Ashworth Hospital 
Authority v MHRT [2002] para. 78) 
This has been interpreted as requiring that where an account given by a 
medical expert is rejected, the tribunal has a duty to explain why (R (Home 
Secretary v MHRT (CH) [20051). There is no corresponding obligation upon 
the tribunal to explain precisely why it disbelieves the service user's account in 
favour of her doctors. Significantly, this strict approach to requiring that 
reasons explicitly state why one opinion has been favoured over another has 
only been followed in cases where the Home Secretary or health authorities are 
challenging the MHRT decision. In the case of BR (R (Home Secretary) v 
MHRT (BR) [2005J), it was clear that the tribunal had considered evidence 
from two medical experts, one of whom had recommended an absolute 
discharge, whilst the other had recommended a conditional discharge. They 
had ordered an absolute discharge, but had failed to explain in their reasons 
why they had not favoured a conditional discharge. The court held that the 
failure to consider a conditional discharge amounted to a misdirection and 
quashed the decision. The court appears to treat cases where the service user's 
account is treated as credible as particularly dubious. In the case of CH 20051, 
the tribunal had ordered discharge on the grounds that the service user had 
indicated that she was willing to comply with future treatment. They had not 
explained precisely why they had rejected the view of her treating psychiatrist 
that she should continue to be detained. The Home Secretary's application to 
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quash this decision succeeded on the basis that the tribunal had not explained 
why it had favoured the service user's own account: 
"... it is not sufficient for a Tribunal to say it prefers one witness to 
another. It follows from that it is equally insufficient that it appears 
from the reasons that they did so... they accepted the evidence of the 
service user as to the risk or lack of risk of her accepting medication, if 
discharged into the community, and implicitly rejected the views of her 
RMO and her nurse. " (ibid. para. 34) 
A similar line of argument was followed in the case of KW (R (KW) v Avon 
and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust [2003f), where the 
tribunal had concluded on the basis of their assessment of the service user that 
he was not suffering from a mental disorder, but had not explained why they 
disagreed with the views of his treating psychiatrist. 
Tribunal reasons appear to be inadequate if they either acknowledge 
the service user's account of herself as more credible than that of her doctor 
without saying why, or if they order discharge in circumstances where the 
Home Secretary or the hospital opposes discharge without explicitly stating 
why they have rejected all possible alternatives. By contrast, their reasons are 
likely to be construed as adequate in cases where a service user has challenged 
the decision in question and the court feels that on balance the tribunal 
probably drew the right conclusions even if it is not clear precisely why. It is 
notable that judges sometimes express regret if the consequence of deciding 
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that the tribunal's reasoning was adequate is that the service user will be 
discharged (see for example R (Epsom and St Helier NHS Trust v MHRT 
[2007] para. 62) and that they also express relief if they are able to reach a 
conclusion which will result in continued detention (R (KW) v Avon and 
Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust 12003] para. 22). 
6.7.3 The disjunctive interpretation of the `nature or 
degree' test 
There are further heads of review which exhibit discrepancies when 
applications taken by service users and those taken by others are compared 
and contrasted. S. 72(1)(b) of the MHA requires that the MIIRT discharge a 
service user where they are satisfied that she is not suffering from a mental 
disorder to "a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to remain 
liable to be detained". The meaning of this section was tested in R v. MHRT 
ex p. Smith [1998] where it was held that it should be read disjunctively; that 
is, that the panel may decide not to discharge if the service user's condition is 
of a nature, although not of a degree, which requires continued detention. In 
this case, which concerned a service user with a diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia, the judge held that whilst Smith's illness was not of a degree 
necessary to require detention since it was well controlled by medication it 
was, nonetheless, of a nature requiring detention since it was liable to recur if 
the service user was discharged and ceased to take his medication. The 
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problem of how s. 72(1)(b) is to be read is most likely to arise in cases where 
the service user in question has a diagnosis of a condition which is liable to 
relapse without medication and where there is uncertainty about whether or 
not the service user will continue to take this medication after discharge: 
compliance cases in other words. 
The significance of the nature or degree test has clearly not been made 
crystal clear to tribunal panels. Both Perkins (2003) and Machin and 
Richardson (2000), in their studies of tribunal reasoning, found that panel 
members frequently found the test difficult to apply. Problems with the phrase 
arise in subsequent case law. In this sample, the failure to apply the `nature or 
degree' test disjunctively was raised as a ground for review in four of the cases 
brought by the Home Secretary (R (Home Secretary v. MHRT (G) [2001], R 
(Home Secretary v. MHRT (PG) [2002], R (Home Secretary) v MHRT (DH) 
[2003], R (Horne Secretary) v MHRT (CH) [2005%). In all four cases the court 
ruled in favour of the Home Secretary. The issue of nature or degree is also 
raised in Smith (see above) and in two further cases brought by service users 
(R v. MHRT ex p. Moyle [1999], R (PLV) v MHRT [2002j). The judge quashed 
the tribunal decision under review in Moyle, but not in PW. However these 
cases differ considerably in the significance they attach to the distinction 
between the conjunctive and disjunctive readings. In the original judgment in 
Smith, the judge held that although the phrase should be read disjunctively, 
this distinction was primarily of academic interest since in most cases the 
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nature and degree of the disorder the person suffers from will overlap. The 
judge in the case of CS [2005] seemed to see the point similarly, he ruled that 
although the panel had misdirected themselves in this case by reading nature 
or degree conjunctively, this did not seem a significant enough error to require 
him to set aside their decision and order a new hearing. The decision was, 
however, set aside on the grounds that the reasons the Tribunal stated for 
ordering a discharge were inadequate. Similarly, in the cases of Moyle [1999] 
and G [2001], the issue of `nature or degree' was sidelined by arguments that 
the panel in question had misdirected itself in other more serious ways. In the 
case of PW [2002] where the applicant was the service user, the judge agrees 
that the reasons given by the panel fail to answer the question of `nature or 
degree' but rules that this failure is not relevant because there was agreement 
amongst the experts who gave evidence to the panel that P\V had a mental 
illness and that his discharge would pose a threat to public safety, that is to 
say the evidence supported the view that both nature and degree were present 
anyway. In all four of these cases, then, the issue of nature or degree is agreed 
to be relevant but not central to the decision reached. By contrast in the cases 
of PG [2002] and DH [2003] (both brought by the Home Secretary) the failure 
of the panel to apply the correct test was deemed sufficiently serious to require 
that a new hearing be conducted. 
All of these cases are remarkably similar on their facts, they all concern 
service users detained under a restriction order with a mental illness 
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(schizophrenia). It is hard to predict when the courts will find that a failure to 
issue a correct direction as to the meaning of s. 72(1)(b) will be of sufficient 
seriousness to justify a quashing order. At present, it looks like the argument 
will only be relied upon if other grounds for granting a quashing order are not 
made out. 
The problem with a disjunctive reasoning is that taken to its logical 
conclusion it allows the MHRT almost complete discretion over ordering 
discharge. Since all service users detained under s. 3 of the MHA will have 
received a diagnosis of a mental disorder, they could all be described as having 
a condition of a nature requiring detention. And, if a stable response to 
medication does not demand discharge, then the inclusion of `degree' in the 
wording of the law becomes largely irrelevant. Underlying the problems with 
this test is the problem of predicting how an individual is likely to behave in 
the future. Non-compliance is difficult to measure and difficult to assess 
(Travis 2002). It is also a term which does not have a stable meaning attached 
to it within medical and psy-system discourse. Indeed, it is now seen as an 
actively unhelpful way of characterising the problem of service users who 
choose not to follow treatment plans (Greene 2004). Consequently it is a term, 
like insight, which may lead to a wide range of interpretations and consequent 
instability within the context of MHRT deliberations. By determining that the 
phrase `nature or degree' is to be read disjunctively, the court has given the 
MART panel a way to avoid the issue of specifying just how great the problem 
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of non-compliance actually is. Provided the service user has a disorder of a 
nature which requires admission (and almost all service users will) the MHR. T 
is able to determine independently whether or not the degree to which the 
disorder is present is relevant. This reduces the burden on the MHRT to 
justify its reasoning. It is only necessary that they can assert that a risk exists 
for them to be able to order continued detention. By contrast, a conjunctive 
reading massively increases the burden on the MHRT to be able to point to 
the evidence (which will typically be ambiguous and highly contested) that 
could justify further detention. 
6.7.4 The meaning of consent 
Given the context of these cases the issue of service user consent is rarely 
raised. It is assumed that the service user consent is not relevant to the 
decision reached by the MHRT. However, in some cases service users raise the 
argument that an intervention in question is rendered either lawful or unlawful 
by dint of the fact that they consent to it. In R (SH) v MHRT 
, 
20071 the 
service user challenged a decision of the MHRT to maintain his conditional 
discharge from hospital. SH had been conditionally discharged for two years 
and adhered to the conditions imposed upon him throughout that period. The 
conditions included requirements that he take medication and that he continue 
to live at a specific address. When he applied for the conditions to be lifted the 
MART panel decided not only not to lift the discharge order, but also to add 
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further conditions on to those with which he was already complying. It was 
not contested that SH had been a model service user for the intervening two 
years, indeed SH had made a statement to the Tribunal in which he stated 
that "... if the doctors suggested that I stop the medication I would be 
concerned about this. " (ibid. para. 6). One argument raised by SH was that it 
was important that the condition that he comply with his medication regime 
be lifted so that he could demonstrate that he was willing and able to adhere 
to this requirement even without the threat of compulsion. He further asserted 
that the power of the MHRT to impose conditions upon discharge was limited, 
and could not be used to impose conditions which overrode his independent 
right to autonomously comply with treatment, and by extension his Article 8 
rights to respect for privacy. The judge ruled, however, that since SH had 
shown himself to be willing to consent to treatment the conditions in question 
could not be characterised as coercive and that in consequence they could not 
be deemed to undermine his fundamental rights. So in this case the presence of 
the service user's consent was used as evidence that the imposition of 
conditions upon discharge was not coercive, and did not consequently infringe 
the rights of service users. 
The presence of consent was reasoned to imply the exact opposite in 
the cases of G (R (G) v MHRT 12004]) and MP (R (Home Secretary) v 
MIIRT [2004]). G was a restricted service user who had been granted a 
conditional discharge. A placement identified for him as satisfying these 
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conditions fell through and staff at the hospital had suggested an alternative 
placement at a rehabilitation unit located within the hospital. In a hearing to 
monitor the progress towards meeting the conditions set by the MHRT panel 
it was decided that since the rehab unit was still part of the hospital, transfer 
to it would not amount to a discharge under the MHA and therefore this was 
not a move they could order. Since the Home Secretary opposed the move G 
was required to remain in his current unit. The case of MP was similar. MP 
had also been granted a conditional discharge by the MHRT and the 
conditions included a requirement that he reside at a specific address and not 
leave this setting unaccompanied. A setting which could comply with these 
conditions had been found, however, the Home Secretary successfully 
challenged this decision on the grounds that the conditions applied were so 
restrictive of MPs freedom that they amounted to a mere continuation of 
detention. Since the MIIRT did not have the power to order detention in 
another setting it followed that in this case it had acted outside its powers and 
consequently the decision was overturned (and MP was required to remain in 
the special hospital where lie was already a service user). Both G and MP 
raised the argument that they were willing to consent to the conditions 
imposed upon their discharge. And in both cases (which were heard jointly) 
the judge ruled that consent was irrelevant since neither service user was in a 
position to become a voluntary service user. The presence of consent did 
nothing to change the underlying fact of their detention. 
285 
In all three cases the reasoning applied to the issue of consent enabled 
the court to decide in favour of the most restrictive outcome. And in all three 
cases the point about consent is dealt with in just one paragraph. These 
decisions at the very least provide evidence for the view that evidence from 
service users is treated in a cursory fashion. But they also suggest an 
underlying systematic bias against accrediting the views of service users on 
their treatment as being relevant to the decisions made about them. 
6.8 Discrimination against mad people in case law 
There are a number of ways to make sense of this data about judicial reviews. 
It could be argued on the basis of these discrepancies that the court is 
fundamentally paternalistic or bigoted in its attitudes towards mad people. 
But this explanation is unsatisfactory because it does not explain why on some 
issues the service user enjoys a more than usual chance of success. Applicants 
who argued that delays in hearing their tribunal were unlawful were typically 
successful, 8 out of 11 applications on these grounds were successful (although 
seven of them were decided at one tied hearing). 
Another explanation is that service users are most likely to succeed in 
cases where the unlawful decision in question is easy to evidence, such as a 
failure to hold a hearing within a fixed time limit, and less likely to succeed in 
cases where the flaw in the decision is harder to evidence, such as where the 
tribunal panel have not expressly mentioned why they favoured one expert 
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account over another. However, it is important not to overstate the degree of 
success enjoyed by service users in applications taken on grounds of unlawful 
procedures. Service users lose consistently when they allege that the tribunal 
panel was biased (R (C) v MHRT [2003], R (PD) v MHRT [2004], R (M) v 
MIIRT [2006]) and when they allege that the medical member provided 
evidence to the rest of the panel and this rendered the hearing unfair (R (S) v 
MIIRT [2002], R (RD) v MHRT [2007J). In both these circumstances, the 
evidential problem is not that great, it is not that an appearance of bias or 
unfairness is not possible, only that the court has to decide what weight to 
attach to it. 
A further attribute which may influence the reasoning of the court, is 
the consequences which will follow from the decision reached. Ruling that an 
excessive delay in conducting a hearing was unlawful will not alter the fact of 
the service user's detention, although it will give rise to an action in damages 
under the Human Rights Act (R (KB, MK, JR, GM, LB, PD, TB and B) v 
MIIRT 20031). In contrast, as noted above, judges express anxiety about 
decisions which will result in a potentially vulnerable service user being 
discharged. Because the reviewing judge is making her decision upon the basis 
of a small fraction of the evidence, it is natural that she will wish to be 
circumspect in reaching her conclusions. But this conclusion still suggests an 
underlying bias: judges favour continued detention over discharge because they 
feel that more harm may result from a wrongful discharge than from wrongful 
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detention. However, only a small handful of cases will result in a judicial 
review leading to discharge (it would only occur in cases where a tribunal had 
ordered discharge and either the Home Secretary or hospital had sought an 
injunction preventing immediate discharge whilst a review is conducted; then, 
if and when the court finds in favour of the Tribunal, the injunction is lifted 
and the discharge goes ahead). In most cases where a successful application is 
brought by a service user the remedy favoured by the court is to quash the 
original tribunal decision and remit it for another hearing, which is a 
significant administrative burden but it does not implicate the court in any 
subsequent decision to order a discharge. 
Underlying these discrepancies in judicial reasoning lurks the problem 
of credibility. This analysis of case law indicates that the parties involved in a 
judicial review hearing are placed upon a ladder of credibility by the courts. 
At the bottom of this ladder are mad people and at the top is the Home 
Secretary, whilst the tribunal itself, health service providers and relatives of 
mad people stand on the middle rungs. All of these people enjoy a greater or 
lesser chance of influencing the court towards their way of thinking because 
their statements or utterances are mediated through a series of wider social 
understandings which affect the degree to which they will be heard. 
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6.9 Conclusion 
The function which mental health law exclusively performs is that of 
maintaining the social expectation that individuals will not be subject to 
arbitrary or unjust detention. The legal system, like all systems, struggles to 
define what an appropriate response to madness might be and as a result relies 
heavily upon psy-system operations in order to sustain an observable 
distinction between legally relevant and legally irrelevant madnesses. 
The problem this generates for mad people is illustrated effectively by 
the example of the MIIRT. A service user who seeks to appeal against the 
decision to detain her in hospital will face a sequence of challenges. One of the 
panel members will provide medical evidence about her condition which she 
may not be empowered to challenge. The evidence available to the MHRT 
panel will largely consist of medically accredited testimony and the 
unaccredited testimony of the service user, who is already believed to be 
mentally ill. And in reaching their decision, the panel may employ reasoning 
based on imperfectly defined terms, which cannot readily be challenged. If she 
wishes to seek a further review of the decision reached as a result of this 
process, she will probably be unsuccessful. Claims that the process was unfair, 
that the reasoning was inadequate or that the law was incorrectly applied are 
all unlikely to succeed. 
These defects can be comprehended by reference to the inadequacy of 
the legal definition of madness, the drive to discredit and the fragility of all 
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knowledge of madness (psy-knowledge may be weak but it is better than 
nothing). They are not the fault of individual actors, but a consequence of 
system operations which inevitably generate distinctions surrounding what 
constitutes information for their purposes. This raises a significant question. 
There is a growing body of references to the involvement of mad people in 
international legal documents, statutes and policy documents. But this chapter 
has demonstrated that the law, as it operates currently, plays an imperfect 
role in promoting the accreditation of mad people, and at times actively 
sustains their discreditation. Can the law adjust its operations to change this? 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
7.1 The ambitions of policy makers 
In a report published in 2004 the Social Exclusion Unit laid out its vision for 
reducing the degree of social exclusion mad people suffer: 
"Our vision is of a future where people with mental health problems have 
the same opportunities to work and participate in the community as any 
other citizen. This will mean: 
 s ommunities accepting that people with mental health problems are 
equal; 
  'people receiving the support they need before they reach crisis 
point; 
  4people having genuine choices and a real say about what they do 
and the support they receive in order to fulfil their potential; 
  q)eople keeping their jobs longer and returning to employment 
faster, with real opportunities for career progression; 
" recognition of the fundamental importance of people's 
relationships, family and caring responsibilities, a decent home, 
and participation in social and leisure activities; and 
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thealth and social care services working in close partnership with 
employment and community services, with fair access regardless of 
ethnicity, gender, age or sexuality. " (Social Exclusion Unit 2004 
para. 15) 
The Social Exclusion Unit then goes on to lay out its agenda for achieving 
these changes. The 27 point Action Plan they lay out is notable both for the 
types of change it demands, and the breadth of social institutions it identifies 
which will need to reform their practice. The following institutions are 
specifically identified in the Plan: children's social services, childcare providers, 
schools, local education authorities, careers advisory services, vocational 
training bodies, universities, job centres, volunteering agencies, small 
businesses, the welfare benefit system, local authority housing departments, 
housing associations, adult social services, health service providers, transport 
services, the police, the probation service, government departments, 
independent regulatory bodies such as OFCOM, the Legal Services 
Commission and the media (ibid. pp. 9Cr-110). But the theory I have outlined in 
this thesis suggests we have every reason to be circumspect about the 
likelihood of such an ambitious agenda for policy reform delivering meaningful 
change to people who have made mad utterances. 
As Chapters Two and Three outlined, Luhmann himself did not 
address the questions either of what madness is, or what the psy-disciplines 
are. I have argued that madness is characterised by utterances which appear 
292 
to lack a meaning content and to defy attempts to enter into chains of 
communication. Mad utterances are statements which can only be 
communicated about rather than with. Mad acts are those which cannot 
readily be explained by those who have carried them out or those who have 
observed them. Individuals who commit very extreme mad acts, or make 
multiple mad utterances may be deemed to be mad themselves, but it is 
crucial to remember that madness is only properly a characteristic of certain 
acts or utterances, and that the vast majority of things said by mad people 
remain comprehensible and therefore meaningful. As I argued in Chapter 
Four, the fact that mad people experience a high degree of social exclusion 
results from the fact that they experience a dual process of exclusion. They are 
often excluded from the operations of interaction systems because their 
conduct leads them to fall foul of the disdain/esteem code which operates in 
these systems to determine which actors are worthy of attention. And their 
utterances are further excluded from the operations of both interaction 
systems and social systems such as law, politics and the economy because their 
utterances are discredited in advance. In these cases the exclusion does not 
result from an assessment that the individual is not morally worthy, but from 
the needs these systems have to maintain their boundaries, reduce the 
complexity of their environment and manage redundancy. 
At the same time as this exclusion is observed, it is also notable that a 
powerful humanising discourse exists within our society which has made 
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pronounced efforts to redress the social exclusion mad people face and restore 
their dignity and their freedom to participate in society. But when the 
products of this discourse are examined closely a curious dissonance is 
observable. Whilst policies intended to promote the involvement of people 
with mental health needs in the decisions which affect their lives are 
widespread, their impact seems to be low, and the empirical evidence on the 
operations of these policies suggest that whilst the attitudes of those 
implementing them are often good, service users nonetheless continue to report 
that their efforts to achieve influence over these decisions are unsuccessful. 
Similarly within the legal system in England and `Vales there is a clear 
perception that one objective of mental health law is to allow mad people to 
challenge the wrongful application of the law. However, in practice we can 
observe that mad people consistently lose legal challenges to decisions made 
about their care, even in situations where their arguments directly parallel 
arguments employed successfully by other applicants. This dissonance can be 
explained as resulting from the powerful effects of discreditation processes. 
Even where an individual experiences esteem within interaction systems they 
may nonetheless be discredited by social systems. 
This leaves us with the question of what we can do with Luhmann's 
theory. King (2006) suggests that legal researchers have responded to systems 
theory in four main ways. The first has been complete dismissal. The second 
has been to use it in a normative fashion to indicate the direction the law 
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should take. King suggests that Paterson and Teubner's work on empirical 
legal autopoiesis provides an instance of this (Paterson and Teubner 1998). 
The third is to suggest a playful response which takes an interest in the new 
worlds of potential meaning the theory generates but does not take them too 
seriously (such as Teubner et al. 2002 p. 919), and the fourth (and the 
approach King takes) is to use systems theory to demonstrate the pretensions 
and delusions of those who would use the law to try to steer or control the 
operations of other systems. King is highly critical of all approaches other than 
his own. 
However, using systems theory as a technique for defining critique 
without engaging either playfully or seriously in debates about social reform is 
neither an inevitable nor a desirable position to adopt. King is right to assert 
that there are serious defects in the first three positions he outlines, but wrong 
to suggest that selecting not to make a selection or to define oneself as a mere 
bystander represents some kind of advance over these alternatives. 
7.2 What should one do with systems theory? 
It is true that Luhmann's concern was with what he described as a scientific 
description of society, and that systems theory is intended to be a 
-normative 
(Luhmann 1997 p. 17). Luhmann is scathing in his critique of humanist 
theories of society which he believes are founded in anthropocentric 
assumptions about the significance of individual common sense (ibid. p. 30). 
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And he argues robustly that humanist theories are inherently inadequate to 
the task of describing society because they start with an assumption about the 
ethical significance of the individual which is in itself a construction (Luhmann 
2002a). Systems theory, by contrast, calls the individual into question and 
explores how, despite a widespread belief to the contrary, human beings exist 
in the environment of society. 
However, in Luhmann's writings specifically upon morality it becomes 
clear that he also had a profound mistrust of the effects of moralising discourse 
upon society: 
"Morality repels, quarrels and impedes the resolution of conflicts 
- 
an 
experience that has resulted, among many other things, in the 
separation of law and morality. In any event, the function of morality 
is not determined adequately by referring to the need for social 
integration. Society, fortunately, is not a moral state of 
affairs. " (Luhmann 1995/1984 p. 235, my emphasis) 
Luhmann's observation that morality does not perform an integrative function 
for society is coupled with his view that the establishment of norms is always 
a local matter, specific to the system within which the norms in question are 
intended to operate. Even norms which are intended to function across the 
whole of society have to be established first within a discourse of fundamental 
rights or human rights, which may generate communication around these 
norms but which can never wholly direct the operations of other operatively 
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closed social sub-systems. Luhmann argues that observing the operations of 
the moral code in society is an empirical matter, and does not require taking a 
position on how that code should be operated (Luhmann 1996). And he makes 
a further suggestive point with regard to normativity in an interview he gave 
shortly before his death. When asked whether a theory of society which was 
not founded upon normative principles was possible he replied that he thought 
it was, largely for the reasons given above. But he also makes the point that if 
one defends a theory upon the basis that it is morally correct then one is also 
indicating that one's opponents are not merely incorrect but that their 
opposition is immoral or amoral (see Hagen 2005 p. 44). Whilst a minor 
consideration in relation to those above, this nonetheless suggests rhetorical 
reasons for Luhmann's refusal to engage with normative accounts of society: 
he felt that debate founded upon a good/bad distinction was unproductive. 
The problem of making normative assertions on the basis of 
observations founded upon systems theory is not that such assertions are 
wrong in any simple sense. It is that having accepted the logic of systems it 
can be difficult to see how normative claims can form part of subsequent 
communications, without ending up in petty entanglements over the direction 
society should take which fail to take into account how improbable it is that 
society ever will take the direction specified. The theory's greatest strength is 
also its greatest weakness; in providing a description of social order which is 
not defined in relation to a normative conception of the ideal society the 
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theory is able to provide a very satisfying description of society without 
beginning with the assumption that the operations of any one particular 
system are morally suspect. We can, for example, observe that the legal 
system obscures what mad people have to say to a greater degree than it 
excludes the contributions of other actors, without simultaneously challenging 
the moral legitimacy of the legal system. However, one then encounters a 
significant problem when one identifies an outcome that seems highly 
problematic, such as the exclusion from decision-making mad people describe. 
If the roots of this exclusion lie in the differentiation and boundary 
maintenance operations of social systems then can anything be done to redress 
this? And if it can what role can observers of this blind-spot play in bringing 
it to the attention of the legal system? 
In what follows I will conclude this thesis by arguing that systems 
research can aspire to something more than critiquing the efforts of policy- 
makers from the sidelines; that by observing the blind-spots of excessively 
ambitious policy-makers and law-makers it may still be possible to inform 
communication about more attainable and perhaps more meaningful objectives 
to pursue. 
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7.3 Systems theory and social reform 
Luhmann was not only sceptical about the effectiveness of policy reform 
measures but also about the possibility of social theory informing the work of 
policy reformers: 
"... we may ask again whether theories of this kind and this degree of 
sophistication can have any influence on the practical job of designing 
and modifying self-descriptions which are able to gain recognition and 
circulation outside of narrow intellectual circles. As a first reaction it 
seems safe to say no. " (Luhmann 1984, original emphasis) 
However, in the same article he goes on to observe that whilst theory cannot 
directly inform the first order activities of social systems such as politics and 
law, it is nonetheless the case that second order theories have historically had 
a considerable impact upon society. He cites the influence of Montesquieu, 
Kant, Marx, Freud, and Keynes as instances of this. And he points out that 
we cannot predict how and why such influence is attained, we can only 
retrospectively examine the circumstances in which certain theory 
formulations gained credibility and speculate, on this basis, as to the 
preconditions necessary for society to embrace a new theory form. Ile 
concludes that sociologists should not seek to achieve such influence by 
packaging their theories in palatable forms, but should instead use their 
position on the outside of society to reflect upon the conditions of their own 
self reference. 
299 
Not only is it impossible to determine in advance what influence 
systems theory either should or will have upon the operations of social systems 
at first order, but it is also difficult to see how systems theory can inform our 
understanding of the social world at second order. Whilst we can use systems 
theory to structure our descriptive account of the social world, the theory does 
not specify a necessary relationship between abstract theoretical constructs 
and first order data about the social world. And although Luhmann states 
that systems theory is consistent with empirical research (2002d), and even 
that an agenda for such research exists (1989b), he does not explicitly tell us 
what methods we should employ to analyse the findings of data about the first 
order operations of social systems. Luhmann merely observes the problems 
posed by systems theory for empirical research. He argues that all social 
theory is in effect the observation of the differences or codes being observed by 
those making first order observations from within a system. In the process 
social theories unsettle the `natural' assumptions implicit in first order 
observations. Marx, for example, demonstrated that there was nothing 
inevitable about class difference (Luhmann 2002e). Such observations can, 
therefore, have a radical impact upon society. The unpredictable consequences 
of unsettling established order may be what King means when he argues that 
to use systems theory as a `guide' to the best direction for law to take could 
have unforeseen and undesirable consequences (King 2006), but this is 
probably to grant social theories a greater influence than they are capable of 
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having in isolation. Utterances about law reform may or may not be 
structured around a distinction which is meaningful to the political system. 
They may be expressed in terms which enable them to readily enter into a 
political discourse about law-making; for example, the statement that a policy 
will be popular (or unpopular) with the electorate can readily be parsed 
according to the political code. But they may equally be expressed in terms 
which mean that the political system has to translate them before deciding 
whether to act upon them. A policy reform that will deliver improvements in 
terms of health or efficiency or public safety has to be transformed into a 
political distinction before a decision can be made as to whether or not to act 
upon it. This can mean that policy-makers appear highly resistant to learning 
from the findings of empirical research (see Peay 2003 pp. 169-70). Kane (2002) 
describes the limitations of the evidence-based approach to policy-making as 
resulting from a group of factors including the complex dynamics of policy 
making processes, the difficulty of evaluating evidence, and the fact that 
researchers and policy-makers belong to distinct communities which do not 
necessarily speak the same language. These difficulties could also be 
understood as arising from the different systems of meaning these practitioners 
are attempting to operate within. These problems are frustrating for 
researchers who can readily observe, at second order, the shortcomings or 
failings of first order legal or political communications about mental health 
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policy. But they also suggest that the danger of second order observations 
actually undermining the operations of the legal system is remote. 
Luhmann describes second order observations as inherently unstable, 
since the social world is not capable of carrying meanings which inhere. 
However, he does not view them as meaningless, since they can allow us to ask 
where the blind spot of the first order observer lies (Luhmann 2002a p. 74). In 
the case of the law, the question of what legal operations fail to observe is 
clearly a highly significant one. In his view however, what this creates is an 
endless recursion, since second order observations can be observed in their 
turn: "any attempt to designate a unity requires new distinctions and, in turn, 
renders the ultimate goal invisible" (ibid). Luhmann is writing here about the 
goal of providing a complete description of the natural world, which he decides 
is impossible, since the set of facts to be known about the natural world 
contains its own self-description, and thus is always incomplete. This paradox 
of observing systems has yielded some diverse strategies for employing systems 
theory to guide the analysis of empirical data about the operations of social 
and interaction systems. Paterson, for example, employs cognitive mapping 
techniques to analyse first order accounts of the impact of new regulations 
upon regulated actors in order to explore how the legal system's coding of the 
world corresponds or maps onto the codes of other systems (Paterson 2000 
pp. 67-80). Gibson et al. (2005) suggest that systems theory can be used to 
inform grounded theory analysis of qualitative data if some of the theory 
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constructs of the grounded theory approach such as `core categories' are 
reformulated in systems theoretical terms as `primary distinctions'. In both 
cases, the authors are grappling with the problem that with a theory as 
thoroughly fleshed out as systems theory, and one which is founded upon 
paradox and indeterminacy, the task of gathering and analysing empirical data 
about the world can seem irrelevant. And both authors agree that their 
approaches may allow systems theory to inform empirical research, but they 
do not allow empirical research to inform systems theory. 
So we have a triple dilemma. Systems theory can observe the blind- 
spots of policy makers, but cannot reasonably aspire to informing better policy 
work, because the theory is pitched at a level of abstraction which means that 
it cannot readily be transformed into information for the purposes of first 
order system observations. The analysis of data gathered through empirical 
social research can also be informed by systems theory and the resulting 
findings structured around systems theoretical distinctions. But these findings 
will only ever yield a second-order reconstruction of first order operations, and 
whilst they may observe some blind spots of the system, they will generate 
their own blind spots in turn. Finally, Luhmann's elaborate theory 
construction relies on the assumption of circularity and self-reference and 
cannot itself be informed or modified by the emergence of new empirical data. 
Leydesdorff (forthcoming) identifies this as a wrong turn in Luhinann's theory 
building, because by defining communication (for example) in such general 
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terms as to obviate the need for grounded empirical inquiry into the nature of 
communication, Luhmann cuts himself off from developing a more nuanced 
account of these crucial social processes and as a result undermines his own 
project of offering a scientific description of society. It should be noted that 
Leydesdorff locates this wrong turn as occurring specifically within the last 
stages of Luhmann's theory development and culminating in his final and most 
ambitious work `Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft' ('The society of society') 
(Luhmann 1997). 
To return to King's question: "what's the use of Luhmann's theory? ", 
none of the possibilities he outlines seem particularly attractive. However, a 
fifth possibility remains, which he does not explore. That is the possibility that 
in observing system blind-spots and by engaging (whether playfully or 
otherwise) in the building of new descriptions of the creation of social 
meaning, second order observers provide a degree of provocation which is 
capable of altering the first-order operations of social systems. Lee (2000) 
suggests that Luhmann is arguing for just such a conceptualisation of the 
value of second-order observation in `The society of society'. To employ an 
analogy which Luhmann favoured, we cannot expect our second order 
observations to steer the operations of other systems as a driver steers a car, 
but our observations might act like crash barriers, helping to refine the 
direction of traffic, and highlighting where efforts at steering have badly 
backfired. Systems theoretical research forms part of the environment of social 
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systems. As the legal and political systems respond to research findings, 
dismissing them or adapting to their conclusions, they move forward in new 
and inevitably unpredictable directions. 
7.4 Moving forward? 
So to conclude this thesis I will outline some of the ways in which the ideas I 
have outlined could be employed to provoke action within the legal and 
political systems. 
It is clear from the report quoted at the beginning of this chapter that 
there is a widespread acceptance that the degree of discreditation mad people 
suffer is socially problematic. Internally, social systems acknowledge this. For 
example, the exclusion of mad people from decisions made about their own 
care jeopardises therapeutic relationships and in the process undermines the 
achievement of the psy-system goal of securing recovery from mental illness. 
Similarly, the economic efficiency of the welfare system is undermined by the 
high degree of economic discreditation mad people suffer, and their consequent 
reliance upon welfare benefits to support themselves. However, the perceived 
goals of a policy affect the ways in which it is implemented by practitioners, 
and this in turn will determine its effectiveness. Currently policies which state 
that they promote involvement are messily organised and structured around a 
group of disparate values including allocative efficiency in healthcare provision 
(DH 2000), therapeutic effectiveness (DII 2004), risk minimisation (DH 
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1999a), the protection of fundamental rights such as autonomy and the 
achievement of empowerment and political justice (UN Convention on the 
Rights of Disabled People 2007). All of these documents are, or will be, 
intended to influence the operations of psy-system practitioners and others 
involved in promoting the welfare of mad people in England and Wales. And 
yet each of these underlying values marks a different distinction. The 
distinction between freedom and oppression on the one hand cannot be 
collapsed into the distinction between risk and public safety or between 
efficiency and waste in service delivery. The realisation of one value cannot 
automatically generate the realisation of another value. It is not feasible for a 
policy to be all things for all people. As a result current policies are not merely 
limited by the difficulty of steering the operations of other systems, but by the 
fact that there is a fundamental lack of agreement within the political system 
concerning which direction these systems should be steered in. 
Turning to the legal system, attempts to influence this system from 
outside are complicated by the fact that the legal system's operative closure is 
understood as one of its virtues. The legal system exerts a crucial influence 
over the effectiveness of policy. Bingley and Heginbotham (1999) describe how 
the mental health legal system in England and Wales has historically followed 
rather than led changes in public attitudes to mad people. This is not 
surprising when one considers that the legal system's function is to maintain 
expectations in the face of counterfactual evidence to the contrary. For as long 
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as society expected, for example, that people who had been diagnosed as mad 
would ordinarily live in long stay hospitals, there was no functional reason for 
the legal system to challenge lengthy incarceration as a practice. Once 
expectations shifted the legal system had to adjust to catch up. Currently, the 
legal system in England and Wales fairly consistently excludes the substance 
of most of what mad people have to say about their care from its operations. 
The system is instead structured around a small number of procedural 
distinctions relating to when and for how long mad people can be detained in 
hospital and who gets to make this decision. Mental health law also plays a 
small role in determining when compulsory treatment in the community may 
be lawful, but it says little or nothing about the rights of service users to be 
included in, or consulted upon decisions about their care. Even when the law 
would appear to offer mental health service users the opportunity to challenge 
a decisions reached about their care, for example at the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal, these forums, in practice, sometimes serve to exclude the very voices 
they were intended to facilitate. 
Discreditation of mad people is practiced by the legal system when it 
determines that, for example, they are not qualified to speak as the experts 
upon their own lives and that their evidence can only be mediated through 
psy-system experts. But it is the effects of discreditation across other social 
systems which sustain the legal system's current operations. Society as a whole 
tends to operate a crude distinction between mad/not-mad which is applied 
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indiscriminately to the utterances made by someone who has made mad 
utterances. The crudeness of the distinctions operated within the legal system 
thus appear adequate to the task of identifying and `protecting' the interests 
of mad people, and the wider expectation that individuals will be protected 
from arbitrary deprivation of their liberty is thus maintained. Efforts to 
achieve laws which reflect a more nuanced account of madness and promote a 
more sophisticated model of rights protection have to start by challenging this 
discreditation. 
By observing the exclusion of mad people from the legal system, and 
contributing to the perception that the legal system is inadequate, a systems 
theory analysis highlights the necessity of challenging the impact of 
discreditation across society, rather than expecting legal reforms to be in the 
vanguard of social change. Involvement policy is unlikely to effect much 
change from the top-down. But changes to the social order can and do arise 
from the bottom-up. There is evidence of a growing commitment amongst 
psychiatrists, mental health nurses and psychologists to promote possibilities 
for communication between service users and psy-professionals (Wadsworth 
and Epstein 1998, Repper 2000, Tee et al. 2007). And the role of service users 
in defining research objectives and refining the evidence base for healthcare is 
increasingly being promoted (Boote et al. 2002). Innovations like these are 
more likely than major programs for policy reform to deliver the changes 
which service users themselves state they want to see: 
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"I feel that no real progress will be made until givers of the services 
and users of the services can sit down together as equals and have a 
discussion about treatments and how they feel about each other more 
generally. For me one of the biggest frustrations in having a mental 
health problem is the way it is perceived by some as having the effect of 
making me unable to make decisions about what is best for me. "' 
(Antoniou 2004) 
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